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ABSTRACT 
The aim of this study is to investigate, examine, and 
establish the nature and process of labour migration from the 
Sudan for work in other countries, as well as to assess the 
causes of this labour movement, and its implications for the 
economy of the Sudan, the individual migrant, and non-migrant. 
Sudanese migration is basically to the Arab oil producing 
and exporting countries, and it is relatively recent. Although 
this migration is highly selective, it involves differen~ 
types of labour; . unskilled, skilled, highly skilled as well 
as employed and unemployed labour. 
This study has shown that the 'pull' factors of migration 
exerted more pressure on the movement of labour than the 'push' 
factors prevailing in the Sudan. The increased demand for 
labour in the oil countries resulted in higher earnings in 
these countries relative to those in the Sudan. Income. 
differentials between the Sudan and immigration countries, as 
well as fluctuations in the level of gross domestic investment 
in these countries are the most significant variables in 
explaining migration from the Sudan. 
The effects of this migration on the economy of the Sudan 
are not entirely positive. The country has been able to export 
some of its unemployed labour force and gain some foreign 
exchange through migrants' remittances. However, because of 
the rapidly increasing migration rate and the skill composition 
of migrants, significant labour shortages could occur to the 
(iv) 
extent of considerable output losses, if migration continued 
at the present rate and composition. The individual migrant 
and his family at home, however, are able to derive substantial 
monetary gains as a result of this migration. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
I:-J"TRODUCTIO~ 
- 2 -
1.1: Purpose and scope of the study 
The drastic increase in the international prices of oil 
in the early 1970s has brought many effects on the World 
economy. The analysis in this area. however, has been 
focused mainly on the adverse effects of the oil price rise 
on the advanced industrial countries, and the enormous 
accumulation of foreign exchange and reserves by the oil 
exporting countries themselves. The implications for the 
non-oil producing developing countries has received very 
little attention so far. The intention of this study is to 
analyse such implications, by focusing on one important aspect 
brought about by this oil price boom. In the countries of 
~~A, one of the changes brought about by the oil price boom, 
is the movement of labour from the non-oil to the oil producing 
and exporting countries in the region. Some countries in 
the region suddenly found themselves exporting labour to other 
countries in rapidly increasing magnitudes. Thus, the non-oil 
countries in the region did not only suffer a burden on their 
balance of payments as a result of this oil price rise, but 
~ere also subject to an outflo~ of their manpower. This 
labour outflow raises very important issues, namely what are 
the main causes of this labour movement, and ho~ is it harmful 
or beneficial to the labour exporting countries in the region? 
This study attempts to analyse such issues, referring 
particularly to the experience of Sudanese migration for 
\.-ork abroad. 
- J -
International migration of labour is liable to have 
implications for the individual~ different social classes, 
and the economy or society in general, both in the country 
sending labour abroad (emigration, home, origin, or sending 
country) and the country receiving these migrant labour 
(immigration, host, destination, or receiving country). These 
impacts, hOw"ever, would depend on ma;ny factors, among which 
is whether migration is permanent, temporary or seasonal. 
Migration is defined as permanent, temporary or seasonal 
depending on the legal status of migrants and the length of 
migration. Generally, temporary migration refers to workers 
who are recruited to work abroad for a specific period of 
time after which they are supposed to return to their home 
countries. Usually this period of migration is in years, 
and thus differs from seasonal migration ,.hich takes place 
during a certain season of the year. It differs from 
permanent migration in the sense that, the latter type of 
migration refers to migrants who settle abroad permanently. 
The net effects of labour migration, however, may be either 
beneficial or detrimental to the economy of the sending country 
and its development process; and in any particular case a 
detailed assessment of the consequences of migration and its 
motives is essential before deciding whether the outflow is 
excessive or not. The major objective of this study is to 
analyse the causes of labour migration and its implications 
for the economy of an underdeveloped country whose labour is 
migrating for work in other underdeveloped countries. That 
is to say, the emphasis is put on the implications for the 
- 4 -
economy of the country of emigration. While it is not 
claimed that the statistical techniques employed in this 
study represent radical innovation, it is the application 
of these to labour migration among MENA countries that 
represent the major contribution of the study. 
Recently, and especially in the 1970s, the Sudan has 
been subject to high migration rates of its manpower to work 
abroad, especially in the oil producing and exporting 
countries of ME~A. Although the extent and magnitude of 
this labour outflow itself is in question, the official 
statistics indicate that the number of official migrants, 
for example, in 1978/79 was more than 25 times higher than 
that in 197J/7~. This migration, moreover, seems to involve 
different types of labour - skilled, semi-skilled, unskilled, 
as well as employed and unemployed labour. This problem of 
labour migration from The Sudan has become one of the major 
policy issues in the country. The analysis of labour 'mobility 
in the country so far, however, has centred around internal 
migration, especially migration from rural areas to Khartoum, 
the capital city(l). International migration, its causes, 
implications for the economy and the individual migrant and 
non-migrant as well as its implications for the economic 
development process of the country, has so far, received 
very little attention. A comprehensive strategy for the 
economic growth of the country proposed by the ILO as recently 
as 197~ does not take this phenomenon of labour migration 
into consideration(2). Nor does the six-year plan of 
economic development for the period 1977/78 - 1982/83(3). 
- 5 -
The few studies which were undertaken recently, seem to 
suffer from the lack of data. A.A. Ali (1976), for example, 
analysing the migration of academic staff from the University 
of Khartoum to Kuwait concludes that(4l 
" ••• The migration of professionals to Kuwait 
is highly profitable for the individual, 
but mayor may not be profitable from a 
social point of view". P.17. 
His indecision seems to be rooted, apart from the narrow 
scope of his study, in the lack of data. 
It is thus the concern of this study to make a comprehensive 
attempt to explore, investigate and critically examine this 
phenomenon of labour out-migration from the Sudan. In doing 
so, the study aims at three major goals. Firstly to establish 
the nature, process and the extent of Sudanese migration for 
work abroad. Secondly, the study attempts to explain and 
examine the various causes and forces of this labour migration 
from the country. Thirdly, the study attempts to examine 
and critically evaluate the implications and consequences of 
this phenomenon for the economy of the country, as well as 
for the individual migrant and non-migrant, and the process 
of economic development of the country. It is only by 
careful empirical investigation of these issues, that sound 
economic policies towards migration could be developed. 
Although the study is meant to be as complete and 
comprehensive as possible, its scope is largely limited by 
the availability of data. Only recent migration, since the 
independence of The Sudan in 19)1) is covered in this study. 
HOw-ever, as will be seen later in Chapter Two, it is not only 
- 6 -
that early migration from The Sudan does not seem to exist, 
but significant migration seems to be very recent, and only 
took high magnitudes in the late 1970s. It is not only that 
the oil price boom itself is of a recent occurrence, but 
also the study has to cope with inadequate and sometimes 
complete absence of data, information and references. Therefore 
most of the analysis is confined to the 1970s. Moreover, it 
seems that Sudanese migration is basically to AOPEC, and 
therefore most of the analysis refers to this migration. 
However, since the study is meant to be complete and its 
main concern is with the economy at large, the study takes 
all types of labour - highly skilled, skilled and unskilled -
into consideration. Moreover, as is seen later, migration 
from The Sudan seems to be a migration of workers rather 
than family migration, and thus the study largely concentrates 
on the migration of workers or those counted as in the 
labour force. The analysis in this study is based on data 
from various sources. These include published and unpublished 
data collected from different departments of Sudan Government, 
as well as other national, international and other sources 
of data. To supplement the data from these sources, however, 
a survey among the Sudanese migrants was undertaken by the 
author. 
1.2: Plan of the study 
In pursuing the three aims of this study, the study is 
divided into five main parts, apart from this introductory 
chapter. Part One, which include Chapters Two and Three 
is meant as a background to the study. It is impossible to 
- 7 -
analyse the causes and consequences of labour migration 
without knowing the history, nature, process and magnitude 
of this migration. Thus Chapter Two, dealing with patterns 
of Sudanese migration, sets out to investigate the history, 
process and trends of this outflow. It is also impossible 
to analyse the effects and motives o£ migration without 
specifying the conditions existing in the economy at the 
time of migration. Chapter Three, then, sets out to examine 
and critically explain the situation of the labour market in 
The Sudan. Such an examination would help to assess the 
future supply and demand for labour in the country, and thus 
surpluses and shortages of labour. 
In order to analyse the causes and implications of labour 
migration more fully, it is essential to know what type of 
labour is largely involved in the migration process, for 
example, is it largely the skilled or the unskilled labour 
who migrate? Part Two which includes Chapters Four and Five 
is set out to investigate the socio-economic characteristics 
of migrants. Because of lack of data, especially in this 
respect, a survey was undertaken by the author among the 
Sudanese migrants in SA in April/May 1980. It is hoped that 
such a survey would not only reflect these characteristics of 
migrants, but also other aspects related to the phenomenon o£ 
labour migration. Chapter Four describes how this survey was 
planned and carried out. In Chapter Five, we attempt to 
establish the socio-economic and demographic characteristics 
of migrants from The Sudan. This would help to identify the 
- 8 -
type of labour that mostly participates in the migration 
process and compare their characteristics to the indigenous 
economically active population of The Sudan. 
Part Three, comprising Chapters Six, Seven and Eight 
attempts to analyse the effects of migration on the Sudanese 
economy. It would be impossible to obtain an exact quantitative 
estimate of the effects of migration on the economy, without 
constructing a complex and somewhat unrealistic model of the 
economy. Even if such a model was developed, it would not 
be possible to apply such a model to ~he Sudanese economy 
because of lack of data. It would be equally futile to 
attempt a proper cost-benefit analysis, for the same reasons 
of data absence. Therefore, instead, the approach followed 
in this study is to examine the impact of .migration on 
several macro-economic variables that are likely to affect 
the economy in general. However, to do so, one needs to 
establish the possible effects of migration. Chapter 'Six, 
then, while reviewing the existing literature on the implic-
ations of migration for the labour sending country's economy, 
presents a general discussion of these implications to 
identify such variables. Chapter Seven, empirically investigates 
the effects of Sudanese migration on these variables. It is 
generally hoped that remittances of migrants from abroad 
could provide foreign currency for the country, and therefore 
concentrated efforts have been made by the government to 
attract these remittances, without much attention to other 
aspects of remittances and migration. The net impact of 
remittances, however, usually involves a set of basically 
- 9 -
empirical questions, which Chapter Eight attempts to investigate 
and answer. 
Part Four deals with the motives of this labour migration. 
This part includes Chapter Nine, which reviews the existing 
theoretical and empirical approaches to the study of causes 
of labour mobility. In Chapter Ten, a simple model is 
developed to test the causes of migration from The Sudan. It 
is hypothesised that, although the economic conditions in 
The Sudan might have caused labour migration from the country, 
yet it was the conditions of the economies of AOPEC and the 
increased demand for labour in these countries which exerted 
the most pressure on labour movements. In this Chapter, this 
model is estimated to examine the causes of migration from 
The Sudan. 
Finally in the last part of the study, in Chapter Eleven, 
the main findings of this inquiry are presented, along with 
recommendations of some policies to deal with the pro9lem 
of labour migration from the country. 
Notes to Chapter One: 
(1) See, for example, M. E. Galale1din (1973) "Internal migration 
in The Sudan since World War IIj with special reference 
to migration to Greater Khartoum". Unpublished Ph.D. 
Thesis, University of London 197). Also, ILO (1976) 
"Growth, employment and equity: A comprehensive strategy 
for the Sudan" ILO, 1976; and A.S. Obrai (1977) "~Iigration, 
unemployment and the urban labour market: A case study of 
The Sudan" ILR, Vol. 115, ~0.2, March/April 1977; and 
- 10 -
A.S. Obrai (1975) "An analysis of migration to Greater 
Khartoum (Sudan)" World Employment Programme Research, 
Population and Employment working paper No.19, July 1975, 
ILO, Geneva. 
(2) ILO (1976) "Growth, employment and equity: A comprehensive 
strategy for The Sudan" ILO, 1976, Geneva. 
(3) Ministry of National Planning "The six-year plan for 
social and economic development, 1977/78 - 1982/83" 
vols. I and II, Khartoum, 1977. 
(4) A.A. Ali (1976) "A note on the brain drain in The Sudan" 
ESRC, Khartoum, Dec. 1976. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
PATTERNS OF MIGRATION 
------ -- -------
- 12 -
2.1: Introduction 
It is the main concern of this chapter to analyse and 
indicate the main trends in Sudanese migration for work 
abroad. This will enable us to clarify the phenomenon and 
advance hypotheses for the future course of the study. The 
available documentary information is analysed in more detail 
in this chapter to give some indication of this pattern. 
As a background to discussing the main trends in Sudanese 
migration abroad, international migration in MENA is discussed 
in Section 2 of the chapter. This is mainly to reflect the 
economic differences between MENA countries. This section 
was necessitated by the observation that Sudanese migration 
is mainly to the oil-producing countries of MENA. The 
remainder of the chapter presents the available documentary 
information about migration from The Sudan, and reviews 
existing studies in this respect. Thus, Section 3 deals 
with the historical and recent trends in Sudaneseenigration. 
In Section 4, the main destinations of Sudanese emigrants are 
discussed. In Section 5, migration channels are discussed 
and examined. In view of the serious underestimation of 
migrants by the documentary information, an estimate of total 
Sudanese migrants abroad is provided in Section 6. In the 
last section a summary and some conclusions are presented. 
2.2: On inter-Arab migration 
The discovery of oil in MENA is said to be the most 
important economic event in Arab economic history. This has 
led to countries of ~ffi~A being classified according to 
whether they produce and export oil or not. In some cases, 
- lJ -
these countries are classified as being "capital-rich" 
and "capital-poor" countries according to their oil wealth(l). 
According to Aliboni (1979)(2), however, today in MENA, 
there exist countries whose economy and finances are founded 
exclusively on oil, like Kuwait, Libya, SA, UAE and other 
Gulf states of Bahrain, Qatar and Oman. There are other 
countries, such as Egypt, Jordan, Morrocco, Sudan and 
Tunisia, with little or no oil wealth but with other resources·, 
notably in agriculture. There are countries which are major 
oil producers but which have other important agricultural 
resources, such as Algeria and Iraq. Finally there are 
countries such as YAR and YPDR which seem to be completely 
lacking in resources. However, in spite of the oil discoverY 
in some of these countries as early as the 19JOs, its export 
did not start until the late 1940s, after the Second World War(J) 
During the 1950s, oil revenues, although rising fast, were 
still modest, and only in some countries, like Iraq, the 
government started to get a 50% share of the oil revenue. 
Thus it was only in the 1960s, when oil revenues had accrued 
for some time and had begun increasing more rapidly, that the 
economic development of these oil producing countries began 
to take shape. At first this was at a relatively gentle pace, 
through the provision of social services and physical infra-
structure. It was in the late 1960s that these countries 
began to realise the oil revenues and undertake proper 
economic planning for the purpose of economic development(4). 
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It was the 1973/74 oil price rise, which allowed these 
AOPEC to accumulate huge amounts of revenue and undertake 
large investments, thus transforming the pace and scale of 
their development in the 1970s. In Saudi Arabia for example, 
oil revenues shot up from US~ 1214 million in 1970 to US~ 4340 
million in 1973 and US~ 22573 million in 1974(5), that is 
19 times greater in 1974 than in 1970. Such revenues allowed 
huge increases in development expenditure. The first 5-year 
plan of economic development in Saudi Arabia (1970-75), was 
'a modest' programme costing SR 56,223 million. The second 
plan (1975-80), and after the oil price rise of 1973/74, 
provided for expenditure of about SR 498,230 million, or 
nearly 9 times greater than the first plan. The third plan 
(1980-85), provided for yet more expenditure of SR 782,000 
mi1lion(6), i.e. nearly twice the second and fourteen times 
the fiI'St plan. Other AOPEC members are no different from 
Saudi Arabia in accruing huge amounts of revenue and spending 
considerably on development. In Libya, for example, the 
1975 development budget of LD 1.15 billion was more than 
seven times greater than the amount spent for that purpose 
in 1970(7). 
Oil revenues not only allowed the AOPEC countries to 
undertake huge development expenditure, but also brought 
marked differences among countries of the region. Table AI, 
in Appendix A, shows some economic indicators of MENA 
countries. The wide variation among these countries could 
easily be seen from the table. The table indicates that 
the oil countries enjoy a higher GNP per capita than non-oil 
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countries. Although lack of oil automatically places the 
country among those with lower GNP per capita, yet population 
size is also important in this respect. For example, Saudi 
Arabia although having the highest GNP, has a lower GNP per 
capita than Kuwait, Qatar and UAE because it has higher 
population. Sudan among non-oil countries, although having 
a higher GNP than the two Yemens, has a lower GNP per capita 
because of its population size. Nevertheless, oil seems to 
be a dominant factor in placing a country among the higher or 
lower GNP per capita groups. Moreover, oil countries not 
only enjoy higher GNP per capita than non-oil countries, but 
also higher growth rates in this per capita GNP. The growth 
rate in GNP per capita in 1970-77 in non-oil countries has 
been very modest compared to that in oil producing countries. 
Population on the other hand, had higher growth rates in 
1970-79 in the oil than in the non-oil countries. Although 
the high growth rates in GNP per capita in the oil countries 
could be attributed to the increased oil revenues, especially 
after 1973/74, the high population growth rates in these 
countries might be attributed to immigration into them. The 
table, furthermore, shows that, with the exception of Algeria, 
all oil countries have large trade surpluses. This surplus 
increased sharply in the late 1970s. On the other hand, all 
non-oil countries witnessed deficit trade balances for the 
whole decade, which continued to worsen each year. Such 
surpluses enabled the oil countries to undertake huge amounts 
of investment. It could be seen from the table that the 
highest growth rate in gross domestic investment was in the 
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oil producing countries. The real growth rate in gross 
domestic investment for the period 1965-77 in AOPEC was 
estimated at about 20.7% per annum, compared to 9.J90 and 
J.9~ during the same period for all developing countries 
and industrialized countries respectively(8). These huge 
investment programmes required labour which is not available 
domestically in these countries, and thus attracted migrant 
labour. In this way it is perfectly understandable that 
labour migration should have been established between the 
oil producing countries and those lacking oil. Moreover, 
because of the common language, religion, culture, etc., 
inter-Arab migration would be much easier than Arab migration 
to countries outside the region. Because of this, inter-Arab 
migration could be dated back in history. However, because 
of the recent accumulation of oil revenues and the recent 
development expenditure, inter-Arab migration seems to be 
very recent, or as put by Bouhdiba (1979): 
"Paradoxically inter-Arab lJligration has ancient 
origins and yet is very recent". (9) 
However, despite the importance of oil as a revenue 
source for the governments in these countries, yet it was the 
construction sector, services, trade and other sectors which 
provided employment for both nationals and migrants in AOPEC. 
In Kuwait, for example, according to its 1975 population 
census, out of employed persons of 298415, the services sector 
provided employment for 5J.7rc (about 46.l~{; of the immigrants 
and 72.J~ of the nationals), the trade sector provided 
employment for IJ. J~~, the construction sector 10. 8~0, while 
the oil sector provided employment for only 1.6~ (1.5 e of 
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migrants and 2.0% of nationals)(lO). The same features of 
employment seem to exist in other oil producing countries. 
For example, the oil sector is said to employ 1.3% employees 
in Saudi Arabia (1970), 1.29{ in Libya (1972), 4.0% in UAE 
(1968) and 0.63% in Iraq (1972)(11). On the other hand, 
in 1975-76, the construction sector is said to have provided 
employment to nearly 42.2% of migrant labour in seven AOPEC(12). 
Migration being mainly from the non-oil countries to 
AOPEC could easily be seen from Table A2 in Appendix A. The 
table shows that about 70% of immigrant labour in AOPEC in 
1975 was provided by ten other Arab countries in the region. 
The most important labour exporters seem to be Egypt, YAR 
and Jordan. These are followed by YPDR, Syria and The Sudan. 
The Maghreb countries of North Africa (Morocco and Tunisia) 
provide the least immigrants to the region and noticeably to 
neighbouring Libya. These two countries, plus Algeria -
which is not an important receiver of migrants - have' 
noticeably large numbers of migrants in Europe, especially 
in France and West Germany, compared to other Arab countries, 
and they seem to have a long history of migration to Europe(13). 
The table shows, furthermore, that nearly half of total 
immigrants in the region are in Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia 
is followed by Libya, UAE and Kuwait as receivers of migrants. 
However, Arab migration seems to be basically to Saudi Arabia 
and Libya (800.( of all Arab migrants are in these two countries), 
while non-Arab migration seems to be basically to the Gulf 
States. This is probably because of the effect of distance 
on migration. Such a hypothesis is supported by the near 
absence of Asian migration to Libya, and the absence of 
- 18 -
migrants from the Maghrib countries in Saudi Arabia and 
the Gulf States. 
Migration to the AOPEC, however, seems to have increased 
considerably in the second half of the 1970s. In 1972/73, 
there were about 900,000 foreign workers in MENA, of whom 
about 650,000 originated in other Arab countries(14). By 
1975, the figure rose to nearly two million (Table A2), i.e. 
an increase of 897,900 immigrants or about 99.8~~ increase in 
about three years. Although there is no concrete statistical 
evidence, it is quite possible to make the general statement 
that labour migration to the region has increased substantially 
since 1973. In the countries of origin, such an increase 
in labour emig~ation, although at different rates in different 
countries, could represent a considerable drain on the 
domestic labour force, with serious implications for the 
economies of these countries. In the remainder of this study, 
we attempt to assess the causes and implications of this 
migration for the Sudan. 
2.3: Patterns of Sudanese emigration 
As indicated in the above section, labour migration in 
MENA in general seems to have accelerated in the 1970s, 
after the AOPEC started to make use of their oil revenues 
for the purpose of economic development. Thus, it is not 
strange to find that Sudanese migration for employment 
abroad started only recently. Although Sudanese emigration 
was dated to the 19th century(lS), that type of migration 
was not for work, insignificant and unrecorded. Such 
migration refers to migration to Saudi Arabia for the purpose 
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of Haj or Omra (Pilgrimage), and was not on a large scale, 
unlike the recent migration for employment. Therefore we 
are concerned here only with recent migration after 1956. 
Recent migration from The Sudan seems to have started with 
some significant numbers only in the late 1960s. In the 
1960s, migration from The Sudan started by official secondment 
of Sudanese, especially teachers and nurses, for work in 
Libya, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States. These were few 
in numbers and largely unrecorded. The available statistics 
about the number of Sudanese migrants date back only to 
1968/69. Data on Sudanese migration, as is the case in 
many developing countries, is very difficult to find and 
evaluate. The available data not only suggests that the 
phenomenon is a recent one, but also that the pattern and 
numbers involved in migration are changing rapidly. Table 
2.1 below gives some indication of this. 
Table 2.1: The number of migrants through the labour 
department, Khartoum, 1968/69 - 1978/79 
Year 68/ 69/ 70/ 71/ 72/ 73/ 74/ 75/ 76/ 77/ 78/ Total 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 
No. 901 425 770 446 432 364 876 1962 1856 6204 9390 23626 
cv.(a) 
-
-52.8 81.2 -42J. ~J.l -15.7 140.7 124.0 -5·4 234.3 51. 4 -,c 
I 
N.B.(a) ~ is the annual rate of change (%). 
Source: Dept. of labour "annual report" different years, and 
"The Economic Survey" of The Ministry of Finance and 
National Economy, Khartoum (different years). 
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The number of migrants ~ach year, as indicated by the 
table, seems to be very small. However, there are many 
indications that the statistics of the Labour Department 
tend to understate the number of migrants as is shown below. 
The table, in general, shows the rapidly increasing number 
of migrants, especially after the mid 1970s. The number 
increased by about 26 fold since 1973/74. With the 
relatively small urban labour market in the Sudan, such 
rapidly increasing migration might indicate a serious problem 
for the country. This, however, would depend on the nature 
of migration, the type of labour involved as well as labour 
market situations in the country and other issues to be 
discussed in the subsequent chapters of this study. The 
table, however, shows a negative rate of annual increase, 
especially in the early 1970s, and in 1976/77. Since data 
in the Table reflects official migration, this could. be 
affected by political relations between The Sudan and, the 
recipient countries. This would indicate that a fall in 
the number of migrants could be attributed to political 
relations rather than being an indication of an actual decline 
in migration, especially if we note the unstable political 
relations in ~~A. In July 1976, for example, there was 
the attempted coup in The Sudan, after which political 
relations with Libya were completely cut off, and no official 
migration to Libya was allowed from The Sudan. This might 
explain the fall in the number of official migrants in 
1976/77 as in the table. In the early 1970s, however, 
political relations between Sudan and Saudi Arabia as well 
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as other Gulf states, although not cut off, were cool, 
especially after the May 1969 revolution in The Sudan. 
It remains to say that the figures in the above table 
represent the number of migrants in whose migration process 
the Labour Department was involved i.e. official migration. 
In this sense, it understates the number of migrants for 
the following reasons. 
(1) not all types of labour necessarily go through 
the Labour Department. 
(2) It does not include those who migrate on official 
secondment. 
(3) It does not include those who migrate illegally or 
unofficially from The Sudan. 
The involvement of the Labour Department in the migration 
process is made clearer when we discuss migration channels 
below (Section 2.5). However, it is important to note that 
the number of illegal migrants from The Sudan could be 
substantial and should have its weight in a region with common 
language, religion, culture, etc., like MENA. According to 
our survey among Sudanese migrants in Saudi Arabia, we 
estimate that the Department of Labour was involved in the 
migration of only about 30% of migrants in the sample 
(Section 2.6). 
If the Department of Labour statistics have such 
limitations, could we find other sources about numbers of 
migrants? Another indication about migration from The Sudan, 
-is the number of degrees and certificates endorsed and 
authorised by the Department of Education, the Labour Department, 
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and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to enable issue of 
visas facilitating entry to another country. These are 
shown in Table 2.2 below: 
Table 2.2: Educational documents and technical qualifications 
authorised by the Department of Labour, Khartoum, 
1971/72 - 1975/76. 
Year 1971/72 1972/73 1973/74 1974/75 1975/76 Total 
No. 395 568 1921 3966 13942 20792 
0/0 1.9 2.7 9.2 19.1 67.1 100.0 
Source: Department of Labour "Annual Report 1976/77" Khartoum, 
1977· 
The number of documents endorsed increased considerably 
over the period under consideration, as indicated by the 
table. If all those having their documents endorsed migrated, 
this would clearly indicate a very rapid increase in the 
number of migrants over the period. However, it is not 
necessarily the case that every one who had his certificate 
endorsed had actually migrated. ' This is the first step 
towards migration, and he could fail in any subsequent step. 
Having endorsed his certificate, the person would start looking 
for a work contract either in The Sudan - at foreign countries' 
missions for example - or abroad, and then he would migrate, 
given the chance. However, it should also be noticed that 
these figures include only those who have endorsed their 
certificates. It completely ignores those who do not have 
a certificate i.e. it reflects skilled labour migration. 
However, even here, it does not include those who migrate 
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without endorsing their certificate. In this way, these 
figures also understate the numbers of migrants. However, 
it was widely believed that such a process of endorsing 
certificates encourages illegal migration from the country, 
and thus it was stopped in October 1976(17). 
It is equally difficult to obtain information about 
the number of Sudanese migrants in any of the destination 
countries. Apart from being unreliable, such statistics are 
hardly released. However, the available statistics give 
the same indication that Sudanese migration abroad has been 
increasing at a rapid rate. Table 2.3 below shows residence 
permits issued to Sudanese in Saudi Arabia. 
Table 2.3: ~umber of residence permits issued to Sudanese 
in Saudi Arabia 1973-1977. 
Year 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 
No. of 
residence 
permits 2127 43 4 ) 3338 8953 15892 
As % of 
total (a) 1.3 2·7 1.5 2.1 3·0 
N. B. : 
-
(a) Residence permits issued to Sudanese as % of total 
permits issued to foreigners in Saudi Arabia. 
Source: Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Ministry of Finance and 
National Economy, Central Department of Statistics 
"Statistical Yearbook" Riyadh, 1978, and other years. 
The table, although referring to a short period of time, 
clearly indicates a very high rate of change in the number 
of residence permits issued to Sudanese in Saudi Arabia. 
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Between 1973 and 1977, these permits increased by 647~, 
a quite considerable increase. The table, however, indicates 
that Sudanese migrants in Saudi Arabia make a small proportion 
of total immigrants to this country. Although this number 
is small, yet, it refers to migrants in one country, and 
probably has its significance for the Sudanese economy. In 
comparison to Table 2.1, this table shows that residence 
permits issued in Saudi Arabia are much higher than official 
emigration through the Labour Department in Sudan. Over the 
same period migrants through the Labour Department accounted 
for only 34~o of total residence permi ts in Saudi Arabia. 
This might reflect the extent of illegal migration from the 
Sudan, and the little involvement of the Department of Labour 
in the migration process. However, it should be pointed out 
that residence permits would include wives and children as 
well as migrant workers, while the Labour Department statistics 
would refer only to migrant labour. However, given the facts 
that these residence permits are for migrants in Saudi Arabia 
only while Labour Department statistics refer to total 
migrants, and that immigration countries discourage families 
from accompanying migrants, one could attribute the difference 
between the two sources of statistics to migrants migrating 
through channels other than the Labour Department, rather 
than only to the effect of inclusion of dependents and 
families. Moreover, apart from excluding illegal migrants 
in Saudi Arabia in Table 2.3, it was claimed that the Saudi 
data usually tends to understate the number of migrants, 
because the government wishes to minimize the dominance of 
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foreign labour within total(18). Thus again this source 
would tend to underestimate the total number of migrants. 
2.4: Main destinations 
Data on Sudanese working abroad by destination country 
is more difficult to obtain and evaluate. The available 
estimates clearly suggest that Saudi Arabia is the leading 
receiver of Sudanese migrants. This is not strange, since 
we have already seen the dominant role played by Saudi Arabia 
as immigrant receiver in the whole region. Table 2.4 below 
gives some indication about Sudanese migrants in each 
destination country. However, because of the nature of 
migration, that it is largely unrecorded and involves a large 
element of illegal migration, the table refers to some 
estimates based on different studies of migration and refers 
to different years. Thus, along with discussing migrants' 
destinations, we review these studies. 
The table, based on data from different studies, shows 
various estimates of the number -of migrants abroad. This is 
because, apart from referring to different years, these 
studies use different methods of estimation. These studies 
are discussed below, in the meantime, however, it is 
interesting to compare destination ranking of all these 
columns. All these studies rank Saudi Arabia and Libya as 
the major destinations of Sudanese migrants. More than 80* 
of migrants are in these two countries. Moreover, with the 
exception of column (1), which refers to an early date, 
Saudi Arabia is ranked as the major recipient of Sudanese 
migrants. Some 600.;- to 70o/c of migrants are estimated to be 
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Table 2.4: Number of Sudanese migrants abroad by destination 
country (different years) 
1968/69 1971/72 1975 1977 1978 
(1 ) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Destination No. % No. ~ No. ro No. ro No. 
Bahrain 46 5·1 154 200 0.4 200 0.6 100 
Iraq 14 1·5 14* - - -
Jordan 21 2·3 29 300 0.6 300 0.8 300 
Kuwait 23 2·5 293 
1
2000 4.0 2000 5.E 3500 
Lebanon 9 1.0 29 I 300 0.6 300 0.8 500 
Libya 476 53 5551** 
1
7000 14 8000 23 20000 
Oman 
- -
500 1.0 150 0.4 1800 
Qatar 1 0.1 83 ! 600 1.2 600 1. 7 2500 
% 
0.1 
0.2 
1.9 
0·3 
11 
1.0 
1.3 
S. Arabia 300 33 1666* 35000 71 ;22000 62 140550 75 
Syria - 13 - - -
~AE 10 1.1 143* 3000 6.1 20005.6 112000 6.4 
!yAR 1 0.1 78 - - 800 0.4 
Others 3 0·3 712 500 1.0 - 4300 2·3 
Total 905 100 8756 49400 100 35500 10C 186350 100 
Notes: (a) *as in 1970/71 
(b) ** as in 1974 
(c) No % is given in co1~ (2) because of difference 
in years as in note (a) and (b) above. 
(d) - indicate no migrants are recorded. 
(e) Columns (1) and (2) refer to the flow of migrants 
during the given year, while other columns refer 
to the stock of migrants abroad by the given year. 
Sources: Column (1), Department of Labour, Khartoum,Annual 
Report, reflecting official migration. 
Column (2), H.O. Beshir (1977) 
Column (3), J.S. Birks and C.A. Sinclair (1980) 
Column (4), Estimates provided by the Labour Department, 
Khartoum. 
Column (5), M.E.Ga1a1e1din (1979). 
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in Saudi Arabia. Other countries enter with varying 
degrees of importance, notably Kuwait, UAE and Oman. 
Column (1), based on the official Department of Labour 
statistics, would tend to understate the number of migrants 
as discussed in Section 2.3 above. Moreover, unlike the 
other columns, this column refers to the flow of migrants, 
i.e. persons migrating from Sudan during 1968/69. This 
column, however, shows that Libya was the major receiving 
country for Sudanese migrants rather than Saudi Arabia. 
Possibly with the relatively late economic planning in Saudi 
Arabia, early official migration was mainly to Libya. When 
the Department of Labour attempts to take illegal migration 
into account and provide an estimate of the stock of migrants 
abroad, as in column (4), they produce a much higher estimate 
of total migrants abroad, and they rank Saudi Arabia as the 
major recipient of migrants. However, without their method 
of estimation being known, nothing very much could be' said 
about these estimates. 
Column (2), based on M.O. Beshir's study of the un-
employment problem in The Sudan(19), apart from not mentioning 
the source of the data, numbers of migrants in different 
countries are not comparable because they refer to different 
years. For example, estimates of migrants in Saudi Arabia 
are for 1970/71, while those in Libya are in 1974. Such 
a time gap would not allow comparison, and therefore we 
exclude these estimates altogether. 
Data in columns (3), (4) and (5) refer to the stock 
of migrants, and thus they are more comparable, although 
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they refer to different years. The three studies almost 
produce the same ranking of receiving countries. They 
differ, however, in the numbers involved in migration. 
Gaaleldin estimates in column (5), seem to be highly inflated 
relative to the others. An estimate of 140,550 Sudanese 
migrants in Saudi Arabia alone would suggest that Sudanese 
migrants dominate the labour market in this country. His 
estimates seem to be inflated because of the high rate of 
illegal migration, 80%, he assumes. Moreover, these 
estimates include wives and children of migrants abroad. 
However, it is believed that these are not high enough to 
make all this difference in the numbers involved in migration. 
The problem seems to lie in the method of estimation. For 
example, the study takes the number of migrants in Saudi 
Arabia through the Labour Department as high as 22,000 in 
1977, then applying an illegal migration rate of 80o/c and 
adding an estimate for migrants remaining in Saudi Arabia 
after the Pilgrimage in 1977, thus obtaining a high estimate 
of migrants in Saudi Arabia in 1978. However, the Labour 
Department's figure is an estimate, as in Column (4), and 
it is not the actual number of migrants through the Department. 
Thus, the wrong base of data, and the high illegal migration 
rate, make these estimates very dubious. 
Estimates provided by Birks and Sinclair(20) in column 
(3), seem to be more reasonable, although they may under-
estimate the number of migrants. The estimate is based on 
official sources either in The Sudan or in the receiving 
countries, or both. This doubt is realized if we notice that 
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the projected outflow of migrants between 1975 and 1985, 
according to them, amounted to about 10,000 migrants. 
Table 2.1 above shows that official migrants through the 
Labour Department in 1978/79 alone amounted to nearly this 
number. 
It is left to point out that estimates in columns (4) 
and (5) do not include the estimated number of migrants 
reported to be in Egypt. These are estimated to be about 
40,000 according to column (4) and about 45,000 according to 
column (5). Although we do not deny the existence of Sudanese 
migrants in Egypt, it seems that these estimates tend to 
exaggerate these numbers. For example, estimates in column 
(5) are based on the 1960 population census of Egypt. These 
seem to be highly inflated, since the 1976 population census 
in Egypt gives the number of Sudanese in Egypt as 9,521 
Only(2l). Even if we apply an underenumeration rate of 50~ 
as the study in column (5) did - and there is no reason for 
such a high rate - the number would rise to 19,042, a much 
lower estimate than that provided by the study, whatever 
the rate of increase it takes for the population. With 
Egypt itself being the major labour exporter in the region 
(Table A2), it is more difficult to accept a high estimate 
for the Sudanese in Egypt. 
In general, it seems that the main destinations of the 
Sudanese migrants are Saudi Arabia and Libya, with Saudi 
Arabia clearly being the major recipient of migrants. 
Moreover the discussion has shown how difficult it is to 
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obtain reliable information about Sudanese migrants in 
destination countries, and therefore any conclusions drawn 
upon such studies should be taken cautiously. 
2.;: Migration channels 
Migration could be regulated in either origin or 
destination countries or both. This section attempts to 
identify some of 'these regulations, particularly the official 
channels through which migrants are supposed to migrate for 
work. 
According to regulations in The Sudan, officially 
migration of Sudanese to work abroad should take one of the 
following forms(22) 
(a) Group contract: This happens when an employer from 
abroad or his representative approaches the Labour 
Department in The Sudan to employ Sudanese abroad. 
In this case the employer or the Labour Department 
would advertize for the required jobs and choose 
the required Labour from the applicants. 
(b) Individual contracts: This happens when an individual 
obtains a job contract from abroad in his own way. 
The Labour Department approves the contract in this 
case and endorses it for travel abroad. 
(c) Official secondment: This happens through the 
Department employing the worker in The Sudan, and 
the Labour Department has nothing to do with this. 
In both (a) and (b) the worker is required to prove that, 
either he is unemployed, self-employed or could be released 
by his present employer in The Sudan, as well as other minor 
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conditions of good reputation, good health condition, valid 
passport, etc. This process, however, applies only to those 
who migrate with a work contract. It excludes all those who 
go abroad for a visit, pilgrimage, those who migrate to other 
countries and then to final destination, etc. A considerable 
number of those who leave the country with the declared 
purpose of study abroad, medical treatment, visit, etc. 
finally end up taking employment abroad, and the Labour 
Department would have no knowledge of them. The whole process, 
however, suggests that the Labour Department has little 
influence on the migration process. It has no say in type (c), 
or those who migrate through other channels. It has a little 
say in type (a) and very little say in type (b). In type 
(a), the Department has to meet the requirement of the 
employer abroad. Moreover, it does not seem to have a list 
of names, or so, from which to select migrants, but the 
process seems to work on the basis of a 'first come first go' 
system. In type (b) migration, the Department is even less 
effective in influencing migration, since work contracts are 
usually sent in the name of the potential migrant, and as 
long as the individual could satisfy the other minor conditions, 
the Department would have no objection to his travel abroad. 
In the emigration countries, there is the same type of 
work visas(23). There is the collective immigration of labour, 
or group contract, in which the number of imported workers is 
a minimum of 23 workers. There is also individual contracts 
if the number of imported labour is less than that. Rules 
governing immigration into destination countries seem to be 
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almost the same in all immigration countries. Imported 
workers for the government ministries and departments are 
recruited mainly through the government missions abroad. 
In the private sector, any individual employer seems to be 
allowed to import any amount of labour.as long as he can 
satisfy certain conditions stated by the Labour Department 
in his country. In UAE, for example, any citizen could 
import labour on collective or individual bases as long as 
he submits written evidence to the Ministry of Labour and 
Social Affairs (in UAE), that his business justifies bringing 
the number and type of workers required; that he assumes 
responsibility for the person or persons he brings into the 
country; and that he would return the worker to his original 
country after the completion of the work contract. Moreover, 
regulations usually prohibit foreign workers from changing 
employers during the term of their contract without the 
consent of their original employer who imported them and the 
Department of Labour. Illegal migration might be encouraged 
by the possibility that some employers might attempt to avoid 
costs of importing and returning migrant workers to their 
countries of origin. This again might be more possible 
because illegal migrants usually work for lower wages than 
others. In practice what is important to the Labour Department 
in these countries is that the employer who imports labour 
should assume responsibility for them, a system known as 
"Kaffeel" • As long as the migrant worker has a "Kaffeel", 
then he should have no problem, thus in some cases employers 
abroad would sell work visas to migrants. The employer in 
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this case would import labour, stand as 'Kaffeel' for them, 
and give them his consent to find employment with other 
employers, if the worker would pay some amount of money to 
him. The migrant would agree to such illegal activities in 
the hope that he might gain from his migration and in the 
fear of being deported back home if he did not obtain the 
consent of his 'Kaffeel' to work with other employers. Other 
employers would be ready to hire these workers since they 
can avoid the cost of importing these labour and returning 
them to their original countries. At the time of our survey 
in Saudi Arabia in April/May 1980, the price of obtaining a 
work visa in this way was about 6-7 thousand SR, which 
amounts to about £S 1500 - £S 2000 at the going exchange rate. 
Such activities would certainly increase the cost of 
migration for the individual, and could discourage migration. 
However, it seems that, at the initial period of migration, 
this cost is usually shared by relatives and friends who 
have already migrated. These costs are usually paid by 
friends and relatives abroad, and the new migrant would pay 
back after finding a job. This process might partly explain 
the dominant role of relatives and friends abroad in providing 
work contracts, job information and initial help for new 
migrants, as would be seen later in Chapter Five. 
Thus, although laws regulating migration and migration 
channels exist both in The Sudan and in destination countries, 
yet there are many different channels of migration, which 
could allow for illegal migration. The Department of Labour 
in The Sudan seems to be less effective in organizing 
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migration from the country. This supports_the points 
mentioned earlier that the statistics of the Labour Department 
understate the number of migrants. 
2.6. Total number of migrants abroad by 1978/79 
The discussion in the above sections, has shown the 
non-availability of reliable statistics about the total 
number of migrants from the country. In this section, we 
attempt to make some estimates of these. The exercise, 
however, would depend largely on the assumptions made about 
the volume of illegal migration. Making use of total migrants 
through the Labour Department as in Table 2.1, and some 
assumptions about the volume of illegal migration, we could 
derive an estimate of the stock of migrants abroad. Three 
possible estimates could be made: 
(1) The Department of Labour statistics reports only 
those who have obtained their job contract from the employment 
offices in The Sudan. These make up 11% of the migrants in 
our sample (Table 5.6). Assuming this to hold true, the 
total number of migrants in Table 2.1 above would represent 
only 11% of total migrants abroad. Thus the total number of 
migrants abroad would amount to about 214,780 migrants by 
1978/79. However, clearly this assumption is unrealistic 
since some migrants who obtain work contracts in their own 
way have to report to the Labour Department to endorse these 
work contracts, and they might be included in the statistics 
of the Labour Department. In this way, this estimate could 
work, at best, as an upper limit on the total number of 
migrants abroad. 
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(2) Another possibility is to assume that every one 
who migrates with a work contract should report to the Labour 
Department, and is therefore included in its statistics. 
These make 61% of migrants in the sample (Table 5.5). On 
this assumption then, the accumulated number of migrants 
abroad would amount to about 38,730. Again this assumption 
is unrealistic, since not all those migrating with a work 
contract have to go through the Labour Department, e.g. those 
on official secondment. This figure then, at best, could 
work as a lower limit on the number of migrants abroad. 
(3) A more realistic estimate could be reached when we 
take those who migrated without a work contract, 39% of the 
sample. To these one should add those who have migrated on 
official secondment, those who obtain their work contracts 
from employment missions to The Sudan, or from private 
agencies, or other ways, or those who did not state how they 
obtained their work contracts. Adding all these, they make 
about 60% of migrants in the sample (Tables 5.5 and 5.6). 
To these we added 10~: for understating since some migrants 
who have migrated illegally would be afraid to state so. 
ThislO~ assumption is arrived at, judging from the 5% who 
did not state how they entered Saudi Arabia, and the 5% who 
stated that they entered Saudi Arabia with a work contract 
but declined to state how they obtained it. Adding all these 
would suggest the number reported by the Labour Department 
should be only 30% of total migrants. This provides an 
estimate of 78-,750 migrants abroad by 1978/79. 
These estimates, however, should be qualified in many 
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respects. Firstly they do not include accompanying wives 
and dependents. However, since these are believed to be 
small in number, and do not count in the labour force, they 
are of little interest to our study. Secondly, these estimates 
are not adjusted for returning migrants. No information is 
available about these. However, since migration has occurred 
in large numbers only recently, and given the relatively 
long period of intended migration (Section 5.9), one would 
expect these to be insignificant. Nevertheless, these estimates 
are tentative and should be taken cautiously. 
2.7: Summary and conclusions 
The discussion in this chapter has shown that international 
labour migration in MENA is mainly from Arab countries to 
other Arab countries, i.e. non-Arab migrants make a small 
proportion of total migrants in the region. Inter-Arab 
migration, moreover, is basically from countries lacking oil 
to those producing and exporting oil. Moreover, it i~ 
noticed that, although inter-Arab migration started early, 
it accelerated sharply in the 1970s, especially after the 
oil price boom of 1973/74, which brought considerable surpluses 
to the oil producing countries, thus transforming their pace 
and scale of development and their demand for labour. 
Like inter-Arab migration, the migration of Sudanese 
for work abroad seems to have started in the 1960s, and took 
high magnitudes after the mid-1970s. Most of this migration 
is basically to Arab countries, especially Saudi Arabia, 
Libya, and other Gulf states. The discussion in this chapter 
has shown that, like studies about migration from The Sudan, 
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data is seldom available about this phenomenon. The 
documentary information seems to be unreliable and almost 
useless in deriving precise conclusions. This is especially 
true when more detailed data about migration is sought. 
However, the available data not only suggest the low 
involvement of the Labour Department in the migration process, 
but also that the numbers involved in migration are rapidly 
increasing. The implications of such rapid migration, 
however, would be more fully understood, after- a clear 
understanding of the population and the labour force and 
the labour market situation in the country. The next chapter 
deals with such issues. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
LABOUR MARKET SITUATION IN THE SUDAN 
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3.1: Introduction 
To analyse the impact of labour migration on the 
sending country's economy, a fair understanding of the 
domestic labour market conditions is essential. This chapter 
is an attempt to shed some light on the characteristics of 
the Sudanese labour market. Special attention is given to 
the supply of and the demand for labour, and thus shortages 
and surpluses of labour. The analysis, however, is largely 
limited by the availability of data. The first population 
census in The Sudan was undertaken in 1955/56. The second 
in 1973, a time gap which brought many changes in the 
population. However, the 1973 population census results 
themselves were officially suppressed, although the provisional 
results are always released. We make use of results of the 
two censuses, as well as relevant statistics available from 
other sources. In Section 2 of this chapter, labour supply 
is investigated. Issues relevant to this include the 'size 
and composition of the population and the labour force, the 
educational status of the population, immigration and 
emigration. Section 3 deals with the labour market character-
istics, and emphasis is put on the employment structure, 
wages and salaries, as well as unemployment situation. Having 
discussed these, Section 4 deals with the demand side in 
the labour market. Some observations on the demand for labour 
and the future requirements of manpower in the country are 
pointed out. The chapter ends with a summary and some 
conclusions in Section 5. 
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3.2. Labour supply 
Among the major factors contributing to the labour 
supply in a country, are the size and composition of its 
population and its economic activity rates; the educational 
status and skills of the population; immigration from abroad; 
and emigration to other countries. This section will give 
some detailed discussion of these factors in turn. 
3.2.1: Population and labour force 
According to the first population census of the Sudan 
in 1955/56, there was a population of 10,263,000 persons in 
the country, of whom 37% were counted as in the labour force 
i.e. economically active. After this, there were some 
surveys in the 1960s, conducted on sample survey bases(l). 
Although these surveys contain information on the population 
and the labour force, comparison between them is very 
difficult. Apart from the different concepts and the 
definition of who should be counted as a member of the 
labour force, comparison is further complicated because of 
differences in coverage and lower age limits taken to define 
the labour force. The 1973 population census seems to be 
of greater importance in providing information about the 
population and the labour force. This reported a population 
of 14,113,590 persons. On this baSis, the inter-census 
growth rate in the population was calculated as equal to 
2.14 per cent per annum; much lower than that usually used 
for estimation (2.8 - 3.0 per cent). However, it was widely 
believed that there was about 5% underenumeration in this 
census. Applying this, total population would amount to 
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14,819,270 persons. However, as far as the labour force 
is concerned, what is important is the age, sex, and skill 
composition of the population, etc. rather than only its size. 
Table AJ in Appendix A shows the population by age, 
sex, rural and urban population according to the 1973 census. 
The first observation to note from the table is the high 
share of population under the age of 15 years. Some 45.8% 
of total population is under this age. This share, however, 
falls to 42.9% of the urban population and rises to 47.7% of 
the rural population. This difference might be explained 
by the rural-urban drift~ The second observation is that the 
population is equally divided between the two sexes, with 
very slight tendency to more males (50.6% being males). 
Although, this sex ratio is 102% for the whole population, 
it varies considerably among different age groups. This is 
lower for the 15-34 age groups, reaching its minimum at the 
25-29 age groups. The third observation from the table is 
that the Sudanese population is basically rural, some 65.2% 
being counted as settled in the rural areas. However, the 
ratio of the urban population to the total seems to be higher 
at ages 10-34 years, reaching its peak at the 20-24 age group. 
This might suggest rural-urban migration at these ages. The 
same observations are noticed when urban and rural sex ratios 
are examined. This is quite high in the urban areas (113%), 
compared to 98~c in the rural areas. Thus, rural-to-urban 
migrants seem to be basically young males(2), or put in other 
words, the propensity to migrate to urban areas seems to be 
higher among the males than the females, and higher among 
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the young than the older people. 
The nomadic population also forms a considerable 
proportion of the total. According to the 1973 census, 
about 11.5% of the population was counted as being rural 
nomadic. Added to the rural settled population, this would 
suggest that more than 3/4 of the total population is rural. 
This would suggest a very small urban population, and in 
fact this makes only about 18.5% of the total population. 
However, in spite of this small share in total population, 
the urban population has been growing at a faster rate than 
the rural population. The overall urban population growth 
rate for the inter-census period has been calculated as 
7.4 per cent per annum, while the rural growth rate amounted 
to 1.5 per cent per annum(3). This could well be attributed 
to rural-urban migration in the country. Table A4 in 
Appendix A gives an indication of inter-province migration 
according to the 1973 population census. It seems that 
inter-province migration occurs mainly to three provinces, 
Khartoum, Blue Nile, and KasaNa. In fact these three provinces 
have experienced the highest growth rates of population 
between the two censuses (4.9~, 3.5% and 3.0~ per annum 
respectively). The least growth rate in the northern region 
was experienced by the three sending provinces, the Northern, 
Kordofan, and Darfur provinces (0.65%, 1.28% and 2.85% per 
annum respectively). The three provinces of the Southern 
region, although they do not seem to send significant numbers 
of migrants, seem to be exceptional. One province experienced 
only a marginal increase (Bahr el Gazal 1.99%), while the 
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other two have a negative population growth rate (Equatoria 
-1.04, and Upper Nile -0.62). Such a decline in population 
could be attributed to the 17 years civil war in the region, 
which ended in 1972. 
The size of the labour force, measured by the economically 
active population, which are those productively engaged 
whether fUll-time or part-time, amounted to about 29.5% of 
all population according to 1973 census. This ratio is 
lower than in the first census, which indicated 37.0% of 
all population. The reason for such a difference could be 
the difference in the lower age limit of the economically 
active population, being 5 years in the first census and 
15 years in the second. Moreover because of the increase 
in school enrolment in 1973 than in 1955/56, more of those 
under 24 years of age would be counted as students, and not 
included in the labour force. Table 3.1 below produces a 
summary of participation rates according to the two censuses 
and surveys undertaken. 
Table 3.1: Coverage, age limit and participation rates in 
major surveys and censuses. 
Lower crude participation rate 
Cover- age 
Survey or Gensus af;e limit male female both 
1955/56 population ALL Sudan 5 66.4 7·0 37·0 
census 
1964/65 census of North-
agriculture rural None 60·3 43.9 52.1 
~964/66 population North-
&: housing urban 8 52·5 5·3 30.1 
survey 
1967/68 Household All North - 49·3 9.6 29·3 
survey 
~973 Population All Sudan 15 47.1 11·9 29.6 
census 
Source: ILO "Growth, employment and equity: A comprehensive 
strategy for The Sudan" ILO, 1976, Table 59, P.305· 
I 
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The comparison between crude participation rates in the 
Table is complicated because of the differet:tt concepts of 
economically active population, coverage, and age limits 
used in each surveyor census. However, a remarkable feature 
of the table is that female participation rates are much 
lower than those of males in all censuses and surveys. 
However, because of the complication in comparing these 
rates, results of the latest census are discussed in more 
detail, to give an idea about labour force composition. 
Activity rates, according to this census, differ according 
to age, sex, and region. Most of the economically active 
population is in the age groups 15-45, with the highest 
concentration in the 25-29 age group. A high participation 
rate was recorded for males in the age group 25-44 years. 
The corresponding activity rate for females is much lower. 
Due to economic, social and religious reasons, it is not 
common for women to go out for work. The percentage of active 
population for both males and fe,males is lower in the urban 
areas than in the rural areas. For example, the male activity 
rate in the rural areas amounts to 91.4% of all ages, while 
that in the urban areas is 85.3%. Due to the concentration 
of higher education facilities in the urban areas, la+ge 
proportions of the population under 24 years of age would 
be counted as students, thus reducing the activity rates in 
the urban areas. Moreover, agricultural activities in the 
rura"l areas might involve many members of the family, thus 
increasing the activity rates in these areas. This is clearly 
seen when female activity rates are investigated. This is 
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much higher in the rural areas, being 24.7%, while in the 
urban areas it is as low as 10.6%. 
To sum up, the assessment of the population and the 
labour force in this sub-section has shown that the urban 
population, although increasing at a faster rate than the 
rural population, still represents a small proportion of 
the total population. Moreover, the participation rates 
seem to be smaller in urban than in rural areas. This 
indicates that the urban labour force is relatively small. 
Moreover activity rates among females are considerably 
smaller than among the male population. However, it is not 
only the population size and its activity rate that determines 
the supply of labour, but also the educational and skill 
composition of this population. 
3.2.2. The educational status of the population 
The literacy rate among the Sudanese population seems 
to be quite low. More than two thirds of the population is 
illiterate. Some idea about thi's is given in Table 3.2 below. 
Table 3.2: Literacy rate by sex and rural/urban~population 
10 years of age and more, 1973 census 
Total Urban Rural 
Sex population population population 
Male 44.3 65.4 37·7 
Female 18.0 38.9 12.2 
Both 31. 3 53.4 24.6 
Source: 1973 population census. 
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The low literacy rate among total population is clearly 
indicated in the table. Moreover, the table shows the 
differences in literacy rates between the sexes and between 
the urban and rural population. This is more than twice 
as high in urban areas as in rural areas. This is partly 
caused by the concentration of educational facilities, 
especially higher education institutes, in the urban areas, 
and partly by the rural-urban migrants being basically 
educated people. The low literacy rate in rural areas 
would be even lower if the nomadic population were taken 
into consideration. The table, furthermore, shows lower 
literacy rates for females than males. Interestingly, 
however, the literacy rate among females in urban areas is 
higher than that of the males in rural areas. In spite of 
this, one should recall that activity rates among females 
in urban areas are lowest. In general, however, such low 
literacy rates in the population indicate limited experience 
and skills of the labour force in the country. 
The school enrolment ratio is also very low. According 
to the 1973 census, only 31% of those aged 7-24 years were 
attending schools. This indicates that the educated manpower 
would not form a high proportion of the population. However, 
the school enrolment ratio seems to be higher for males 
than females (40% and 22% of males and females aged 7-24 years 
respectively). The educational system, moreover, seems to 
be dominated by general academic studies, rather than 
technical studies. Students-of high secondary schools 
taking technical courses in 1976/77, amounted to only 17% 
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of total students for that year(4). Such a system of 
education affects higher education too, in the sense that 
males and humanities studies would dominate the higher 
education. Female students in universities and higher 
institutes make up only 20% of students in these institutes 
in 1976/77, and about 14% of graduates for that year(5). The 
effect of such a system on graduates is demonstrated in 
Table 3.3 below. 
Table 3.3: Graduates by degree and major field of study 
from universities and higher institutes in 
The Sudan, 1976 
H.lnstitute University ~ Diploma 1st Degree Total (No. ) (No. ) study Total Female Total Female (No. ) % 
Education & teacher 
training 31 2 110 18 141 4. " 
Law, humani ties, 
religion, etc. 53 10 723 185 785 26.1 
Social (:.: behavioral 
sciences - - 258 16 258 8.6 
Commerce &. business 
admin. 54 10 538 176 592 19·7 
Natural science - - 102 18 102 3.4 
Medical & health 
related 78 38 226 26 304 10.1 
Engineering & 
architecture 132 6 176 .... 308 10·3 I 
Agricul ture, Fishing, 
etc. 181 4 227 29 458 15·2 
Others 56 33 - - 56 1.9 
Total 585 103 2419 475 3004 100.0 
Source: UNESCO "Statistical Yearbook" 1978-79. 
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The table shows that a large percentage of graduates 
are those who have been taking theoretical courses. The 
highest proportion of graduates being graduates of Arts, 
humanities and religious studies, followed by graduates of 
commerce and business administration. The graduates of 
engineering, agriculture, medicine, etc. make lower proportions. 
Such a tendency in the education system may create structural 
imbalances in the labour market in the sense that there might 
be excess supply of certain professions and shortages in 
others. This might lead to unemployment in some portions 
of the labour force and supply bottlenecks in others. 
3.2.3: Immigration 
The population counted as being born outside The Sudan 
amounted to 220,239 according to the 1973 population census. 
This would make only about 1.6% of the total population of 
the country, a very small proportion. However, it is widely 
believed that a considerable underenumeration has occurred 
in this foreign population. Table A5 in Appendix A shows 
this population by age, sex, rural and urban areas. Although 
these foreign born population make 1.6% of total population 
of the country, the ratio increases with age, indicating 
that immigrants might contribute to the labour force. However, 
the sex ratio of the foreign population is very low, especially 
at the working ages. This is the opposite of what one would 
have expected in an immigrant population, in which males 
are expected to be more numerous than females. Such an 
observation suggests either underenumeration or that this 
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immigration is family immigration, or both. The table 
furthermore indicates that the majority of these immigrants 
were counted in rural Sudan, some 67·3% of them being counted 
in the rural areas. However, the percentage of them counted 
in the urban areas is much higher than that of the Sudanese 
born population, 32.7% of the immigrants being counted in 
the urban areas, compared to 18.5% of the population born 
in The Sudan. When broken by province of enumeration 
(Table A4), these immigrants tend to be concentrated in the 
border provinces, especially Equatoria in the south, Darfur 
in the west and Kasalla in the east. Together, the three 
provinces receive nearly 60% of these immigrants. The Blue 
Nile province, where cotton picking attracts migrants receives 
20% of these immigrants, wh~le the urban centre in Khartoum 
province receives only 12%. Coupled with the refugee influx 
from Ethiopia in the east, Chad in the west and Uganda in 
the south, one is tempted to say that most of these immigrants 
are either refugees or workers who move from neighbouring 
countries across the borders with their families. This 
might explain the high ratio of females in the immigrant 
population. However, the investigation of the origins of 
this population, although showing that most of the immigrants 
are of African origin, many of them from neighbouring countries, 
reveals that non-neighbouring countries also contribute to 
this immigrant population. Table A6 in Appendix A gives 
the immigrant population by country of origin, according to 
the 1973 population census. It is easily seen from the table 
- 53 -
that immigrants are basically African, about 96.1% of them 
being of African origin. However, it is the Nigerians who 
form the largest group. Together with migrants from Chad 
they make nearly 75% of total immigrants. Migrants of Arab 
origin, excluding Egypt, make a small proportion, notably 
from Yemen. Europeans are only 0.7%, while Asians are only 
0.8% of immigrants according to the 1973 population census. 
A different picture is provided when work permits issued 
to foreigners by the Department of Labour are investigated. 
It is no longer the Africans who dominate the work permits, 
but the share of others is considerably higher. Table A7 
in Appendix A shows work permits issued by the Labour Department 
to foreigners in 1977/78 by nationality. Work permits issued 
to Africans amounted to ~4.9% of the total, those issued to 
Europeans 36%, while the Asians accounted for 13.0% and the 
Arabs are a minority of 5.4%. The two important groups of 
Nigerians and Chadians counted in the census do not appear 
in work permit issue. This is probably because they do not 
work in the formal modern sector, but rather in the informal 
sector and the agricultural sector, where work permit rules 
are not enforced. The highest share of work permits is 
issued to Egyptians who make 21.4% of the total. These 
groups, however, work in the formal modern sector, as teachers, 
technicians, etc. In fact more than 73% of work permits 
issued to Egyptians were in the nature of professional, 
technical or skilled workers. In all about 55~ of work 
permits were for such types of job. Such would suggest 
that the issue of work permits would tend to reduce the loss 
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of high-level manpower as a result of migration abroad. 
However, apart from the fact that work permits issued to 
foreigners are few relative to emigration abroad, the latter 
is increasing at a faster rate than the former. For example, 
the increase in the number of work permits issued to 
foreigners by the Department of Labour was only about 5% 
between 1976/77 and 1977/78, compared to 76.6% increase in 
the number of Sudanese migrating abroad through the Labour 
Department only, in the same period(6). 
3.2.4: Emigration 
Mucb detailed discussion about migration patterns from 
The Sudan and migrants' characteristics are in Chapters Two 
and Five, and we need not repeat them here. However, we 
should point out that, although emigration is of a recent 
nature, it has increased substantially after the mid-1970s. 
Moreover, skilled and educated manpower, seems to be of 
considerable proportions among migrants as compared to the 
economically active population ~s a whole. For example, 
out of the total of 10175 migrants through the Labour Department, 
between 1974/75 and 1977/78, only 26.9% were unskilled labour, 
the remaining being professionals, technicians, and skilled 
labour(7). Moreover, in a study about absenteeism from work 
without permission, in the public sector, by the Labour 
Department in 1976/77 and 1977/78, out of a sample of 98116 
employees, 8040 (8.1%) left their work without permission 
or previous notice. It is believed that these have illegally 
migrated abroad. Out of these, however, the professional, 
administrative and those with skilled jobs were more than 
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23%(8). Thus in the nature of selectivity in the migration 
process, one would expect the most able, educated and 
experienced to migrate. In this way emigration could be one 
cause of educated manpower shortage in the country. 
In summary, it seems that the economically active 
population in The Sudan forms a small proportion of the total 
population. Moreover, it seems that the urban labour force 
is very small relative to the rural labour force. Furthermore, 
the low literacy rate among the population would indicate 
very small skilled and educated manpower in the country. 
Moreover while immigration is largely composed of unskilled 
labour from neighbouring countries, emigration seems to draw 
on the most ab~e, educated and experienced labour force. 
How far this would affect the labour market and employment 
situation in the country would not be clear unless an 
assessment of the labour market characteristics and the 
demand for labour is made. In the next section we sh~d some 
light on the labour market characteristics. 
3.3: Characteristics of the Labour Market 
The economy of The Sudan is prinCipally agricultural. 
Table A8 in Appendix A shows the contribution of different 
sectors to the GDP of the country. It is noticed that 
agriculture is the dominant contributor to the GDP. Although 
its share has been decreasing since independence in 1956, 
(from 6l.0~ in 1955/56 to 33.5% in 1979/80) it continued 
to contribute more than one third to the GDP. The contribution 
of the manufacturing sector on the other hand, although it 
has been increasing, never reached 10% of the GDP. Such a 
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structure of the economy, being basically agricultural, 
and divided into traditional and modern sectors, has its 
effects in shaping the Labour Market. In this section we 
attempt to identify the main characteristics of the labour 
market in the country, especially· the urban labour market, 
and see how it works. Three main issues are discussed, the 
employment structure, the wage and salary structure, as 
well as unemployment situation. Each of these is discussed 
in a separate sub-section below. 
3.3.1: Employment structure 
As indicated in Table 3.4 below, agriculture is the 
dominant activity of the population, some 65% being involved 
in agriculture(9). This is not strange in an economy where 
agriculture contributes the most to the GDP, and where most 
of the population are in the rural areas. The table, further-
more, shows that the percentage of women involved in 
agriculture is higher than the percentage of men in this 
sector, i.e. women are mainly e~gaged in agricultural 
activities more than others. This is due to the involvement 
of rural women in agricultural activities. This could 
explain the high economic activity rates of women in the 
rural areas noted in 3.2~1 ab~ve. Moreover, the table shows 
the small size of manufacturing sector employment, which 
involved only 3.9% of the total economically active population 
in 1973. It is interesting to note that over 50% of those 
involved in this sector, according to the census, are 
classified either as "employers" or "own account workers" 
or "unpaid family workers". This indicates that apart from 
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Table 3.4: Economically active population by sector, 1973. 
Sector Total Male Female 
No. % No. % No. 
Agricu1ture(1) 2,253,158 65·2 1,642,992 59·5 610,166 
Mining and 
quarrying 2,984 0.1 2,872 0.1 112 
Manufacturing 135,153 3·9 113,529 4.1 21,624 
Electricity and 
Water 34,718 1.0 34,444 1.2 274 
Construction 70,505 2.0 69,985 2.5 560 
Trade(2) 185,809 5.4 172,370 6.2 13,439 
Transport(3) 128,588 3·7 127,078 4.6 1,520 
Finance(4) 4,523 0.1 4,012 0.1 511 
services(5) 380,367 11.0 343,173 12.4 38,194 
Act. not defined 257,390 7·5 251,095 9·1 6,295 
Total 3,453,235 100.0 2,759,865 100.C 693,370 
Notes (1) Agriculture, fishing, hunting and forestry 
(2) Wholesale, retail trade, restaurant and hotel 
(3) Transport, storage and communications 
(4) Finance, insurance, real estate, etc. 
(5) Community, social and,personal services. 
Indicates less than 0.1%. 
Source: 1973 population census. 
% 
88.0 
-
3·1 
-
-
1.9 
0.2 
-
5·5 
0·9 
100.C 
a few large scale employers, a large amount of employment is 
in very small scale establishments, many of which are best 
thought of as being in the informal sector. According to the 
1978 private sector establishments survey of the Department 
of Labour(lO), out of 452 establishments in the manufacturing 
sector, only 52 or ll~ were employing 100 employees or more, 
while the highest proportion of them, some 270/, were employing 
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10-14 employees only. All this implies that the modern 
manufacturing sector in the country is very small. The 
modern agricultural sector employment does not seem to be 
large either. Only 10.5% of those involved in agriculture 
are classified as 'employers', the majority of the remaining 
being classified as "own account workers" or"unpaid family 
workers" • Apart from large scale schemes owned and operated 
by the government, like the Gazera scheme, Rahad scheme, 
etc., most agricultural activities could be classified as 
subsistence sector, which provides employment for the owners, 
or the family members. 
It is interesting to note that the services sector is 
the second largest which involves the economically active 
population, as indicated in the table above. Moreover, the 
highest proportion of those classified as "employees", some 
36. 8~{ are in the services sector. This suggests that most 
modern formal employment is provided by the government or 
the public sector. This is more understandable if we note 
that the government provides most of the services, like 
health, education, etc. Moreover, the transport and 
communications system, e.g. Sudan railways, river transport, 
the Post Office and Telecommunications, are operated by the 
public sector. This is besides the public sector involvement 
in industry, agriculture and other activities. Thus an 
analysiS of public sector employment might give more indication 
about the labour market. Table 3.5 overleaf shows public 
_sector employment by economic sector in 1978. 
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Table 3.5: Public sector employment by economic sector, 
1978 (in 1000) 
Salaried Wage Total ~ Sector employees Earners Employment No. % No. % No. o/r 
Agriculture 25·0 27.6 35·9 19·1 60·9 21. 8 
Manufacturing 9.8 10.8 19.8 10.5 29.8 10.6 
Commerce 6.1 6.7 30.6 16.3 37·7 13.2 
Transport and 
Communications 11·5 12·7 47.2 25·1 58.7 21.1 
Services 38.3 42.2 54.7 29·1 93·0 33·3 
Total 90·7 100.0 188.2 100.0 278.9 100.0 
Source: "The public sector employment survey 1977-78", 
Ministry of Public Services and Administrative Reform, 
Khartoum, cited in A.S. Ahmed "The manpower situation 
in the Sudan" Labour & Society, Vol. 5(3), July 1980. 
The table clearly indicates that the highest proportion 
of public sector employment is in the services sector. This 
is followed by the agricultural sector, where most of the 
modern large scale schemes are owned and operated by the public 
sector. The manufacturing sector is the least employing sector, 
employing only 10.60/ of public sector employees. 
The employment structure in the country would certainly 
be affected by the skill differentials among the population. 
The education system and the low literacy rate among the 
population, as noted in 3.2.2 above, would leave its marks in 
the labour force and the labour market. In other words, the 
educated manpower would be expected to form a small proportion 
of the labour force. Thus, those with high level occupations 
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i.e. professional, technical and administrative workers 
make only 3% of the total economically active population 
according to the 1973 population census. The dominance of 
labourers in the labour force is also reflected in public 
and private sector employment. In the public sector, labourers 
make about 67.5% of total employment of 278,900 in 1978, 
while those with technical, professional and administrative 
jobs make 7~:, and the remaining are general and higher 
secondary school leavers (11). The priv·ate sector employment 
in 1978 amounted to 48,748 (excluding employment in agriculture) 
out of which 85.3~i are classified as labourers, 6.3o/r with 
technical, professional and administrative jobs, and about 
8.4% are those with general and higher secondary levels of 
education(12). This indicates that the private sector 
employment is not only small in size relative to the public 
sector, but· it also employs lower proportions of the educated 
manpower in the country. In other words, most employment 
of the educated manpower is in the public sector. This stems 
from the fact that the public sector sets out as an employer 
'of the last resort' to the educated manpower. The government 
being a major employer used to work as an employer 'of the 
last resort' for university graduates and school leavers, 
irrespective of the actual demand for them. Thus, under the 
political pressure of 'educated unemployment', the government 
had to create an unemployment relief fund in 1966, and thus 
an employment policy was introduced to guarantee employment 
to all graduates of universi ties and post-secondary insti tutes(}3) 
· - 61 -
In the beginning and until 1970, even the general and higher 
secondary school leavers~ who were not able to enter the 
next stage of the education system, were also employed under 
this sCheme(14). Since 1970, however, it appears that the 
scheme applied to graduates of universities and higher 
institutes only. In 1974, after establishing a board for 
recruiting university and higher institute graduates, the 
policy of employment was changed and a new budgetary allocation 
system was adopted. Under the revised system, the government 
continues to guarantee employment_as an employer of the 
last resort - to all professional university graduates, and 
all technicians from higher institutes, both inside and 
outside the country(15). This assurance is no longer 
available - in theory at least - to graduates of arts, 
humanities, law, social sciences, mathematics and general 
sciences. ·Such a policy of employment might explain the 
high proportion of educated manpower in public sector 
employment. Moreover, it might. explain the low levels of 
unemployment, especially among the university graduates 
as would be seen later in the chapter. 
3.3.2: Wages and salaries structure 
The public sector, being the leading employer in the 
country, has a clearly demarcated wage scale, with a minimum 
level, annual increments and criteria for climbing along the 
scale from a specified minimum to a maximum pay. However, 
it seems that in the public sector, legislation has played 
a major role in determining wage levels and its structure. 
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Three cadres and one minimum wage fixation order were 
introduced in this sector. These are the 1952 and 1968 
cadres, the 1974 minimum wage order and the 1978 Job 
Evaluation and Classification Scheme (JECS). 
The 1952 cadre divided the labour force into five 
categories of skills, and within each category, it specified 
different scales. It defined the minimum and maximum pay 
within each category, the criterion to enter each category 
and move along the wage scale ladder, taking the educational 
level as the mal.'n crl.'terl.'on(16). I l' 'th th 19~2 d n l.ne Wl. e  ca re, 
the 1968 cadre adopted a "point" system of job evaluation. 
This attached a certain number of points to each job, 
according to the academic and training qualification required 
for the post, the responsibilities attached to it, the mental 
and physical efforts required to carry out the post, as well 
as the working conditions attached to the post(17). The 
1974 minimum wage decree did not change the wage structure, 
but only raised the minimum nominal wage level from £513.900 
to £5 16.5 per month, and brought general increments in 
wages amounting to l7~1: for low paid groups, and 12% above 
that(18). The basic aim of the 1978 JECS was the evaluation 
of individual jobs within the public sector and the setting 
up of an organizational chart showing the relationship of 
one grade to another and the relevant pay scale(19). Thus 
a new system of job classification and pay structure was 
introduced. The pay scale was divided into 22 categories, 
with criteria to enter each category. The main criteria, 
however, were educational attainment and the nature of the 
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job, i.e. a combination of the other two cadres. Thus the 
scheme has come under the criticism of simply matching the 
already existing pay scales with the newly created scales(20). 
The wage level was also supposed to change according to the 
JECS. The rate of increase in wages was higher for the 
least paid groups, decreasing for higher paid groups(2l). 
These increments were supposed to be implemented in two 
phases; 50~ of the proposed'increase in July 1978, and the 
remaining 50% in July 1979. The first phase was already 
implemented in July 1978, while the second phase was suspended 
to review the whole scheme, and was never implemented(22). 
The first phase brought about a 35% increase for the lowest 
paid workers and down to about 6.6~6 for the highly paid 
employees. Thus although the public sector has a clearly 
demarcated pay structure, legislation seems to have played 
an important role in determining the pay structure and the 
wage levels. 
In contrast, no definite structure of wages prevails 
in the private sector. There was no minimum wage legislation 
for this sector, and it was only in 1974 that the government 
forced the private sector to adopt the minimum wage standard, 
and private firms were allowed three years until 1976 to 
reach the £S 16.50 minimum wage of the public sector in three 
annual increments. However, this excluded agricultural 
workers, establishments employing less than 10 workers, as 
well as workers under 18 years of age(23). Thus those 
benefiting from this order would be a minority of the labour 
force in the private sector. As for wage levels, at least 
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in the early 1970s, the unskilled and semi-skilled were 
paid better in the public sector than in the private sector. 
For example in January 1970, the monthly nominal wage in 
the private sector for the unskilled was £. S 9.57, while it 
was £. S 13.90 in the public sector. The private sector, 
however, seems to pay more for technicians and professionals(24). 
However, wages in the private sector are more complex to 
compare to the public sector, or within the private sector 
itself. This is because of variation in size, activities 
undertaken, skills employed, hours of work, the influence of 
government legislation, the pressure of unionization 
etc. The absence of a demarcated pay policy as well as 
information about the above factors, makes it difficult to 
carry the analysis further. However, comparison of weekly 
earnings in the private sector, according to the 1978 private 
establishments survey of the Labour Department, shows that 
the manufacturing sector is not the leading sector in'setting 
wages, but rather the transport and communication sectors, 
as well as finance and trade. Moreover, it shows wide 
differences in earnings in different sectors within the 
private sector itself. An explanation of such variations, 
apart from the absence of a pay policy, could lie in the 
size of establishment, hours of work, skill composition, etc. 
3.3.3: Unemployment 
When it comes to unemployment and underemployment, the 
problem gets more complicated, not only because of the 
absence of data, but also because of differences in the 
concept and definition of who is to be considered as unemployed. 
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The word 'unemployment' can be used in many different senses. 
It has been said that it can describe the condition of not 
being at work, the activity of seeking work, the attitude 
of desiring a job under certain conditions, and the need 
of finding a jOb(25 ). Accordingly, statistics about un-
employment would differ according to the concept and 
definition of the word unemployment and underemployment. 
In general, however, these statistics are found from the 
censuses, the sample surveys, or from the employment exchange 
registers. The available data about unemployment in The 
Sudan draws upon all these sources, and although fragmentary, 
gives some indications about this problem in The Sudan. 
The ILO, general level of unemployment based on the 
employment offices statistics and defined as the number of 
applicants for work on the register at the end of each period 
relative to the total labbur force is given in Table 3.6 below. 
Table 3.6: General rate of unemployment 1970-1979 
Year 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 77 78 79 
U.R. (r) 4.76 4.95 4.08 4.06 4.42 5·49 6.68 6. 3· 6.62 
45 56 
U.R.~ unemployment rate 
Source: ILO"Yearbook of Labour Statistics" 1980. 
As seen from this table, the general level of unemployment 
in the country seems to be very low. However, a surprising 
thing about these figures is that they have changed so little 
over these years. So one doubts whether the low and seemingly 
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constant rate of unemployment hides a lot of under-employment. 
However, based on the employment offices statistics, the 
value of the statistics varies widely. Where registration 
is entirely voluntary and especially where the employment 
offices fUnction only in the more populated and urbanized 
areas of the country, or are not widely used by employees 
seeking work or employers seeking workers, the data from 
these offices are generally very incomplete and do not give 
a reliable indication of the extent of unemplOyment(26). 
Thus it would be interesting to seek other sources of data 
which might better reflect unemployment in the country. 
Attempts to measure unemployment were made through 
surveys and censuses. When these are investigated, it seems 
that the unemployment problem in The Sudan is basically an 
urban problem. This is best reflected in the 1967/68 
Household Budget survey. According to this, unemployment 
rate for ~orthern Sudan amounted to about 2.9°( of the .labour 
force, ranging from 1.5% in rural areas to 7.5% in semi-urban 
areas to 9.6~ in the urban area~ ~27). Other surveys also 
attempted to measure unemployment, especially urban un-
employment. These are summarised in Table 3.7 overleaf. 
These estimates in the table are not strictly comparable. 
They are for different years, and there are also differences 
in sampling methods, coverage, and in basic definitions. 
The Population and Housing Survey, for example, defines the 
labour force as persons above eight years of age; the 
Household Budget Survey does not define a limit, while the 
Gilaleldin" estimates refer to unemployment levels of males 
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Table 3.7: Some estimates of the level of urban unemployment 
in The Sudan according to surveys and censuses 
Survey/census Year Coverage 
Unemployment 
rate (%) 
Population census 1955/56 All Sudan 1.7 
Population and 1964/66 Khartoum and 5·0 
housing survey Omderman 
Population and 1964/66 All urban areas 3·5 
housing survey 
Household Budget 1967/68 All urban areas 9.6 
survey 
Galaleldin survey 1971 Khartoum 5·6 
MEFIT survey 1974 The three towns 6.5 
ILO survey 1974 The three towns 5·9 
Population census 1973 All Sudan 6.0 
Notes: (1) The Three Towns are Khartoum, Omderman and Khartoum 
North. 
Source: For 1955/56 census, ILO, "Growth, employment and 
equity .. " p.312. For 1973 census, the provisidnal 
results of the census. For all others, either the 
survey itself or Table 67, p.313 of ILO "Growth 
employment and equity •• '." 2nd impression, 1978, 
only and defines the labour force as persons of ten years of 
age and over, The ILO defines this as those 12 years of age 
and above, while the 1973 census defines it as those of 15 years 
and above. However, unemployment rates in urban areas seem 
to be higher than those for all The Sudan. It is more 
interesting however to have unemployment rates in more detail 
by age and sex. Some idea of these is shown in Table J.8 
overleaf. 
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Table 3.8: Unemployment rate by age and sex (Khartoum) 1974 
Age 12-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50+ 
Male 5·1 24.6 27.0 7·5 4.0 3·2 2.0 1.2 5.6 
Female 1.2 4.4 .5.1 4.4 2·7 0.4 1.2 0.4 
Source: ILO survey of Greater Khartoum, cited by T. Mulat. 
(1975) "Educated unemployment in The Sudan" World 
Employment Programme Research, working papers, ILO, 
July 1975, Table 2 p.8. In the original table, these 
two rows are added for each age group and reported as 
unemployment rate for both sexes. 
The breakdown of unemployment rates by age groups reveals 
that the age groups 15-19 and 20-24 have the highest unemploy-
ment rates. These are ages of leaving school and university, 
and this might suggest that the unemployment problem is 
basically a problem of the urban educated labour force. The 
table shows lower unemployment rates among females than among 
-
males. This, however, does not mean that unemployment problems 
are less acute for females. This is because of the low 
participation rates of females, ,and as discussed above, the 
socio-cultural factors prohibit females from seeking employ-
mente 
Thus, although the evidence is fragmentary, the unemploy-
ment situation in The Sudan might be summarised in the 
following points: 
(i) Unemployment seems to be more acute among males than 
females, although this might be due to the low participation 
rates of females. 
(ii) The youngest persons, i.e. those aged 15-24 years seem 
to be especially prone to high unemployment rates. 
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(iii) Unemployment rates are low for the illiterates, 
gradually increasing to higher proportions among the educated, 
but decreasing for the above secondary levels of education, 
i.e. unemployment is more acute among general and higher 
secondary school leavers. 
(iv) The rate of unemployment seems to be higher in urban 
areas than in rural areas, suggesting that unemployment is 
basically an urban problem. 
However, it should be noted again that official data on 
unemployment could be misleading, and that the evidence 
presented in this section is largely fragmentary, therefore 
such conclusions should be taken cautiously. Moreover, we 
are not able to quantify the extent of underemployment, since 
apart from the definition of such a word, data is seldom 
available. The ILO survey of 1974, defined the underemployed 
as those working less than 35 hours a week. These amounted 
to 3.1% of the labour force in Greater Khartoum. However, 
with most of the population involved in agriculture, there 
is the possibility that a considerable proportion could be 
underemployed. Furthermore, the government policy of 
employing educated manpower, might result in an inflated 
civil service with a degree of considerable underemployment. 
In fact it is usually claimed that the civil service is 
already overstaffed and it "could do with half its personnel" 
and that "it is overloaded at the top with a large number of 
high scale officials, and at the bottom with too many lower 
" (28) po s t s. •• • . 
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3.4: Future requirements of manpower. 
Section 3.2 of this chapter was addressed to the supply 
of labour in the Sudan, while employment, underemployment, 
etc. were discussed in Section 3.3. In this section we 
turn to the demand for labour side, especially the future 
requirement of manpower. Unfortunately data is not available 
in the details of enabling precise conclusions to be drawn. 
However, in the recent 6-year plan of economic and social 
development of 1977/78 - 1982/83, attempts were made to 
estimate supply and demand for labour for the plan period. 
These projections could give some indication about future 
requirements of manpower in the country, and we make use of 
these, as well as data from other sources, in the analysis 
of this section. These estimates are reproduced in Table 3.9 
overleaf. The table however does not show estimates for 
unskilled labour. These were not taken into account by the 
plan on the assumption that it would be abundant. 
According to the plan's projections in the table, a 
shortage of 11,000 workers is expected by the end of the 
plan period. These 1.3% shortage in labour does not seem 
to be very alarming, given the conditions prevailing under 
the plan's assumptions. It must be pointed out that these 
estimates were made without taking international "migration 
into account, and therefore the situation might be different 
if the supply of labour were projected accounting for 
emigration and other factors. However, although the overall 
shortage of labour as predicted by the plan does not look 
very serious, shortages in certain categories of labour, 
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Table 3.9: Demand for and supply of labour-over the 6-year 
plan period 1977/78 - 1982/83 by occupation (1000) 
Occupation (and level of 
education) 
Balance 
as % of' 
Demand Supply Balance demand 
Professionals (university 
graduates) 23.5 
Technicians (applied 
higher institutes) 24.0 
Assistant technicians 
(H. Second. Sch. Training) 24.0 
Skilled labour (H. Technical 
Second." element. Sch. teachers 
& Training) 72.0 
Clerks (general and second. 
schools) 41.0 
Semi-skilled (elementary, 
general secondary & 
handicraft) 648.0 
Managing Directors 
(Miscellaneous) 8.5 
Total 841.0 
26.0 
13·7 
17·5 
48.8 
830.0 
. +2·5 +10.6 
-10·3 -42.9 
- 6.5 -27·1 
-23·2 -32.2 
- 4.0 
- 9·8 
+31. 0 4.5 
- 8·5 -100.0 
-11.0 
-1·3 
Notes: Balance indicates supply'less demand, thus a + sign 
indicates surplus while a - sign indicates shortage. 
Source:"The six year plan of' economic and social development 
1977/78 - 1982/83" Ministry of' National Planning, 
Khartoum, April 1977, Vol. 1, Table 10-7, p.l03. 
especially technicians and skilled labour are much higher. 
Moreover, when each category is examined alone, shortages of' 
certain types of labour, and surpluses of' other types, 
within each occupation group are f'ound. For example, while 
there is a surplus of' 10.6% of' the profeSSionals, or the 
university graduates, this surplus is mainly in graduates of 
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social sciences, arts and humanities. 
seen clearly in Table 3.10 overleaf. 
Such imbalances are 
The table clearly indicates that the excess supply of 
10.6% in the professional occupations is only from graduates 
of general sciences, mathematics, social sciences, humanities 
etc. Occupations of critical importance to economic growth 
like engineering, agriculture, and veterinary scientists 
show shortages of high percentages. The deficit being 
49.l~, 46.8% and 54.5% respectively. The shortage in the 
supply of technicians is much greater, amounting to over 
40~ of the demand. This is more acute in the case of certain 
specializations, e.g. veterinary science technicians, 
engineering, and agricultural technicians, etc. 
As pointed out above, what the plan fails to predict 
is the consequences of migration abroad on the supply of 
labour. Although the plan is very recent, it does not refer 
to the process of migration, the number of Sudanese working 
abroad or the possible brain-drain in the future, possibly 
because these started to assume a large scale only recently. 
However, in the presence of the very rapidly increasing 
emigration, especially in the late 1970s (Chapter Two), the 
shortages of labour as predicted by the plan would be very 
much aggravated. Moreover, the skill composition of migrants, 
and the high tendency of migration to select from the 
educated and the skilled (Chapters Two and Five), would mean 
further shortages in occupations already predicted to have 
acute shortages by the plan. This failure of the plan to 
Table 1.10: Demand and supply of professionals and technicians for the 6-year plan by 
specialization. 
Professionals . Technicians 
Specialization Demand Supply Balance ro Demand Supply Balance 
Aericulture 5000 2660 -2340 -46.8 5000 2150 -2850 
Veterinary 2200 1000 -1200 
- 511 • 5 2000 580 -1420 
Medicine(a) 3010 28h5 -1.65 
- 5·5 2 l.o0 1370 -1030 
Engineering(b) 4 lfOO 221.0 -2160 -49.1 11250 6065 
-5185 
Science & Maths. 2000 2900 + 900 +45.0 - - -
Accounting & Finance 3000 4700 +1700 +56.7 1600 1600 0 
Teachers(c) 1700 16 l.o 
-
60 
- 3·5 900 900 0 
Eco. & Soc. Science 1500 2690 +1190 +79.3 - - -
Law 495 1740 +1245 +251·5 - - -
Office workers 
- - - -
500 500 0 
Others 200 3585 +3385 +1692.5 300 530 +230 
% 
-57·0 
-71.0 
-42.9 
-46.1 
-
0 
0 
-
-
0 
+76.6 
Total ~3,505 26,000 +2495 +10.6 23,950 13,695 -10,255 -42.9 
Notes: 
Source: 
(a) 
~~j 
0/£. 
Medicine includes general practitioners, dentists and pharmacolo~ists for the 
professional groups, and the medical assistance for the technicians. 
Engineering includes all specializations, i.e. mechanical, electrical, civil, etc. 
Teachers refer to high secondary school-teachers for the professional groups, 
and general secondary school teachers for the technicians. 
is the balance as percentage of demand. 
indicates tllat the specialization does not apply to the given occupational category. 
(d) Other notes as in Table 3·9 
abridged from Tables 11-7 and 12-7, p.l05 of the source referred to in Table 3.9 above. 
-.J 
\...oJ 
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account for emigration seems to be rooted in the highly 
mechanical way of projection, i.e. the supply would represent 
graduates of universities, institutes and schools each year, 
while demand would increase with the projected increase in 
GDP. Estimates of supply of labour should allow for many 
factors, among which are labour mobility, whether geographic 
mobility abroad or internal mobility, or whether occupational 
mobility, death rate, retirement rate, etc. 
The projected demand for labour, however,' has al·so not 
increased according to the plan's predictions. The plan 
aimed at an annual growth rate of GDP of about 7.5% per annum. 
However, neither the GDP, nor investment have grown according 
to the plan. The growth rate in GDP at current prices for 
the period 1970-79 was estimated to amount to about 4.3%(2 9 ). 
In real terms, however, the growth rate is much lower. We 
calculated ~DP growth rate for 1970-79 to be about 1.55%(30 ). 
Economic planning itself has witnessed considerable plan 
turnover. Since independence in 1955/56, the country had three 
economic plans; the 10-year plan of 1960/61 - 1970/71; the 
5-year plan of 1970/71 - 1974/75 and the six-year plan of 
1977/78 - 1982/83. The 10-year plan was abandoned half-way 
through in 1964/65, after a change in government. The 5-year 
plan was quickly amended by the "interim programme of action" 
in 1973, and emphasis was shifted from investment in agriculture 
to transport and communications, and the plan period was 
extended by two years. The 6-year plan has also been suspended 
after the first year of the plan and replaced by the "three 
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year economic consolidation programme,,(31 ). 
It is not only plan turnover that was high in the 
country, but also there was always less actual expenditure 
than what was planned for development. Table 3.11 below 
gives some information on actual and planned development 
expenditure in the country. 
Table 3.11: Approved allocation and actual development 
expendi ture 1970/71 - 1978/79 (£. S million) 
Approved Actual Execution 
Year allocation expenditure rate (%) 
1970/71 36.0 26.7 74.2 
1971/72 65.9 29·8 45·2 
1972/73 65·5 29.6 45·2 
1973/74 85·6 41. 8 48.8 
1974/75 205. 0 102 .4 50.0 
1975/7 6 131.7 113·1 85·9 
1976/77 254.2 216.0 85·0 
1977/78 307.0 185·9 60.6 
1978/79 202.9 164.9 81. 0 
Source: Bank of Sudan "Annual Reports", and "The Economic 
Survey" of the Ministry of Finance and National 
Economy (different years). 
execution rate = (actual ~ approved) x 100. 
In the early 1970s, the execution rate, i.e. actual 
expenditure relative to planned expenditure, did not exceed 
50~ except for 1970/71, the first year of the 5-year plan. 
In the second half of the decade, however, this started to 
increase. It must be noted here that there is a considerable 
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reduction in amounts allocated - as well as actual - in 
1975/76, in which there was a reduction of £5 73.9 million 
of allocated funds than in 1974/75. Both these were increased 
in 1976/77 to finish on-going projects, in order to start 
the 6-year plan. The first year of the 6-year plan, 1977/78, 
had a very large allocated fund for development. However, 
actual investment fell short of the planned target by £5 121.1 
million, or nearly 40%, and was lower than the previous year's 
actual investment. Realizing the shortages of manpower, and 
capital, the government quickly suspended the plan and under-
t90k the "three year economic consolidation programme" for 
the period 1978/79 - 1980/81. The programme places major 
emphasis on "completing projects already in progress, and 
easing bottlenecks in capital, labour, and infrastructure". (32) 
Thus the allocated development expenditure and the actual 
both fell after the first year of the plan, and the targeted 
growth rate of the GDP was put down to 6.5% per annum(33). 
Thus, it is not only the supply of labour projected by 
the six-year plan which is in doubt, but also the projected 
demand for labour. In such a case it would be very difficult 
to give a precise account of the future supply-demand 
situation of the labour force. However, the general impression 
from this section is that, although there could be some 
surpluses of certain types of labour, yet, acute shortages 
could exist of other types. 
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3.5: Summary and conclusions 
Like many developing countries, it is notable that the 
Sudanese economy is mainly agricultural, with agriculture 
contributing the most to GDP and exports. Thus agriculture 
involves nearly two thirds of the economically active population 
of the country. However, apart from the large scale 
agricultural schemes owned and operated by the public sector, 
activities in the agricultural sector are mainly in the 
traditional subsistence part. The manufacturing sector is 
very small and contributes less than 10% to the GDP. All 
this contributes to the small urban labour market in the 
country. The public sector is by far the largest single 
employer in the country. The private sector employs only a 
small proportion of the labour force, the majority of which 
is best thought of as being informal sector employment. 
With low levels of literacy of the population, the 
educated labour force makes a very small proportion of the 
economically active population. However, although the 
literacy rate is improving, in the sense that more and more 
school and university graduates are produced, the educational 
system seems to be biassed towards general academic studies 
rather than technical studies. The implication of this is 
an excess supply of educated manpower of certain types and 
shortages of other types. Moreover, it was noted that females 
not only have a lower literacy rate than males, but they also 
have much lower activity rates. This was attributed to 
various economic, religious, and cultural reasons. 
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The public sector has set a clearly demarcated wage 
structure, in which wage scales, minimum and maximum pay, 
as well as criteria for entry and moving along a scale are 
specified. However, it seems that legislation has played a 
major role in wage determination and wage levels in this 
sector, rather than only forces of supply and demand. In 
contrast, the private sector never had a clear pay policy, 
and it was only recently that the minimum wage legislation 
was enforced there. 
Unemployment seems to be an urban problem in The Sudan, 
and mainly among the young school leavers. The low levels of 
unemployment in rural areas might hide considerable under-
employment, especially in agriculture, although it is not 
possible to give a precise account of the extent of under-
employment. As for the future requirement of manpower, the 
6-year economic plan of 1977/78 - 1982/83 predicts shortages 
in the supply of some skills, e.g. engineers, agriculturalists, 
technicians, etc., as well as surpluses in others. These 
shortages might be aggravated and critical shortages occur to 
the degree of hindering the economic development process if 
emigration continues at the present rate and composition. 
The full implication of migration in this respect is investi-
gated in other chapters, however, here it is worth pointing 
out that the plan's projections did not take this migration 
into account. Moreover, the projected demand for labour 
itself does not seem to have grown according to the p-Ian, 
since the targeted growth rate in GDP was reduced, and the 
plan itself was suspended. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE SUDANESE MIGRANTS SURVEY 
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4.1. Introduction 
A sample survey was undertaken by the author among 
Sudanese migrants in Saudi Arabia during April/May 1980 
(hereafter called migrants survey) to obtain information 
about the phenomenon of migration from The Sudan. The purpose 
of this chapter is to present some detailed notes on how 
this survey was planned and executed, as well as problems 
encountered in conducting the survey. The second section 
of the chapter deals with planning the survey, while its 
objectives and purposes are discussed in Section J. Section 
4 deals with the formulation of the questionnaire, and how 
questions were designed, as well as the methodology of the 
survey. In Section 5 we explain how the field-work was 
carried out. In particular, the section presents discussion 
of the pilot survey, the sampling frame and the sampling 
procedure, as well as the conducting of the interviews. The 
chapter concludes, in Section 6, by stating some of the 
difficulties and lessons learned from undertaking such a 
survey, in the hope that they might be avoided in future 
research in this area. 
4.2: Planning the survey 
In view of the absence of detailed information about 
Sudanese migration for work abroad, it was thought necessary 
to carry out a detailed survey among Sudanese migrants. The 
determination of the items on which information was to be 
collected, the degree of detail to be attempted, and the 
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ways in which the information could best be obtained, 
constituted the most difficult part of planning the survey. 
Careful consideration was given at the beginning to the 
purpose for which the survey was undertaken, the type of 
information it was to collect, and the use to which the 
information was to be put. Since the survey was thought to 
be the first of its type in the country, it was likely to 
provide information that would be of use for many purposes. 
So the first thought was to obtain as much detailed information 
as possible. However, being aware of the danger of overloading 
the survey with the collection of different items of information, 
as well as financial and other constraints, the number of 
questions asked was rather limited. 
Before starting the survey, we studied the work already 
done by others on the topic and related subjects. Unfortunately 
no such detailed survey has been undertaken about migration 
from The Sudan. However, in early 1980, we became aware of 
two studies in this area,Galaleldin (Dec. 1979) and Abdalla 
(Feb. 1980). Although both studies are based on survey 
results, the first does not state how the survey was undertaken 
and what problems were encountered. The second states that 
questionnaires were distributed to 500 migrants in their 
place of work and collected from them, without going into 
much detail about how this was carried out. This resulted 
in a response rate of 50% i.e. 250 questionnaires were 
collected out of the 500 distributed. Nevertheless, both 
studies gave some insights about how to tackle our problem. 
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Another problem relating to planning the survey was 
where it would be best to undertake it, i.e. whether the 
survey should be carried out in the Sudan or in destination 
countries. To fully understand the implicationsof migration 
to the Sudanese economy, it might well be better to undertake 
the survey in the Sudan, among returning migrants for example. 
There was no way to identify these after they return home, 
unless a large sample survey which included both migrants and 
non-migrants was undertaken. The financial and time constraints 
would not allow such a survey to be undertaken. Moreover, 
since we do not know the geographic origins of migrants in 
The Sudan, it would be very difficult to know where to 
undertake such a survey. Furthermore, because of the recent 
nature of migration, returning migrants were thought to be 
very few. Thus the possibility of undertaking the survey in 
The Sudan was eliminated. The alternative was to undertake 
the survey at the receiving end of the migration stream. 
However, given the limited time and resources, it was not 
possible to undertake a survey in each country receiving 
Sudanese migrants, and thus only one country had to be chosen. 
Saudi Arabia was chosen for this purpose, mainly because 
about 70~ of Sudanese migrants migrate to Saudi Arabia 
(Chapter Two). Given this fact, and the similarity in 
economic conditions in all receiving countries, it was hoped 
that a survey among Sudanese migrants in Saudi Arabia would 
be fairly representative. Of course it was not possible to 
undertake a survey which would cover all towns in Saudi Arabia. 
Riyadh city, being the capital and the largest city in the 
country was chosen for this purpose. 
- 88 -
4.3. Objectives 
The principal objective of the survey was to collect 
information about some problems relating to Sudanese 
emigration abroad, in order to test some hypotheses relating 
to this phenomenon. In particular, data was collected about 
the personal and demographic characteristics of migrants, 
their incomes abroad and at home, their savings and remittances 
from abroad, and many other related subjects. A detailed 
investigation along these lines has been lacking. The 
documentary information about Sudanese migration is not only 
scarce and unreliable, but also proved to have serious 
limitations (Chapter Two). The only available information 
about migration was that obtained from the Department of Labour 
in The Sudan. This proved to be inadequate, understates the 
number of migrants and lacks the necessary detail needed in 
any study of migration. It was virtually useless for deriving 
any information about future behaviour, and of little value 
in uncovering motives, opinions 'and other information usually 
found by careful ques~ioning. 
In addition to the demographic information about migrant's 
characteristics, information about their incomes, savings, 
remittances, and intended use of savings in The Sudan was 
also collected. To fully understand and investigate the 
implications of migration for the Sudanese economy, information 
about these matters is necessary. Migrants do not affect 
the home economy only by their absence, but also through 
their savings, remittances from abroad, and what use these 
remittances are put to at home. Thus information about 
- 89 -
migrant's propensity to save, as well as their propensity 
to remit home are very valuable in this respect. Information 
about migrant's employment, both abroad and at home, should 
be useful in assessing skill gains from migration, and the 
implications of returning migrants for the labour force in 
the home country. Information on other, and related subjects 
was also collected. In summary, the main objectives of the 
survey could be stated in the following general points: 
(a) To measure the level and trends of migration streams 
from the Sudan. 
(b) To establish and measure the demographic and socio-economic 
characteristics of migrants. 
(c) To explore and investigate the motives for migration. 
(d) To study the implications of this migration for the 
economy of the country as a whole, as well as for the 
individual migrant and non-migrant. 
(e) To help formulate sound economic policies towards' 
migration. 
Questions should be designed to obtain information about 
these objectives for the purpose of testing hypotheses 
relating to these matters. Thus, the second stage of the 
survey is to formulate a questionnaire which is capable of 
obtaining most of the required information. 
4.4: Formulation of the questionnaire 
For the purpose of undertaking this survey, a questionnaire 
was designed and prepared at Stirling University, and some 
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refinements were intro&lced after the results of the pilot 
survey. Since Arabic is the common language used by migrants, 
the questionnaire was translated into Arabic before carrying 
out the survey. The general approach in designing and 
preparing the questionnaire took the following into account. 
(a) Simplicity: In a survey, it should not only be easy to 
interpret and communicate with the respondent, but it 
is also essential that the question is easily understood 
without ambiguity. This was more important in our survey, 
taking into account the wide differences in the levels 
of education expected among migrants from a population 
with low levels of literacy, like the Sudanese population. 
In such a case 'difficult' wording would cause confusion 
to the respondent. Thus each question aimed to be as 
simple and direct as possible. 
(b) Arrangement of questions was carefully planned. Questions 
more likely to raise the interest of the respondent were 
placed early in the schedule, the rationale being that, 
if the interest of the respondent was aroused and he 
became involved, he would be willing to continue with 
questions that might be less interesting or that required 
patient thought. The more 'sensitive' questions, such 
as those relating to incomes, savings and remittances, 
were placed towards the end of the questionnaire. 
(c) Most questions had structured answers to allow answering 
by ticking the appropriate answer. This however did not 
apply to question 16, concerning intended use of savings 
at home, since we were interested in obtaining as much 
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detailed information as possible, and we did not want 
to severely restrict the respondent. 
(d) Answers were meant to be objective and capable of 
tabulation. 
Having finished planning the survey, defining its 
objectives, and designing the questionnaire, what remains 
is to undertake the field work and conduct the survey. The 
following section explains how this was done. 
4.5: Field-work and related aspects 
To undertake the field-work, the first task would be to 
secure finance for this purpose. Finance, however, was one 
of the major constraints in conducting the survey. This 
played the major role in limiting the sample size to only 
400 respondents. Before the execution of the survey, however, 
it is also important to improve the questionnaire and make 
sure that the questions would lead to the required information. 
A pilot survey, before undertaking the proposed survey, 
was helpful in these matters. Having done this, and before 
conducting the survey, one needs to select a sampling frame 
and a sample to identify the respondents for the purpose of 
the survey. After the pilot survey, and the selection of 
the suitable sample, then comes the conduct of the survey 
itself. This sections deals with these main problems of 
the field-work, and shows how they were carried out. 
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4.5.1: The pilot survey 
Before undertaking the full survey, a pilot survey 
was carried out after the completion of the questionnaire. 
The main items to be tested with the help of this, were the 
suitability of the design and the wording of the questionnaire. 
It is only by trying a question and being able to examine 
the full response to it, that one can discover whether the 
question is clear or not. Our aim here was to make the 
questions easily understood by the respondent, willingly 
answered by them, and taken by the whole population unambiguously 
to mean the same thing. Additional benefits of the pilot 
survey were to determine: 
(a) ways in which to word questions to obtain precise data. 
This involved the function of the question, whether to 
collect facts or opinions, and whether to do this by 
open or closed questions. 
(b) ways of putting the subject to the respondent to achieve 
a high response. 
(c) the best layout of the schedule so as to make it manageable. 
(d) Since we are using structured answers in the questionnaire, 
such a pilot survey was hoped to indicate answer choices 
which are meaningful to the respondent, which do not 
overlap, which include the full range of possible answers, 
which do not seem to be very restrictive, which do not 
suggest answers, and which are clearly relevant to the 
purpose of the questionnaire. 
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(e) the length of time required to complete the questionnaire. 
Given the financial and time constraints, and problems 
of exit and entry to Saudi Arabia, there was no way to 
supervise the pilot survey myself. Some of the schedules 
of the questionnaire (50) were sent to my brother and 
friends in Saudi Arabia, explaining to them the purpose of 
the pilot survey, and how it could be carried out, asking 
them to undertake this and return the filled questionnaire 
to me. After receiving these, I went through all the answers 
to see how clear the questions were, and whether there was 
any ambiguity. A few questions needed re-wording to give 
a more precise meaning, and a few needed to be re-ordered. 
Some questions, particularly those on demographic aspects, 
were more easily understood by the respondents than others, 
such as those on economic aspects. This suggested that we 
add a definition of income, and remittances to the questionnaire. 
The sensitive questions, concerning income and so o~were 
moved to the middle of the schedule. However, since we 
could not undertake the pilot survey ourselves, some of the 
aims, like the length of time needed to complete the 
questionnaire were left unanswered. The schedule of the 
questionnaire is in Appendix C. 
4.).2: Sampling and the sampling frame 
The most difficulty was experienced in finding a SUitable 
sampling frame from which to draw a sample for the survey. 
The Sudan, as well as the whole Arab region suffers from the 
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lack of recorded information. In The Sudan it was not 
possible to find any sort of address list, or any type of 
record about migrants in Saudi Arabia. The Sudan Embassy 
in Saudi Arabia, again had no records whatsoever, nor the 
Saudi authorities (who were unwilling to release any information 
even if they had it). The only suitable information was 
found with the Sudanese Association Committee (SAC) in Riyadh. 
The Association is formed to look after the social welfare 
of Sudanese there, and it keeps records of names and addresses 
of its members. This type of information, however, is not 
complete and is not up to date. This is because it is 
optional for the individual to join the Association, and 
there is the possibility that some are not members, and thus 
they would be excluded if the sample is based on this 
information" only. Moreover, new migrants might need some 
time to get information about the Association and decide 
whether to join or not. The alternative to this was a list 
of Sudanese clubs, in which some social activities are 
undertaken, and which are used as a residence by some members 
of the club. I learned that there are over 100 such clubs 
in Riyadh city, with addresses known to the SAC, each with 
a membership of 20-40 persons. It was quite possible to 
base the whole sample on these clubs. However, I learnt 
that the majority of members are workers who are either 
single or unaccompanied by families, and who came to live 
together in these clubs so as to reduce their cost of living 
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and housing. In this way it would e~clude migrants 
accompanied by their families, as well as those who live 
separately. Furthermore, these clubs are based on geographical 
origins in The Sudan. That is some members of a village, 
township or an area in The Sudan, would come together and 
form a club. So, basing the whole sample on these would 
introduce a bias in the sample towards a cert~in type of 
migrant •• The alternative to all this was to distribute the 
questionnaire among migrants in their places of work. However, 
apart from the difficulty of knowing exactly their places 
of work, basing the whole sample on this would be too costly 
and time consuming in relation to the limited resources and 
time available, as well as it would exclude the unemployed 
migrants. Taking all these problems into consideration, it 
was considered most appropriate to divide the sample equally 
between the two groups. One part would be based on a sample 
drawn from these clubs and the other on a sample drawn' from 
migrants in their places of wor~. To obtain a sample of 
these clubs, 20 clubs were selected from a list of addresses 
of 100 clubs, using simple random sampling, with the help of 
random number tables. From each selected club, 10 migrants 
were to be interviewed. The greatest difficulty, however, 
was experienced with the second part of the sample, since it 
was very difficult to list all places in which the Sudanese 
in Riyadh work. This is especially true in the case of 
migrants working in private houses. However, the SAC was 
again helpfUl in providing such a list, although it might 
- 96 -
well be incomplete. From this 30 places were selected, 
and the questionnaire was distributed among migrants while 
at work. 
It was generally felt that if the SAC was convinced 
of the value and purpose of the survey, it would be helpful, 
not only in conducting the survey, but also in the publicity 
aspects of the survey. So the survey and its purpose were 
explained in detail to the committee, who in turn discussed 
these with their friends. The value and purpose of the 
survey was also explained and discussed in a general meeting 
of the association members to give some publicity to the 
survey. 
4.5.3: Conducting the survey 
Given the limited resources available to employ inter-
viewers, the survey was conducted mainly by myself. The 
amount of money available would not allow employing even one 
interviewer. However, the help ,0£ two friends was obtained 
in this respect, to whom the purpose of the survey was fully 
explained. They were also carefully trained in how to conduct 
the interview and fill in the questionnaire, and they were 
given some questionnaires to undertake part of the interviewing. 
However, since they had their own jobs, this meant doing 
the interviews in their spare time. The SAC was very 
interested in the survey, and very helpful too. The committee 
was able to assign a car for me, and someone each day to 
drive me around to the chosen addresses. This, however, was 
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again limited by the spare time available to them. 
To save time the questionnaire was distributed among 
the chosen sample, and left with the respondent to complete. 
In some cases, the respondent would be ready for interviewing 
on the first visit, in which case I would undertake the 
interviewing myself. A maximum of three visits was possible 
for each respondent. The questionnaire would be handed to 
the responden~ on the first visit and collected on the second 
visit if an interview did not take place on the first visit. 
A third and final call is made if the questionnaire was not 
completed in the first two visits. Only three respondents 
refused to answer completely. However, it was not possible 
to get hold of some respondents after the first visit because 
they were not found at their places of work or residence. 
In this way, from a total of 400 schedules, 310 were collected 
and found suitable for analysis. This implies a response 
rate of 77.5%, which is reasonably good, given the most 
difficult field conditions. 
Thus, although no definite claim can be made that the 
sample was particularly typical or representative of migrants 
as a whole, given the difficulties under which the survey 
was undertaken, it ~ould ge said that we made the most out 
of what was available. A proper large random sample would 
have extended the survey beyond the resources and time 
available. The choice of the sample size was necessitated 
from the start by the limited facilities and time available 
in relation to the task to be undertaken. 
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4.6: Some difficulties and lessons learned 
As ours is one of the pioneering surveys in this area 
of study in the country, some of the difficulties and lessons 
learned with regard to the questionnaire, the field-work 
and related aspects, might be usefUl for those undertaking 
similar surveys in the future. 
discussed below. 
Some of these are briefly 
(a) The determination of the details of the information to 
be collected constitutes one of the main difficulties in 
planning the survey. The detailed problems which arise 
in determining what information is necessary and how it 
is best obtained is not an easy task. The basic problem 
is essentially that of the selection of the most relevant 
items of information from all those which it is possible 
to collec~. Thus, apart from some theoretical background 
to indicate what information might be relevant, a careful 
planning of the aims of the survey and its purposes is 
essential before undertaking a survey. 
(b) In this survey, it would have been useful if the survey 
could have been undertaken with the help of interviewers, 
who could be trained and well informed about the survey 
and how to conduct it, and who could easily be supervised. 
This would certainly have resulted in a higher response 
rate, and probably in better quality answers. 
(c) To obtain some co-operation from the Saudi authorities, 
it might have been better if the survey was conducted 
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with the help of an institute in Saudi Arabia. A 
survey conducted in collaboration with the University of 
Riyadh, for example, would not only secure permission of 
the authorities to undertake the survey, but might also 
result in a good co-operation from the authorities. 
(d) It is needless to mention the importance of a proper 
sampling frame to draw a sample from. This, however, is 
very difficult to obtain in many developing countries. 
(e) It might be helpful to undertake a survey among returning 
migrants, in order to fully understand the implications 
of migration for the country. In particular, information 
about how migrants actually spent their savings and 
remittances, and how they used their gained training and 
experiences, might be helpful in this respect, rather 
than information about the intended use of savings and 
remittances. 
In spite of the above mentioned problems, and the 
limited facilities available, the questionnaire was comprehensive 
and determined efforts have been made to make the survey as 
complete, representative and comprehensive as possible. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CHARACTERISTICS OF MIGRANTS 
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Introduction 
The available documentary information about migration 
from The Sudan and the characteristics of migrants was 
discussed in Chapter Two. Such data was found to be 
inadequate, unreliable, and lacking the necessary detail 
for a migration study. Thus a survey among migrants was 
undertaken to supplement the available information. Chapter 
Four dealt with the aims, planning, methodology and other 
aspects of this survey. The purpose of this chapter is 
mainly to reflect the findings of this survey as far as 
migrant's characteristics are concerned. These include the 
age and sex composition of migrants, their marital status, 
regional origins, educational attainments, and other 
related topics. All the data in this respect, unless otherwise 
stated, refer to the results of this survey. 
5.1: Distribution by age and sex 
As expected, migrants tend'to be of young working ages. 
They tend to be concentrated in the 20-44 years of age, 97% 
of migrants in the sample being in this age category. 
Moreover, it seems that there is more tendency for concentration 
at the 25-34 age groups, with 61% of the sample being in this 
age group, while 36~ are in the 25-29 age group. Migrants 
under 20 years are a very small proportion, making.less than 
l~' of the sample, wi th .the minimum age being 17 years. This 
low proportion of migrants under 20 could be explained by 
the migration laws in the immigration countries. 
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require a minimum age of 17 years for imported labour. 
The female migration for work seems to be non-existent 
or negligible. Only one female in the sample of 310 migrants 
was found. This should not be surprising Since, as noted 
in Chapter Three, females have low participation rates. 
With socio-cultural factors inhibiting females to go out 
for work in The Sudan itself, it would also inhibit them 
from migrating for work abroad in a region having the same 
social attitudes towards females going out for work. This, 
however, does not deny the migration of accompanied wives 
and children. These, however, are believed to be small in 
number because of regulations in the immigration countries 
which discourage families from joining migrants. In general, 
then, it seems that migration does not only select from the 
young active population, but mainly from the male labour 
force. 
5.2: Marital status 
Generally, it seems that the proportion of single 
migrants in the sample is relatively higher than the married 
ones. While 53% of migrants in the sample are single, 
only 45~ of them are married. Moreover, only 15% of the 
sample or about 33~ of married migrants are accompanied 
by their wives and families abroad. With migration selecting 
from the young, and migration laws discouraging migration 
of families, it is natural to find such marital status of 
migrants. Moreover, taking the family abroad would increase 
- 103 -
expenditure abroad, and therefore only able migrants would 
take their families abroad. Furthermore, the process of 
selecting migrants would prefer either the single or those 
who are unaccompanied by their families. For example, 
employers abroad are usually responsible to their governments 
for the labour they import, the 'kafeel' system as discussed 
in Chapter Two, and therefore they try to reduce costs by 
selecting single or unaccompanied migrants. 
5.3: Regional origins 
The majority of migrants seem to be born in the rural 
areas of the country. 710/ of the sample reported rural 
areas as their place of birth. However, the majority of them 
were residing in the urban areas before migrating abroad, some 
suo/< of the sample stating urban areas as their last place of 
residence before migration. This would indicate a step 
migration; from the rural areas to the urban areas, a,nd then 
from urban areas to other countries. The proportion of 
these who were residing in urban areas, of those who were 
born in rural areas, increases considerably with the level 
of education. This indicates a higher propensity to migrate 
to urban areas in the country for educated people. That 
rural to urban migrants in The Sudan are basically young 
educated males was also noted by internal migration surveyS 
in the country (Galaleldin 1973 and ILO Survey 1974). Urban 
to rural migration on the other hand seems to be very 
negligible, since only 1% of those born in urban areas were 
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residing in rural areas before migrating abroad. 
As for the geographical origins of migrants, it seems 
that most migrants were originally born in four provinces, 
The Northern, Khartoum, Gazera and the Nile province (Table Bl). 
However, most of these were resident in Khartoum province 
before migration abroad. Khartoum and Gazera provinces 
are usually the receiving province of migrants from other 
provinces (Chapter Two and Table AS), while the Northern 
province is traditionally the sending province. There is a 
complete absence of migrants abroad from The Southern 
provinces of The Sudan. As noted in Chapter Two this region 
does not seem to participate in internal migration to the 
northern region either. The differences in race, religion, 
language, and culture between the Southern region and other 
AOPEC could be expected to work as strong deterrent to 
migration from the southern region to these countries. 
5.4: Education 
The literacy rate among migrants seems to be quite high. 
Table S.l overleaf shows the distribution of migrants in 
the sample according to their levels of education. 
It is clearly seen from the table that the literacy 
rate among migrants amounts to about 90% of migrants in the 
sample. Moreover those with above secondary levels of 
education represent a considerable proportion of migrants, 
being over a quarter of the sample. With the low literacy 
rates among the indigenous population as seen in Chapter Three. 
it is certain that such a proportion of educated labour force 
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Table 5.1: Migrants by level of education. 
Level of education 
Can't read or write 
Primary 
Intermediate (general secondary) 
Secondary (Higher secondary) 
Higher institute 
University 
Post-graduate 
Not classified, student 
All sample 
Source: Migrants Survey. 
Number 
30 
71 
38 
82 
28 
45 
15 
1 
310 
10 
23 
12 
26 
9 
15 
5 
100 
would not hold for the home population. These educational 
attainments of migrants indicate that migration selects 
mainly from the relatively educated manpower in the country. 
5.5: Occupation abroad and in The Sudan 
The proportion of migrants taking unskilled jobs while 
abroad is the highest among all types of occupations abroad, 
making about 31% of the sample. The occupational composition 
of migrants abroad, however, does not seem to differ much 
from that at home, although some differences occur. These 
are reflected in Table 5.2 overleaf. 
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Table 5.2: Occupation abroad and in The Sudan 
Occupation Abroad 
No. % 
Unskilled worker 97 31 
Farmers .. . . 
Skilled worker 50 16 
Clerks 28 9 
Accountants 48 15 
Technicians 28 9 
Professional & administrative 42 14 
Unemployed 17 5 
N.B.: •. indicates no observation in the sample. 
Source: Migrants Survey. 
in Sudan 
No. % 
41 13 
29 9 
62 20 
26 8 
38 12 
34 11 
45 15 
35 11 
The table shows that while 22o/r of migrants in the sample 
had an unskilled job at home (including farmers), thi$ 
proportion rises to about 3l~ among migrants abroad. Generally 
it seems that occupations are down-graded when migrants work 
abroad, and migrants usually take lower-level jobs abroad 
than they had at home. For example, while 20% of migrants 
in the sample had skilled occupation in The Sudan, only 16~f,. 
have skilled jobs while abroad. Put in another way, of 
those who have been working as skilled labour in The Sudan, 
only 6l~( do so abroad, while 26~{ of them are classified as 
taking unskilled jobs (Table B2). In general, however, 
the majority of migrants in the sample had an occupation 
at home that required some skill. This probably indicates 
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that the migration process tends to select from the skilled 
manpower in the country. 
5.6: Employment sector abroad and in The Sudan 
Migrants in the sample, while abroad tend to be 
concentrated in the services and the trade sectors. While 
in The Sudan, a considerable proportion of them seem to 
have been working in the services sector too. Table 5.3 
below shows the employment sector of migrants, both in the 
Sudan and abroad. 
Table 5.3: Migrants by employment sector abroad and in The 
Sudan before migration 
Sector Abroad In Sudan 
No. % No. ~0 
Agriculture 1 
- 39 13 
Construction 13 4 14 4 
Electricity and water 12 4 7 2 
Commerce 80 26 13 4 
Transport and communications 23 7 31 10 
Finance 31 10 5 2 
Services 88 28 107 35 
Manufac turi ng 8 3 47 15 
Minerals and oil 3 1 1 -
Domestic servants 26 8 1 -
No job or answer 25 8 45 15 
- indicates less than 1% of the sample of 310. 
Source: Migrants Survey. 
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The table indicates that the services sector is the 
leading employing sector for migrants both at home before 
migration and abroad. However, the differences in employment 
sector are also clear. While 13% of migrants in the sample 
were involved in the agricultural sector before migration, 
almost none of them is in this sector abroad. Furthermore, 
the table shows that 15% of migrants were employed in the 
manufacturing sector at home, against only 3% abroad. Thus, 
it seems that migrants not only change their occupations 
abroad, but also their employment sectors. These changes 
could'also be seen when sectors of employment are divided 
into the broader public and private sectors of employment. 
Table 5.4 below shows this: 
Table 5.4: Migrants by public and private sectors of 
employment abroad and in Sudan 
Sector Abroad in Sudan 
No. % No. % 
Public sector 174, 56 175 56 
Private sector 114 37 47 15 
Self-employed 2 0.6 52 17 
No job or answer 20 6 36 12 
Source: Migrants Survey. 
The public sectors both abroad and at home set out to 
employ the majority of migrants. The private sector abroad, 
however, seem to employ larger proportions of the migrants 
than in The Sudan. The self-employed migrants tend to be 
non-existing abroad, while they are of a considerable proportion 
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in The Sudan. This probably stems from the regulation 
that no migrant labour abroad is allowed to establish his 
own business in most immigration countries unless as a 
partner with a citizen of the country itself. This partly 
explains the small proportion of those reported as self 
employed abroad. 
5.7: Ways of entering Saudi Arabia 
Rules which regulate migration officially were discussed 
in Chapter Two, Section 2.5. In practice, however, people 
might use many means of migration other than the official 
channels. The purpose of this section is to investigate the 
channels used by migrants in practice, and whether they 
differ considerably from the official migration channels. 
Table 5.5 below shows the main means by which migrants in the 
sample have. entered Saudi Arabia. 
Table 5.5: Ways of entering Saudi Arabia 
Ways/means No. % 
Work contract or work visa 189 61 
For Haj, Omra or a visit 80 26 
Through other countries 25 8 
Other ways 2 0.6 
Did not state 14 5 
All sample 310 100 
Source: Migrants Survey. 
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The table clearly indicates that the majority of 
migrants in the sample, some 61% entered Saudi Arabia with 
a work contract or a work visa in the first place. If all 
those who migrated without a work contract or work visa are 
considered as illegal migrants from The Sudan, this would 
indicate an illegal migration rate of about 39% of the 
migrants in the sample. However, some of those who stated 
that they entered Saudi Arabia with a work contract might 
be afraid to state otherwise, even if they actually entered 
without a work contract. Thus the true illegal migration 
rate might be well above the observed 39%. Moreover, not 
all those who migrated with a work contract did so through 
the Labour Department in The Sudan. Furthermore, some of 
the work contracts might have been obtained illegally. This 
raises the question of how work contracts or work visas are 
obtained by migrants. Table 5.6 below gives some indication 
on this. 
Table 5.6: Ways of obtaining job contracts 
Ways/means No. % of all % of work 
sample contracts 
(a) 
Labour Exchange Office in Sudan 33 10.6 17·5 
Employment missions to Sudan 29 9.4 15·3 
Private employment agencies 5 1.6 2.6 
Relatives and friends 93 30.0 49·2 
Official secondment 17 5·5 9·0 
Other ways 3 1.0 1.6 
Did not state 9 2·9 4.8 
All 189 61.1 100.0 
~.: (a) % of those who entered with a work contract. 
Source: Migrants Survey. 
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The table clearly indicates that the main way of 
obtaining work contracts is through relatives and friends 
abroad. These provide work contracts for about 30% of the 
sample or nearly 50% of these who migrated with a work 
contract. These are compared to 11% and 18% respectively 
obtaining their work contracts from the Labour Department 
in The Sudan. This probably indicates the limited involvement 
of the Sudanese Labour Department in the migration process, 
confirming that the statistics from the Labour Department 
could considerably understate the number of migrants abroad. 
5.8: Job information channels 
It seems that friends and relatives are not only important 
sources of obtaining work contracts or work visas, but they 
are also important in providing information about job 
opportunities abroad. About 51% of migrants in the sample 
stated that they received information about their first job 
abroad from relatives and friends abroad (Table B6). This 
compares to 11% obtaining their information from the Labour 
Office in The Sudan, 11% from newspapers, 9% through direct 
contracts with their employers and 2% through private 
employment agencies. It seems that relatives and friends 
are particularly important in providing information for 
migrants with low levels of education and skills. Presumably, 
migrants with high levels of education and skills are more 
able to obtain and analyse information from other sources. 
The time spent in first job search abroad seems to be 
short. Migrants who were able to find their first job in 
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less than a month were about 53% of t~e sample, while those 
who found their job in one to two months were about 16% 
of the sample. Those who stayed more than six months to 
find a job were only 57: of the sample (Table B7). The time 
spent in first job search, however, should be minimal since 
migrants - at least officially - are suppos~d to have migrated 
with a work contract. The longer time spent searching for 
the first job might be attributed to illegal migration, as 
well as the way in which the job contract is obtained. The 
illegal migrant might find it difficult to obtain a job. 
In fact only 34* of those who entered Saudi Arabia for a 
visit or Haj" were able to obtain a job in the first month 
of their arrival, compared to 67% of those who entered with 
a work contract. However, the fact that 67* of those who 
entered with a work contract obtained their jobs in the first 
month would indicate that some work contracts are obtained 
illegally, and actually the migrant is offered a work.visa 
rather than a specific job. For example only 40% of those 
who obtained their work contracts from relatives and friends 
were able to find a job in less than a month, compared to 
100% of those who obtained their work contracts from the 
Labour Office in Sudan. Thus the time spent in first job 
search seems to depend not only on the demographic 
characteristics of migrants, but also on the way in which 
the work contract is obtained. Generally speaking, however, 
the short time spent in first jo~ search would indicate a 
low magnitude of income foregone by migrants during this job 
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search time. Migrants, however, do not only spend time 
searching for jobs, but might also change their jobs in 
search of better ones. About 33% of migrants in the sample 
had changed their jobs at least once since migrating abroad 
(Table B8). It should be pointed out, however, that the 
usual practice in changing jobs is that the migrant would 
be working at his present job and at the same time searching 
for another job. In this way time spent during changing job 
would be greatly reduced. 
5.9: Period since out-migration and the intended period of 
migration 
Sudanese migration for work abroad, as discussed in 
Section 2.3, seems to be a recent phenomenon. The migrants 
survey reveals that most of the migrants in the sample, 38% 
had a year .since out-migration from The Sudan. This proportion 
decreases with the increase in the period since out-migration 
to reach 15% of the sample having more than 5 years since out-
migration (Table B17). However, it should be pointed out 
that this is not a conclusive evidence that migration is a 
recent phenomenon, since some migrants might have returned 
home after a certain period of migration. This is quite 
possible since it seems that migration from the country is 
of a temporary nature. Less than 1% of all migrants in the 
sample stated that they intend to stay abroad forever. 
However, about 35% of migrants stated that they intend to 
migrate f-or a period of between 5 to 10 years, with the 
majority of this group intending to migrate for about seven 
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years. Those who are not sure when they will return home 
make about 29% of the sample, while 25% of the sample stated 
an intended period of migration of less than 5 years 
(Table BI8). In general, however, it could be said that 
the intended period of migration is somewhere between five 
and seven years. This, however, would differ according to 
the migrants characteristics and the like. When broken down 
by occupation, for example, it seems that migrants with 
lower occupational levels tend to plan a longer migration 
horizon than those with higher levels of occupations. 
Moreover the proportion of those who do not know when they 
might return home seems to decrease with the increase in 
the occupational levels. This tends to support the hypothesis 
that those with low occupational and educational levels 
tend to take longer to fulfil their aspirations and expectations 
than those with higher levels, probably because of their 
relatively lower incomes. However, this would depend .also 
on the conditions in the migrants' work contracts. 
5.10: Migrants' future intentions 
Since migration seems to be of a temporary nature, 
questions would arise about migrants' intentions when they 
finally come home. Among these is the intended location of 
settlement at home. According to the survey, most intend 
to settle in urban areas. Table 5.7 overleaf gives some 
indication of these future places: 
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Table 5.7: Intended settlement of migrants on return home 
Area of intended settlement No. % 
Khartoum 187 60 
Other large towns 65 21 
Rural areas 37 12 
Don't know yet 11 4 
No answer 10 3 
Source: Migrants Survey. 
It is clear from the table that Khartoum, the capital 
city, is the main target of future settlement. Added to 
Khartoum are· other large towns, and thus intended urban 
settlement is about 81% of migrants in the sample. On the 
other hand, the proportion who intend to settle in the rural 
areas, 12%, is lower than the proportion of those who were 
resident in these areas before migration, 19%. This indicates 
that migration abroad would induce urban settlement on return 
rather than rural settlement. This indicates a widening gap 
between urban and rural areas, especially if migrants invest 
their savings where they intend to settle. The investigation 
of what migrants intend to do on return, then, would be of 
interest. Table 5.8 overleaf gives some indication about this. 
Although a considerable proportion of migrants in the 
sample, as indicated in the table, is not sure yet of what 
they will do on return home, it is clear that nearly half 
intend to establish their own business on return home. A 
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Table 5.8: Migrants' intended future employment on return home 
Intended employment 
Go back to previous job 
Look for another paid job 
Establish own business 
No intention to go back 
Don't know yet 
No answer 
Source: Migrants Survey. 
No. 
22 
6 
152 
o 
114 
16 
7 
2 
49 
o 
37 
5 
very small proportion intend to go back to their previous 
jobs. The majority of these, however, are those on official 
secondment who have their jobs and positions still kept for 
them at home. It is clear from the table, moreover, that 
the proportion of migrants who intend to go back to paid 
employment on return are very small. This suggests that 
establishments in the Sudan from which the migration occurred 
cannot expect the returning migrants to work for them again. 
S.ll: Summary and conclusion 
The discussion presented in this chapter suggests that 
migrants are basically young, educated and skilled males. 
The majority of migrants in the sample are in the young 
working ages. Moreover, the literacy rate seems to be quite 
high, with considerable proportions of them with high levels 
of education. The evidence not only suggests that the 
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literacy rate is high among migrants relative to the 
economically active population of The Sudan, but also that 
migration occurs mainly among the educated labour force. 
Furthermore, the skill composition of migrants seem to 
suggest that migration selects mainly from the skilled manpower, 
with more than two thirds of migrants in the sample having 
had a job in The Sudan requiring some sort of skill. Migration 
however, seems to be of a temporary nature, in the sense 
that all migrants intend to return to The Sudan after some 
time abroad. The planned period of migration, although 
tending to differ according to the characteristics of migrants, 
generally seems to be between five and seven years. On 
return home, however, most migrants seem to have the intention 
of settling in urban areas rather than in rural areas. The 
proportion who were resident in the rural areas before 
migration i5 higher than that who intend to settle in these 
areas after return home. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
IMPLICATIONS OF MIGRATION: A GENERAL DISCUSSION AND A 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
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6.1. Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to point out the implications 
of migration, by reviewing the theoretical and empirical 
studies dealing with these impacts. Various types of model 
have been proposed to analyse these effects. They differ, 
however, in their coverage, scope and in their aims. These 
studies have dealt with the implications for the economies 
of both immigration and emigration countries or the economy 
of one of them. The implications for the receiving country's 
economy are well discussed, especially in the case of 
migration into West Europe (e.g. B. Thomas 1954, UN 1953 
and 1973, Kindleberger 1967, C. Jones 1977, etc.). In this 
chapter, emphasis is put on the implications for the economy 
of the country sending labour abroad, i.e. the emigration 
country. Section 2 presents a summary of some studies in 
this respect, along with their criticism. In Section 3 a 
more detailed discussion of possible consequences of migration 
is presented. The main macro-eGonomic effects of migration 
are identified along with the theoretical bases underlying 
their effects. Migration could have different implications 
for the individual than for the economy at large. Section 4, 
presents a discussion of the effects of migration on the 
individual, both migrant and non-migrant. The summary and 
main conclusions are presented in Section 5. 
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6.2. Migration Studies: 
Depending on the type of migration, whether permanent 
or temporary, and the type of variables considered, migration 
studies have reached different conclusions about the possible 
effects of migration. Some studies were optimistic and 
suggested that migration abroad could contribute positively 
~ 
to the development process of the home coun~y. Others, 
( 
however, have considered migration to be detrimental to the 
economic development process. An optimistic view about the 
role of migration on the sending country's economy is 
provided by Friedlander (1965), in his analysis of migration 
from Puerto Rico. He stresses that migration cannot only 
provide positive benefits to the emigration country, but can 
also stimulate economic growth, especially when it is coupled 
with large .scale foreign investment. He suggests a model 
in which unskilled labour is removed from the economy. while 
production remains stable. Thus the model assumes an 
agricultural economy whose land is all cultivated and which 
has an excess supply of labour. As a consequence of removing 
the unskilled labour, per capita income. and productivity 
accelerate comfortably ahead of population growth, leading 
to more economic growth. However, apart from the restrictive 
assumptions of the model, the model pays very little attention 
to the feedback effects of migration, and assumes that all 
migrants are unemployed unskilled labour. There are other 
authors, like Michalopoulos (1968), who look on migration in 
a similarly favourable light, contending that as long as 
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migration reduces unemployment at home and increases per 
capita income, its effects are positive. 
Kindleberger (1965) analysed the effects of migration 
on a number of variables, like the production foregone, 
gains in training, the impact of rising wages as a result of 
migration, etc. Although the analysis is much more detailed, 
he normally assumes that migrants are the agricultural under 
or unemployed labour, rather than the skilled employed labour. 
Moreover, based on migration from Southern Europe to Northern 
Europe, he puts more emphasis on possible gains in training 
and experience by migrants abroad. 
One of the most comprehensive analyses of the economic 
consequences of migration is that of Paine (1974). She 
enumerates eight key factors which determine whethe~ migration 
will generate sustained economic growth, along the framework 
proposed by' Kindleberger. These are (Paine p.49) 
(1) occupational composition and skill levels of migrants 
(2) suitability of skills gained abroad to the home country 
(3) remittances from abroad 
(4) the extent of investment of remittances in productive use 
(5) the extent to which remittances are spent on imports 
(6) the effects of remittances on the price level 
(7) the implications for trade between the host and the home 
country, and 
(8) the proportion of migrants who settle abroad permanently. 
In the light of these factors, she identifies two extreme 
cases of migration effects; one case is favourable for 
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economic growth, and the other describes conditions which 
could result in migration being detrimental to economic 
development. To which extreme a country approximates would 
depend on the outcome of the above eight key factors. The 
identification of an economy's position between the two 
cases indicates little about whether the economy benefits 
or loses from migration. The two hypothetical cases are too 
extreme. One assumes that only the unskilled unemployed 
labour are migrating, while the other assumes that it is the 
skilled employed workers who are migrating. In practice, 
however, a combination of both these types of labour usually 
migrates. ' If this is the case, then the country's position 
would approximate to neither of these two cases, and thus no 
clear conclusions could be reached about the net effects of 
migration. 
Taking the migration of skilled labour, Bohning (1975) 
cites many arguments against exporting skilled labour. He 
argues that it is an unnecessary waste of resources to train 
someone and then lose him to another country unless the home 
country benefits through remittances or eventual return of 
migrants. He argues that remittances contribute to increased 
consumption at home, and thus foreign exchange earned through 
remittances is spent on imported goods. However, the study 
ignores other positive effects, such as possible productive 
use of remittances, or migration of the unskilled and 
unemployed, etc. The study, moreover, puts more emphasis on 
permanent migration, claiming that these usually make the 
largest proportion of migrants. 
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In summary, it seems that there is far less agreement 
about the consequences of migration for the sending country's 
economy. Indeed it is possible that different consequences 
could be obtained under different assumptions. The ultimate 
consequences would depend on which type of migration is 
analysed, and which variables are taken into consideration. 
However, it seems that most of these studies state one or 
more variables as a possible consequence of migration. These 
include manpower losses, reduction in unemployment, remittances 
from abroad, and many others. In the next section these 
are discussed in more detail. 
6.3: Possible gains and losses due to migration 
The discussion in the above section suggests some of the 
migration consequences on the economy of the home country. 
For the sake of clarity, these are summarised in Table 6.1 below. 
Table 6.1: Possible gains and losses due to migration for the 
economy of the labou~ exporting country. 
Gains 
1. Remittances from abroad 
2. Reduction in unemployment. 
3. Decline in consumption. 
4. Gained training and 
experience by migrants 
abroad. 
5. Efficient allocation of 
human resources. 
Losses 
1. Inflationary effects of 
remittances. 
2. Outflow of human capital. 
3. Foregone production. 
4. Danger of forced massive 
repatriation. 
5. Demographic consequences. 
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It is worth mentioning that these are not all possible 
gains and losses due to migration. While others are identified 
in the following discussion, these seem to be the most general 
and commonly identified effects. In the remainder of this 
section we present a detailed discussion on these possible 
gains and losses. In doing so, we formulate a framework 
which is used in the next chapter to analyse the effects of 
labour migration from The Sudan on the economy of the country. 
6.).1: Reduction in domestic unemployment. 
There is no doubt that the migration of the unemployed 
. leads to reductions in domestic unemployment directly. The 
migration of the already employed may Teduce unemployment 
indirectly if their places could easily be filled by suitable 
unemployed. Migration may also reduce unemployment and/or 
underemployment through its feedback effects. The reduction 
in social expenditure and consumption resulting from the 
departure of migrants, as well as the resulting savings and 
capital formation due to remittances, could be channelled to 
more investment, in theory at least, and thus more jobs could 
be created. However, reductions in domestic unemployment 
and/or underemployment would depend on many factors. Suitable 
replacements for those already employed who migrate abroad 
might not be available. Obviously labour is not homogeneous, 
and in view of the selective migration process, it is possible 
to have on balance in the sending country, surplus labour, 
mostly unskilled, while simultaneously shortages of skilled 
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labour. Under such conditions migration may adversely 
affect output in the sending country in spite of the existence 
of high rates of unemployment and/or underemployment. Thus, 
the net gains from reductions in unemployment would depend, 
among other things, on the type of labour actually migrating, 
i.e. whether the employed or the unemployed, on the productive 
use of remittances, and on the occupational composition of 
the migrants. 
6.3.2: Gains in foreign exchange, and the effects on the balance 
of payments 
One of the most important benefits to the emigration 
country is said to be the migrant's remittances from abroad. 
Remittances from abroad may represent a sizeable source of 
foreign exchange earnings to the country. Indeed the existing 
evidence suggests that these are making considerable sums 
for countries like Turkey, Yugoslavia, Greece, Portugal, etc. 
(Eldridge 1966, Nikolic 1972, Paine 1974, Chandavarker 1980, 
etc.). In view of the fact that inadequate foreign exchange 
earnings may constitute, in many developing countries, one 
of the major constraints on the process of economic development, 
one can hardly underestimate the importance of remittances 
in this respect. However, it should be pointed out that, 
unless migration continues indefinitely, remittances cannot 
be considered a steady source of income and foreign exchange 
receipts. Moreover, if migration resulted in changes in the 
consumption habits of migrants, non-migrants or both towards 
more imported goods, then much of the remittances might be 
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spent on imports with no improvement in the balance pf 
payments of the country. Furthermore, remittances might 
not contribute very much to official foreign exchange earnings 
if they are not sent through the banking system, but rather 
secretly through a 'black market' of foreign exchange. Such 
'black market' dealings could exist to maintain demands o~ 
non-migrants for foreign currency, especially if there are 
controls on exchange transfers out of the home country because 
of shortages of foreign exchange. 
Remittances, moreover, do not only affect foreign exchange 
receipts. They might also form a sizeable surplus capital 
which could provide the necessary physical and working capital 
for the economic development process. This however would 
depend on the use these remittances are put to at home. 
The existing evidence suggests that savings and remittances 
from abroad are often utilized not in productive investment, 
but largely in consumption expenditure. The increased 
consumption as a result of remittances could lead to price 
rises in the home country if the demand is not met. Although 
this would depend on the marginal propensity to consume, the 
extra demand is likely to have inflationary consequences if 
there is no spare capacity to produce the additional commodities 
in the short run. Given the supply bottlenecks faced by many 
developing countries the danger of inflation is almost certain. 
Migration does not affect the balance of payment through 
remittances alone, but also through effects on.imports, 
exports and the exchange rate of the emigration country. Or 
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as put by Paine (1974) "emigration is not only a way for 
the sending country to fill its exchange gap, without affecting 
the size of this gap". Imports could rise as a result of a 
change in consumption habits towards more imported goods. 
Exports may rise if migrants abroad demanded more of their 
home country's products, or if these products became known 
abroad as a result of migration. The exchange rate would be 
affected if, in order to persuade migrants to send more 
remittances through the official channels, the exchange rate 
offered to them is undervalued. 
In conclusion, it seems that the overall impact of 
migration and remittances on foreign exchange earnings and 
the home country's balance of payment, involves a set of 
basically empirical questions. These include the size, extent 
and frequency of remittances, and the use they are put to at 
home, as well as changes in consumption habits and price 
levels brought about by these remittances, and the implications 
of migration for the imports, exports and exchange rate 
of the home country. 
6.3.3: Reduction in consumption and foregone production 
The direct contribution of remittances to foreign 
exchange and the indirect ones to savings and capital formation 
in the emigration country, might be supplemented by a reduction 
in domestic consumption and social overhead expenditure 
resulting from the absence of migrants and their families. 
The resulting savings could be channelled to more investment, 
and thus facilitate rapid economic growth. However, this 
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reduction in consumption might not be effective if, as a 
result of migration, the remaining population increased 
their consumption. This is possible because of the effects 
of remittances and increased earnings due to migration, 
especially if these remittances go to low income groups with 
a high marginal propensity to consume. 
The reduction in consumption, if it occurs, could 
constitute a net gain to the sending country to the extent 
that the "departure of the active population would not cause a 
decline in production of greater or equal magnitude. It is 
sometimes claimed (Kindleberger, 1965) that the reductions 
in consumption and output due to migration usually cancel 
each other. However, it is quite possible that the reduction 
in consumption could be smaller than that in output. In order 
for migration not to reduce aggregate production in the 
sending country, it should absorb either the unemployed or 
those whose position could easily be filled by other unemployed 
members of the labour force with the same qualifications and 
quality. With the already eXisting shortages of skilled labour 
in many developing countries, it is hard to believe that it 
is possible or easy to substitute unemployed workers for the 
skilled who migrate. It is equally difficult to substitute 
capital for labour because of the already existing bottlenecks 
of capital. Thus the matter would depend partly on the type 
of labour migrating. 
1 
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6.3.4: Gained training and experience versus the outflow of 
human capital. 
It is often argued that countries of emigration could 
derive substantial benefits from the training of their migrants 
in modern methods of production and from behavioral conditioning 
to the industrial environment. The realization of such benefits 
however depends on many things. Firstly, if migration is 
permanent or if migrants return home at the retirement age, 
the home country will not benefit from their gained training 
and experience. Secondly, this would depend on how suitable 
the gained training and experience are to the home country. 
~vt 
If migrants take low s~~ed jobs abroad they might not be 
,/ 
adequately trained, or if they receive highly specialized 
training in accordance with the needs of the immigration 
country, these might be of limited use in their home country. 
Thirdly, the productive use of this gained training is also 
important i.e. whether returning migrants are willing to 
enrich the labour force rather than returning to occupations 
which are of minor significance to the economic development 
of the country. These benefits of gained training and 
experience might or might not be realized when migration is 
to the industrialized developed countries. However, the 
existing evidence does not seem to support significant gains, 
but rather it suggests that if the migrant was unskilled 
when he left his country in the first place, he is unlikely 
to return home with any useful skills (e.g. Cerase 1967, 
Paine 1974, etc.). More doubts arise when migration occurs 
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from a develo·ping country, like the Sudan, to other developing 
countries, like the AOPEC. This is because the industrial 
sector itself in these countries might not be developed to 
train migrants, rather it might depend on experienced migrants 
to establish their industrial base. 
These gains in training and experience by migrants abroad, 
are often compared with capital losses associated with the 
migration of skilled labour and professionals. The direct 
and opportunity costs of educating and training personnel in 
the home country might be very high compared to the gained 
training and experience from migration. The literature, 
especially on the brain drain, goes far to claim that in many 
cases emigration countries are subsidizing immigration 
countries by providing trained manpower (e.g. Kade & Schiller, 
1972). These opportunity costs of training, educating and 
losing this. labour through migration could be very high for 
a developing country with limited resources and shortages of 
skilled manpower. In many cases for social and political 
reasons, the costs of education and training might not be 
avoidable, even if it is known that such potential labour 
would migrate. It is worth mentioning that, if migrants are 
mainly unskilled labour, then losses to the emigration 
countries due to such costs of education and training might 
not occur. 
6.3.5: Demographic effects 
The demographic consequences of migration on the sending 
country's population and its labour force, include the actual 
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and potential impact of migration on the size, structure, 
and growth rate of the population. Zolotas (1966) points 
out that the demographic problems usually associated with 
overpopulation pressures could also take the opposite form 
of underpopulation and dependent societies. Because migrants 
tend to concentrate in the active age groups, the age structure 
of the population may deteriorate. Thus, if migration 
continues on a large scale, the sending country's population 
may be composed mainly of old people and children. If 
migration is temporary, this situation might not arise. 
However, as a result of migration, the size of the economically 
active population would obviously fall. This decline, of 
course, may be offset if non-migrants who were inactive 
became active now. 
Migration may also affect the population growth rate. 
This might fall if migrants postpone their marriage, or if 
husbands and wives are separated for long periods because of 
migration. The rate of urbanization may also be affected as 
a result of migration. This might fall if people who would 
have migrated to the urban areas, migrate abroad now. It may 
rise if people migrate to urban areas as a first step towards 
migrating abroad, or if returning migrants tend to settle 
in urban areas rather than in the rural areas. 
In summary, this sectio~ has dealt with some implications 
of labour migration abroad for the home country's economy, 
spelling out the theoretical justification for their consideration 
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It should be pointed out that there are other implications 
of migration to the economy of a country. Among these is 
the impact of migration on the public sector accounts, like 
tax revenue, public expenditure, etc. The government could 
lose the tax revenue paid by migrants before migration. 
Expenditure on organizing migration would increase, e.g. 
personnel needed to handle passports, etc., although this 
might be offset by a rise in the fees paid by the migrants. 
6.4: The impact on the individual 
The discussion in the above section dealt with the effects 
of migration on some macro-economic variables. These are . 
obviously important indicators for the assessment of migration's 
impact on a country's economy from the social point of view. 
These however do not account for the welfare implications for 
the individual, since these could be different from those of 
the society. In this section we present some discussion 
of the implications of migration for the individual. A central 
problem here concerns whose welfare should be taken into 
consideration, that of the migrant or non-migrant, and whether 
the welfare of the migrants should be considered part of the 
welfare of the emigration or the immigration country's 
population. If migration is permanent so that migrants leave 
the home country once and for all, then it might be possible 
to consider what happens to the welfare of those left behind 
in the emigration country. This, however, might not be the 
case if migration is temporary. Thus, studies dealing with 
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the welfare implications of migration have generally 
considered separately the welfare of migrants, non-migrants 
in the origin country and non-migrants in the host country 
(e.g. Berry & Soligo 1969, Bhagwati & Rodriguez 1975, etc.). 
Whether migrants themselves will be financially better 
off or worse off would depend on whether what they earn abroad 
exceeds the costs of migration and their foregone income at 
home. Added to this are all the psychic costs and benefits 
associated with migration. These would include separation 
from the family, familiar surroundings, breaking old friendships, 
loneliness, etc., as compared to the advantages of gaining 
new experiences, of knowing a new society, the status of 
being abroad, etc. These non-quantifiable aspects of migration 
are as important to any individual migrant as the financial 
aspects, if not more so, and in any attempt to assess the 
effects of migration from the individual's point of view they 
should be taken into consideration. 
International migration not only affects the incomes of 
migrants and their families, but also the incomes of non-
migrants at home. It has been argued that, for infinitesimal 
movements, migration will neither make non-migrants better 
off nor worse off (Grubel & Scott, 1966). This is true if 
the migrant has been contributing his marginal product to the 
national income and earning it as well, thus his presence or 
absence is irrelevant to the non-migrant welfare. However, 
if there are finite movements, welfare losses do occur to the 
remaining population (Barry & Soligo, 1969). It was also 
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argued that migration would improve the per capita income 
of the remaining population at home. This stems from the 
assumption that, although the migrant was adding his marginal 
product to the national income, he was earning his average 
product i.e. higher than his contribution. However, an 
improvement in per capita income for example, might not be 
accompanied by an improvement in income distribution, and 
might make at least some non-migrants worse off. This raises 
the problem of how migration affects the distribution of 
income in the home country. A priori it is diff{cult to state 
clearly whether migration improves or worsens income 
distribution, since the problem involves many factors. In 
the first place this depends on the origin of migrants, and 
who migrates, whether the poorest or those with above average 
income. However, the impact of migration on income distribution 
is far more. complicated than this. For example, migration 
may affect the income of others if more employment is·created 
by returning migrants, or from investment of remittances, or 
if labour shortages as a result of migration lead to a wage 
rise. Migration, moreover, could affect income distribution 
between different economic sectors e.g. agriculture and 
industry by affecting their terms of trade. It could also 
affect factor payments, for example, the rise in wages due 
to migration may be paid out of profits. Furthermore, migration 
might affect income distribution between regions of the 
country, depending on the region from which migration is 
occurring, and to which migrants are returning. 
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6.5: Summary and conclusions 
In this chapter the possible consequences of migration 
for the sending country's economy were spelt out and discussed 
in detail. The discussion has centred around the effects of 
migration on certain macro-economic variables, as well as 
the implications for the individual migrant and non-migrant. 
Whether migration is beneficial or not for the economy of the 
sending country would depend on the outcome of many factors. 
It would depend on the nature of migration itself, whether 
permanent or temporary, on the skill composition of migrants 
and their employment status before migration, and thus the 
resulting reductions in domestic unemployment and output. 
This would also depend on the size of remittances from abroad, 
their contribution to foreign exchange earnings, and the use 
they are put to at home, and the implications of all these to 
the balance of payments. It will depend also on the g~ins in 
training and experience by migrants while abroad, and the 
effective use of these at home, 'as well as losses in human 
capital as a result of migration. The net effects of migration 
would also depend on the effects on imports, exports, exchange 
rate as well as income distribution and other factors. 
Certainly not all these possible effects of migration lend 
themselves to precise measurement for the sake of empirical 
investigation. Even when measurements are proposed, a major 
constraint could be the availability of data. In the next two 
chapters, attempts are made to measure some of these effects 
of international migration on the Sudanese economy. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE SUDANESE ECONOMY 
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7.1: Introduction 
In the previous chapter, the possible gains and losses 
to the emigration country due to migration were outlined and 
discussed in detail. In this chapter, attempts are made to 
quantify and analyse the implications of Sudanese migration 
abroad for the economy of The Sudan at large, as well as for 
the individual migrant and non-migrant. Taking the economy 
at large, certain macro-economic variables are considered in 
this chapter. These include the effects of migration on the 
population and labour force, on the domestic unemployment 
levels, on the balance of payments, and on other topics. 
are each discussed in a separate section. To complete the 
assessment, implications of migration for the individual 
migrant, his family, and the non-migrant left at home are 
also discussed in a separate section. The net impact of 
These 
migration and whether it might be beneficial or harmful to 
the economy is then outlined in the summary and conclusions 
of the chapter. 
7.2: Effects on the population and labour force 
According to our estimates, the total number of migrants 
abroad by 1978/79 of 78,750 migrants (Section 2.6) would only 
account for about 0.5% of the estimated 1978 population of 
The Sudan, a very small proportion.(lhowever, migrants are 
mainly from the working ages, and in such a case, a proper 
comparison would be with the economically active population. 
The total number of migrants amounts to only l.5~: of the 1978 
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economically active population, again a very small proportion. 
What is important, however, is not only the total number 
of migrants, but also the age and skill composition and other 
characteristics of migrants compared to the labour force in 
the country. As discussed in Chapter Five, migrants are 
basically young educated males. Table 7.1 below gives a 
comparison of migrant's age and the economically active 
population of The Sudan. 
Table 7.1: Percentage distribution of migrants and the 
economically active population by age groups. 
Age 15- 20- 25- 30- 35- 40- 45-
group 19 24 29 34 39 44 49 
Migrants 1.0 16.5 36.1 25.2 11.0 7.0 2.6 
50+ 
0.6 
Pop. 11. 2 12.0 15.8 12.0 13·7 9·6 7.8 17.8 
Notes: Pop. is the economically active population of The Sudan. 
Source: (1) Migrants, according to the 'migrants survey'. 
(2) Population from "1973 population census, the 
provisional results". Dept. of Statistics, Khartoum, 
1976. 
The table clearly shows that the percentage of migrants 
in the active age groups is higher than that of the economically 
active population. While over 95% of migrants are in the 
20-44 age groups, only 63% of the economically active population 
are in this age group. In general, the percentage of migrants 
in the active ages of 20-34 years, exceeds that of the 
population by large margins. It is only at ages above 35 or 
below 20 years that the percentage of the economically active 
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population is higher than that of migrants. 
When it comes to educational attainment of migrants, 
it seems that these are very high compared to the indigenous 
population of the country. While the literacy rate among 
the population aged ten years and more is about 31~ (440/0 
for males) according to the 1973 population census, it amounts 
to 90~ among migrants (Table 5.1). The skill composition of 
migrants also suggests that considerable proportions of the 
highly skilled labour force have migrated abroad. Migration, 
thus, seems to deprive the country of its most active, skilled 
and educated manpower. It seems that, if migration continues 
at the same rate and composition, the country might be faced 
with shortages of labour, especially skilled labour. 
7.3: Reductions in unemployment 
The ge~eral level of open unemployment in the country, 
as discussed in Section 3.3.3 is quite low, although unemploy-
ment is particularly high in urban areas and among young 
school leavers. The statistics of registration and appointment 
from the employment offices, however, suggests a clear mis-
matching between entrants to the labour market and the number 
of job vacancies. Although these figures from the employment 
offices are in doubt, as discussed in Chapter Three, on the 
face of it they indicate persistent unemployment, and raise 
the question of why unemployment does not seem to fall despite 
migration. It should be pointed out that to explain persistent 
unemployment data is needed, among many other things, on new 
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entrants to the labour market, retirement and death rates, 
job creation process, etc. However, it is legitimate to ask 
what the level of unemployment would be had migration not 
occurred. The estimated total number of migrants abroad 
amount to 8.0% of the estimated 989,616 persons added to the 
labour force from the education system between 1969/70 and 
1978/19 (Table A9). If all migrants were unemployed before 
migration, then their departure would result in direct reduction 
in the unemployment rate. If they were already employed, 
their departure would reduce unemployment only indirectly. 
Naturally not all migrants were unemployed before migration. 
The unemployed before migration amount to llo/r of the sample. 
Most of these unemployed were general and secondary school 
~eavers, which suggests that the country is able to export 
some of its unemployed labour force. 
7.4: Implications for the balance of payments 
One of the most tangible effects of migration on the 
home country's balance of payments and foreign exchange 
earnings, is migrant's remittances from abroad. Chapter 
Eight discusses the role of remittances in greater detail. 
For the purpose of this section only a brief discussion is 
presented. Remittances through the official banking system 
have increased considerably, especially after the mid 1970s. 
They contribute considerably to the reduction in the foreign 
exchange gap, and they account for a high proportion of 
imports and exports of the country. Remittances, however, 
not only contribute to foreign exchange earnings, but also 
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migrants' families at home enjoy higher income as a result 
of remittances. Whether these remittances contribute to 
domestic savings and capital formation depends largely on the 
use they are put to at home. The evidence suggests that 
remittances are largely spent on consumption rather than in 
productive use. However, although remittances could be looked 
upon as a means of providing foreign exchange for the country, 
and a source of income for families at home, yet they have 
some disadvantages to the country. In fact the unpredictable 
nature of the flow of remittances is only one disadvantage 
associated with their utilization as a source of income and 
foreign exchange earnings. In general, the evidence suggests 
that, the short-term advantages of the money transfers by 
migrants to the country are clear. The task of the government 
is facilitated externally by the foreign exchange they provide, 
and internally by the income they distribute. But in the 
long run, they might give a false impression of ease, ~nd 
thus discourage the tackling of basic problems, since in the 
long run, migration involves changes in work and consumption 
habits as well as in exports, imports and the price level in 
the country. 
7.5: Effects on consumption 
It is always contended that emigration countries benefit 
"from the reduced consumption resulting from the departure of 
migrants and their families. In this section we attempt to 
assess the implications of migration from The Sudan in this 
respect. For the Sudan, there is no way to measure directly 
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the reduced consumption due to migration, and even if a 
proxy is suggested, the lack of data still presents a major 
problem. There is no doubt that the departure of migrants 
and their families would reduce consumption by the amount-
they used to consume. In practice, however, most migrants 
leave their children and dependents at home. Table 7.2 below 
shows the average numbers of dependents and children f·or 
different categories of migrants. 
Table 7.2: Average number of children and dependents for 
different categories of migrants. 
Average No. Average No. 
Category of children of dependents 
All migrants 1.2 5·0 
Unmarried migrants 0.0 3. 9 
Married migrants 2.6 6. 2 
Married unaccompanied by family 2·9 6. 8 
Married accompanied by family 2.2 5·0 
Source: Migrants survey. 
The table indicates that married migrants unaccompanied 
by families have larger numbers of children and dependents 
than the accompanied migrants. This is natural since taking 
the family abroad would increase expenditure abroad. Also, 
immigration countries do not encourage migrants to bring 
their families with them. Saudi Arabia, for example - except 
for certain categories of migrants like teachers, doctors, 
engineers, etc. - insists that a migrant's earnings should be 
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at least SR 4000 per month with a stay of one year in the 
country before he can bring his family to Saudi Arabia(2). 
Such regulations imply that most migrants must leave their 
children and dependents at home. Unmarried migrants also 
have dependents at home. In fact less than 19% of the 
sample stated that they had no dependents left at home. 
Thus, although consumption at home might be reduced as a 
result of migrants' departure, reductions due to the departure 
of families and dependents might not be very great. Moreover, 
consumption at home may increase rather than decrease, due 
to the increased purchasing power of families at home as 
a result of remittances from abroad. 
7.6: Output losses 
The loss of skills that are difficult to replace may 
cause considerable damage to the domestic economy, since it 
may result in slowing down production and reducing productivity. 
In countries with an abundant supply of labour, this un-
favourable consequence of migration might not be that serious. 
But given the supply bottlenecks of skilled and high level 
manpower in many developing countries, reduction or slow 
down in production might be inevitable. 
Assuming no replacement of migrants, and that wages 
reflect fairly accurately the marginal productivity of the 
worker, we could equate the value of the loss in output due 
to migration, to the earnings that migrants would have received 
had they stayed at home. However, the assumption of no 
replacement for any of the migrating workers is hardly 
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acceptable. Moreover some of the migrants were unemployed 
before migration and their departure could hardly contribute 
to losses in output. Furthermore, it is unwise to assume 
the same wage, and thus the same marginal productivity for 
all types of migrants. This would differ according to the 
skill level of migrants. And finally migrants might return 
home after some time abroad, and thus their departure might 
not be a complete loss to the economy. Unfortunately the 
data is not available in the details of enabling precise 
conclusions to be drawn in this respect. 
It is interesting to investigate the implications of 
migration for the output of different sectors in the economy. 
However, because migration is very recent, it would not be 
clear yet whether migration had actually resulted in Significant 
output losses in any sector. Because most of the economically 
active poputation is involved in agriculture, with a high 
possibility of underemployment, and because the majority 
of migrants are basically from the urban areas, it is unlikely 
that migration could have resulted in significant output 
losses in this sector. Fluctuations in agricultural output 
have been attributed to weather conditions and the government's 
agricultural POlicy(J). Migration may even result in output 
increases in this sector if migrants invest their savings 
in agriculture. Although most savings and remittances from 
abroad are spent on consumption (Chapter 8), yet about lJo/c' 
of migrants intend to invest part of their savings in 
agriculture. The situation in the industrial sector is not 
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very clear either. However, the existing under-capacity 
utilization in the public sector industry in the country 
has been attributed to non-labour factors, such as inefficient 
machinery, shortages of raw materials, etc. (4) The most 
likely sector to have lost labour to migration is the services 
sector (Table 5.3). However, as discussed in Chapter Three, 
this sector seems to be overstaffed largely because of the 
government policy to employ all educated manpower irrespective 
of the actual demand for them. With such under-employment 
the removal of some labour might not result in significant 
output losses. However, taking the present high rate of 
migration, it is likely that labour shortages to the extent 
of creating significant output losses would occur in the 
long run, if migration continues at the same rate and 
composition. 
7.7: Gains in skills due to migration 
It is hypothesised that em~gration countries gain from 
the acquisition of new skills by migrants while abroad. This 
section attempts to examine such a hypothesis. It was noted 
in Chapter Five that migrants abroad work in different sectors 
of employment and occupation from those at home. In many 
cases occupations abroad are down-graded, and migrants often 
take unskilled and low rated occupations (Sections 5.5 and 5.6). 
Such observations suggest that, while abroad, migrants tend 
to take jobs which are not suitable to their previous experience 
and qualifications, and that they gain little skills from 
migrating abroad. In answer to the question whether migrants 
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think that their present occupations correspond to ,their 
previous experience and qualifications or not, the results 
were as set out in Table 7.3 below. 
Table 7.3: Present job in relation to experience and qualifications 
Suitability No. % 
Very suitable 86 28 
Suitable to some extent 115 37 
Not suitable at all 84 27 
No job 17 5 
Did not state 8 3 
Total sample 310 100 
Source: Migrants Survey. 
The table suggests that those who think their jobs are 
not suitable at all are nearly equal to those who think that 
their jobs are very suitable. If one adds to the former, 
those who think their jobs are suitable to some extent, these 
would certainly make the majority of migrants in the sample. 
The percentage of those stating their present job as being 
very suitable to their experience and qualifications are 
higher among those with higher levels of education and those 
with high rated occupations (Table BI9). This situation of 
job suitability, coupled with the down-grading of occupations 
abroad, as well as changes in profession - e.g. sometimes an 
electrical engineer, say, would be working as a civil engineer, 
mechanical engineer, etc. - would mean that migrants do not 
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gain considerable new skills and training from migration. 
Generally speaking then, the evidence does not seem to 
support the notion that migrants learn new skills from 
migrating abroad, since the majority of them work on jobs 
which are inconsistent with their 'qualifications and previous 
experience. This, however, does not deny that migrants could 
learn new experiences in knowing a new nation, and new 
dimensions to life which might broaden their horizon and 
way of thinking, and stand as a positive aspect of migration. 
7.8: Losses in human capital 
Gains in new skills from migration are often matched 
with capital losses associated with the migration of the 
skilled and profeSSional workers i.e. the direct and indirect 
costs of educating, training and losing the worker through 
migration, as well as the cost of replacing the migrant worker. 
The direct private cost of educating a pupil was estimated 
by the ILO in 1973 to be about ~S 30 for the primary level of 
education increasing to about £s 301 for a university graduate. 
The public sector cost was estimated to be about £S 180 and 
£s 6405 respectively(5). These costs might have increased 
considerably since 1973. They show the high public sector 
costs of education relative to the private costs, reflecting 
the fact that education is almost provided free by the state. 
With the literacy rate amounting to 90% among migrants 
(Table 5.1), and a considerable proportion of migrants with 
high leyels of education, it means that substantial capital 
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is lost to the state through migration of educated manpower. 
The educational capital embodied in the worker, are only part 
of the total stock of human capital exported through migration. 
Knowledge and experience gained through work are equally 
important. Considering the fact that the m'ajority of migrants 
have been working in The Sudan before migration, with average 
duration of employment of about three years; this component 
of human capital could also be substantial. Moreover, 
resources devoted to education and training have an opportunity 
cost that must be taken into consideration. These costs might 
be very high in a country with scarce capital. However, it 
should be noted that investment in education is made for 
multiple reasons, and that they would have been made regardless 
of whether people migrate or not. Furthermore, it is also 
important to make the distinction between permanent and 
temporary migration. In the case of the latter, the migration 
of workers might not be a complete loss. It could also be 
argued that migrants pay their costs of education through the 
cash remittances they send from abroad, and thus the net 
impact could be treated as the trade-off between these costs 
and the cash remittances they make. Remittances, although 
they might contribute to the improvement of the balance of 
payments, are essentially private transfers, and it is the 
migrant and his family who are the main beneficiaries. In 
contrast, education and training costs are mainly borne by 
the state or the society. Thus, in general, although it is 
very difficult to put a magnitude on the losses in human 
capital embodied in migrants, this could be higher, especially 
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for the highly educated migrants. 
7.9: Impact on the individual 
As discussed in Chapter Six, the implications of migration 
for the individual could be different from those for the 
society in general. While the discussion in this chapter so 
far has dealt with the impact of migration on the economy 
and society at large, it did not deal with the impact on 
the individual migrant himself, his family, or the individual 
non-migrant. The purpose of this section is to reflect 
some of these impacts. 
There is no doubt that migration has benefits and costs 
to the individual migrant himself. As a result of migration, 
migrants earn higher incomes than their earnings before 
migration. For example, while the monthly minimum earnings 
before migration reported by migrants in the sample was £S 7, 
these are SR 800 a month abroad, or about £S 120.66 at the 
official exchange rate(6). On ~verage, a migrant used to 
earn £S 59 a month before migration, while abroad he earns 
an average monthly salary of SR 2572 (Table B9) i.e. about 
£S 387.93 at the official rate of exchange or about £S 621.26 
at the premium rate offered to migrants(7). In other words 
migrants' salaries abroad are nearly seven times greater 
than average earnings before migration using the official 
exchange rate, and more than ten times greater if the premium 
rate is used. It is important ~o note that this comparison 
uses the migrants' average salary. When the value of allowances 
given to some migrants is added to this, the difference in 
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earnings is much higher. Thus total average earnings abroad 
are nearly thirteen and eight times greater than those at 
home, at the premium and official exchange rates respectively. 
However, it should be pointed out that the comparison is more 
complicated than this, since it should involve not only the 
exchange rate, but also prices in the two countries, the 
time of comparison and other factors. For example, average 
earnings before migration would usually spread over a span 
of time, since not all migrants migrated in the year of the 
survey. Thus, average earnings before migration was re-
calculated using yearly averages and adjusted by the consumer 
price index(8). To obtain real earnings in both countries, 
average earnings were adjusted to the 1975 consumer price 
index. Using this, average earnings before migration amounted 
to £5 50.75, while those abroad amounted to about £5 410.15 
and £5 256.11 at the premium and the official exchange rates 
respectively. That is, salaries abroad are more than 'eight 
and five times higher than those before migration at the 
two rates. When allowances are added total earnings abroad 
are nearly ten times and eight times higher than those before 
migration at the two rates of exchange. This suggests that 
migrants' real earnings are slightly reduced while abroad. 
Nevertheless, real earnings abroad are still higher than 
those at home. 
However, in counting benefits for the migrant, one 
should not ignore the costs incurred by him. There are 
tangible ~nd non-tangible costs of migration which might be 
important to the individual migrant. For those who were 
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already employed before migration, earnings they forego 
from previous employment would reflect the opportunity cost 
of foreign employment to a large degree. These, however, 
would be reduced largely if a migrant had a work contract 
according to which he could take up employment abroad 
directly on arrival rather than spending some time searching 
for a job. Among migrants in the sample, the time spent in 
first job search is not very long (Section 5.8) and the 
income foregone is minimal. Added to this cost are the 
travel and other tangible costs of migration. When a worker" 
migrates with a work contract, these travel costs are usually 
paid by the employer abroad. However, given the fact that 
in practice some migrants obtain only a work visa, and in 
some cases they have to pay for this work visa illegally 
(Section 2.5), it seems that some costs to the migrant are 
inevi table." Among the other tangible costs are those incurred 
in quitting a job at home. For example retirement benefits 
and other benefits may have to be sacrificed if one decides 
to migrate. Other less tangible costs include the risk that 
one might not find a job readily available on returning home, 
especially if the migrant was not able to make savings abroad 
on which he could rely after returning home. However, most 
of these costs, like many intangible benefits may not be 
measurable. Nevertheless, given the large monetary gains 
to the migrant in the form of higher earnings abroad, it 
seems that on balance, the migrant is better off than before 
migration. 
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It is not only the individual migrant who benefits 
financially from migration, but also his family at home. 
As a result of migration, migrants are able to remit home 
larger amounts of money than they would have earned at home 
for themselves and their families, thus increasing the 
incomes of families left at home. Average remittances in 
cash per month amounted to about SR 496 (Table BIJ). This 
would mean average remittances in cash of about £S 74.81 at 
the official exchange rate i.e. about 1.3 times average 
earnings before migration. This also makes about £S 119.81 
at the incentive rate offered to migrants or more than twice 
average earnings at home. To these cash remittances one 
should also add remittances sent home in the form of goods, 
i.e. remittances in kind. Average remittances in kind per 
month amounted to SR 117 or about £S 28.3 a month at the 
premium rat.e and about £8 17.6 at the official exchange rate. 
To both these one should also add any presents the migrant 
would bring to the family and friends on visits home. Thus 
as a result of migration and remittances from abroad, the 
standard of living, at least for migrants' families at home, 
increased considerably. One of the top priorities for 
remitted earnings is an improved standard of living for the 
migrant's family. Nearly 25% of the migrants in the sample 
reported that they intended to spend their savings to improve 
family conditions at home (Chapter 8), while 37% of them 
intended to buy or build a house for the family. Moreover, 
of those who reported owning a house in The Sudan, about 61% 
acquired it after migrating abroad. The remaining 39%, 
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although they owned a house before migration, spent some 
of their savings and earnings abroad on improving it. 
Thus, as a result of remittances from abroad, people are 
now better clothed, housed and fed. The rise in the standard 
of living and the ways in which remittances are spent would 
not only affect migrants and their families, but also other 
non-migrants, because of the spill-over effects of these 
remittances. In fact the general rise in the standard of 
living could be seen in many remote villages which had never 
dreamed about electricity in the past, now having small 
electricity generators brought by migrants to provide electricity 
not only for their own family but for the whole village. 
This is in addition to other consumer goods, such as T.V. 
sets, radio and tape recorders, etc., which were rarely 
available in the villages. However, it should be pointed 
out that su.ch consumption, although it might raise the 
standard of living, might also put more constraints on the 
balance of payments of the country, if the society at large 
demanded more imported goods. As far as the impact of 
migration on the migrant and his family is concerned, it 
seems that, both are financially better off than before 
migration. However, this does not mean that all migrants 
are successful. There is no doubt that some of those who 
migrate do not find jobs or are unable to make any savings. 
For example, nearly 7% of migrants in the sample stated 
that they were not able to make any savings. Added to these 
are the 5~~ who are unemployed. Most of these, however, are 
new migrants who naturally would take some time to settle, 
find jobs and make savings. 
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For the individual non-migrant, the costs and benefits 
of migration could be completely different from those for 
the migrant and his family. The full implica~ions of 
migration for the society at large, apart from the implications 
discussed in the above sections of this chapter, would include 
the implications of migration for income distribution. 
Whether migration improves income distribution or not would 
depend on many factors, among which are comparative earnings, 
size of remittances from abroad and their use at home, as 
well as the origins of migrants. Earnings and remittances 
from abroad were already discussed, and migrants and their 
families seem to derive substantial monetary gains from 
migration. As for the migrant's origins, if they originate 
in families with above average income, then migration would 
tend to worsen income distribution. Although no precise 
information' about this is available, generally speaking it 
seems that it is those with higher incomes, e.g. the skilled 
and educated, who migrate. If earnings in The Sudan are 
determined by level of education and occupation -the most 
important factors - the fact that those with higher educational 
and occupational attainments form a considerable proportion 
of migrants in the sample implies that most migrants were from 
the better-off income groups at home. Such an implication 
would suggest that migration tends to increase income 
inequality. Furthermore, even for those who had the same 
income, the fact that the migrant could earn abroad more than 
the non-migrant, making more savings and sending remittances 
home, would imply that the migrant is much better off. This 
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possibility might induce more migration from the country. 
However, income distribution is also affected by the way 
in which remittances from abroad are spent at home. These 
are discussed in the next chapter in greater detail. If 
these remittances are spent on industrial goods, for example, 
they would increase the incomes of those working in industry, 
etc. 
Equally important, if not more so, are also the 
implications of migration for income distribution between 
regions of the country. If migration occurs mainly from a 
certain region, then labour shortages in that region might 
adversely affect output. However, remittances to this region 
might contribute to its development if they are productively 
used. Migration could, furthermore, affect income distribution 
between the rural and urban areas. If remittances are spent 
more in one, area than another, income dispari ties might 
increase. Although migrants from The Sudan were originally 
born in rural areas, most of them intend to settle in urban 
areas on returning from abroad (Section 5.10). It is not 
only settlement, but also the intended use of savings 
suggests that most savings and remittances would be spent 
in urban areas (Chapter 8). Thus, while it appears that 
migration offers considerable positive benefits to the migrant 
and his family, doubts arise as to whether non-migrants are 
served well by the process of migration. The choice between 
the individual migrant and the society, however, is essentially 
a choice between the private and social cost and benefits 
which in many cases is determined by the planner or by the 
state. 
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7.10: The net impact of migration 
This chapter has dealt with the impact of migration 
on the Sudanese economy at large, the individual migrant, 
his family and non-migrants. These impacts involve factors 
which are quantifiable and others which are not. However, 
it was not always possible to quantify factors which are 
measurable in practice because of data imperfections and 
scarcity. In such circumstances it is very difficult to 
conclude with greater precision whether migration has been 
beneficial or harmful to the economy. Nevertheless, the 
analysis in the chapter gave some general insight in this 
respect. 
chapter. 
This section summarises the main findings of the 
However, most of the evidence should be taken as 
indicative rather than conclusive due to the data problems. 
The investigation in the chapter has shown that it is 
not only unskilled labour that migrates abroad, but largely 
skilled and educated manpower. In this way it seems that 
migration could result in an ove'rall decrease in the labour 
force, especially of the educated and skilled. This reduction 
could develop into acute shortages sufficient to hinder the 
economic development of the country, if migration continues 
at the same rate and composition. At present, manpower 
shortages do not seem to be significant, and thus output 
losses would be minimal. This, however, does not rule out 
some imbalance in the labour market in the sense that shortages 
of certain skills and professions could exist beside surpluses 
in others. The obvious strategy for the government, then, is 
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to monitor each category and regulate migration and training 
accordingly. On the other hand, migration seems to have 
worked as a safety valve for relieving domestic unemployment 
and underemployment pressures. The domestic economy has 
persistently failed to respond effectively to the new entrants 
to the labour market. In a sense, then, migration has served 
as a factor for reducing unemployment and defusing the social 
tension which could otherwise have affected the existing 
economic, political and social structure. However, because 
migration involves small numbers, and most of the migrants 
were already employed before migration, it seems that the 
unemployment problem might not be solved completely through 
migration. Because of the existence of unemployment and 
underemployment and the short period since migration has 
occurred in significant numbers, it does not seem that 
migration has resulted in any significant decrease in output, 
especially in the agricultural sector. The sector which is 
more prone to output losses is the services sector, although 
the considerable underemployment in this sector might prevent 
output declines in the short run. Gains in training and 
new skills by migrants while abroad do not seem to be 
substantial. The evidence suggests that very few migrants 
gain new skills from migrating abroad. Migrants generally 
take employment which is lower than their previous occupations, 
and which is inconsistent with their past experience and 
qualifications. 
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For the individual migrant and his family at home, it 
seems that both can derive substantial monetary gains from 
migration. As a result of migration, migrants are able 
to earn, and remit home, quantities of money which exceed 
what they used to earn at home before migration. In this 
way they are able to improve the standard of living of their 
families at home, as well as other parts of the population. 
However, this does not mean that all migrants are successful, 
nor that migrants do not incur any cost in deriving these 
gains. These costs, however, are largely non-monetary and 
it is highly possible that they are outweighed by the 
monetary gains. 
Notes to Chapter Seven 
(1) The 1978 population of The Sudan is estimated to be about 
17,376,000 according to UN "Demographic Yearbook" 1980, 
and the economically active population is estimated to be 
5,212,800, according to the ILO "Yearbook of Labour 
Statistics" 1979. 
(2) lLO "Social and Labour Bulletin" No.4, Dec. 1980, p.482. 
(3) Ministry of Finance and National Economy "Economic Survey 
1979/80" (Arabic) P.2l, Khartoum. Also, lMF surveY(1980~ 
and Nashashibi, K. (1980). 
(4) According to the Bank of Sudan "Annual Report" 1978, p.14, 
underutilization of capacity is mainly due to "obsolete 
and inefficient machinery, shortages of raw material, 
failure in electric power, transportation bottlenecks 
and marketing problems". 
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(5) ILO (1976). II.Growth, employment and equity II . .. . 
(6) Strictly speaking, comparability could be misleading, 
because not all migrants have entered Saudi Arabia in 
1980, the time of the survey. If exchange rate was 
fixed, prices and earnings might change over time. However, 
given the observation that more than 50% of migrants in 
the sample have migrated between the time of the survey 
and the two preceding years, this short time might justify 
the comparison. See also note (8) below. 
(7) At the time of the survey, April/May 1980, the official 
exchange rate in The Sudan was US$ 1 = £S 0.50,i.e. 
£S 1 = SR 6.63 (US$ 1 = SR 3.315 in April/May 1980 
according to the IMF 'International Financial Statistics'). 
Migrants were offered an incentive rate of US$ 1 = £S 0.80, 
i.e. £S 1 = SR 4.14 by the banks in The Sudan. 
(8) Average' earnings in The Sudan were calculated as follows: 
earnings per migrant, wi is ,average earnings in year i, 
p. is consumer price index in year i at 1975 prices, and 
]. 
t is time. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
THE ROLE OF REMITTANCES FROM ABROAD 
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8.1: Introduction 
In this chapter we attempt to provide empirical answers 
to some questions about the role of remittances from abroad. 
These include the size, frequency, determinants, and the use 
these remittances are put to at home, as well as other 
related topics. Section 2 attempts to answer the question of 
who remits i.e. do migrants' characteristics affect their 
decision to send remittances home. In Section J the size of 
remittances is investigated, while in Section 4 attempts 
are made to examine the determinants of these remittances. 
In Section 5 the frequency of remittances is explained. The 
channels through which remittances are sent home are discussed 
in Section 6, while the main uses of remittances at home 
are investigated in Section 7. The policies introduced by 
the government to attract these remittances are discussed 
and critically evaluated in Section 8. Finally in Section 9, 
the summary and conclusions of the main findings are presented. 
8.2: The socio-economic background of migrants and the decision 
to remi t. 
It might be interesting to start the analysis in this 
chapter by the question of who remits? or in other words, 
do the demographic, social and economic characteristics of 
migrants affect their decision to remit. Columns (1) and 
(2) of Table BIJ in Appendix B, show the percentage of 
migrants who remit in cash and in kind. While 889f of migrants 
in the sample remit in cash, only about 55% remit in kind. 
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This~ apart from showing that a considerable proportion of 
migrants remit in cash and in kind, suggests that migrants 
tend to remit in cash rather than in kind. These proportions, 
however, vary according to migrants' socio-economic background. 
For example, as their age increases, the proportion of migrants 
who remit in cash increases until it reaches 100% of the 
eldest group. This is natural since older people are likely 
to be married and have more dependents than younger ones. 
Thus, it is notable that a higher proportion of married than 
unmarried migrants send remittances home. Moreover, the 
proportion of migrants accompanied by families abroad who 
remit is slightly lower than for those unaccompanied. The 
presence of the family abroad would increase expenditure 
abroad, while the need of the family for maintenance at home 
would induce unaccompanied migrants to send remittances home. 
Other characteristics also have some effect on the decision 
to remit. For example the proportion of those with higher 
occupational and educational lev~ls who send remittances home 
is lower than those with lower levels. This, however, does 
not necessarily mean that migrants with higher levels of 
education and occupation do not remit home. These groups 
are more able to take their families abroad beca~se o~ their 
relatively higher incomes and other facilities offered to them. 
8.3: The size of remittances 
Total remittances in cash through the official banks 
have increased considerably over the decade. 
overleaf shows these remittances. 
Table 8.1 
Table 8.1: Renlittances in cash (in £S million) and as percentage of some economic 
indicators (1970-79). 
Year Remitt- As % of As % of As % of As % of As % of' 
ances invisible invisible exports imports GDP 
(£S M) receipts payments 
1970 0.4 2·7 1.5 0.4 0.4 0.1 
1971 0.4 2·5 1·5 0.4 0.4 0.1 
1972 1.1 6.6 3·4 0·9 0·9 0.1 
1973 1.2 7·3 3·2 0'.8 0.8 0.1 
1974 1·5 6.6 2.8 1.2 0.6 0.1 
1975 2.2 6.3 3.5 1.4 0.6 0.1 
1976 4.3 10.2 5·6 2.2 1.3 0.2 
1977 15·0 26.6 19·7 6.5 4.0 0.6 
1978 36.1 29·4 39·2 17.9 8.0 1.1 
1979 75.4 45.1 57·1 32.4 15.8 2.4 
---- --
Notes: Remittances are cash remittances through the banks. 
Source: Compiled from Bank of Sudan "Annual Reports" and "The Economic Survey" of' the 
Ministry of Finance and National Economy, Khartoum (different years). 
I-' 
0\ 
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The table clearly indicates the sharp rise in cash 
remittances, especially after the second half of the 1970s. 
This rise in remittances could be attributed partly to the 
increase in the number of migrants after the mid 1970s 
(Chapter Two). Among other factors which might have contributed 
to this rise are the policies introduced by the government 
to attract remittances, as well as the devaluation of the 
Sudanese pound in June 1978 and September 1979(1). The table, 
furthermore, shows that remittances have also been increasing 
as a percentage of all variables in the table. Remittances 
are, thus, large enough to be given their weight in any 
policy concerning migration, and foreign exchange earnings. 
In this way, one could say that migration could contribute 
considerably to foreign exchange ~arnings, and so remittances 
from abroad do contribute to the reduction in the foreign 
exchange gap. 
Figure 8.1 overleaf shows monthly officially recorded 
remittances through the banks b~ source country for the 
period April 1975 to October 1979 (data in Table All). The 
graph shows remittances from Saudi Arabia, Libya, and other 
Arab countries. Other Arab countries are Bahrain, Iraq, 
Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Syria, UAE and YAR. 
These are pooled together because of the small remittances 
from each one separately. The figure generally shows the 
same pattern of fluctuations for all the countries shown in 
the figure. As in Table 8.1 above, Figure 8.1 shows considerable 
increase in remittances especially after 1977. The peak of 
remittances occurred in July 1978, after the devaluation of 
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the Sudanese pound in June 1978. The fall in remittances 
after July 1978 might be explained, partly, by the fact 
that despite the devaluation of the pound, the incentive 
exchange rate offered to migrants by the banks was not changed 
(Section 8.8.4 below) until March 1979. Despite this, 
however, and the devaluation of the pound again in September 
1979, remittances never reached the July 1978 level. Thus, 
although the determinants of remittances could be many, 
remittances do not seem to be very sensitive to exchange 
rate fluctuations. 
The figure, furthermore, shows that as a single source 
of remittances, Libya was dominant, until the end of 1977, 
after which Saudi Arabia was dominant, although they both 
moved closely together. Remittances from the group of other 
countries has always been higher than from Saudi Arabia, 
and higher than from Libya after the end of 1977. As discussed 
in Chapter Two, Saudi Arabia is the major recipient of Sudanese 
migrants, followed by Libya, with the remaining Arab countries 
receiving only about 10% of migrants. In such a case one 
would expect more remittances from Saudi Arabia than from 
Libya and other countries. It would be interesting to ask 
why this does not seem to happen. Apart from the possibility 
of different propensity to remit in different countries, 
there could be many reasons for this. Firstly, we are not 
sure that the distribution of migrants among these countries 
remained the same over this period, although it is highly 
probable that it did not change. Secondly, the data refers 
to remittances through the banks only. It excludes remittances 
" 
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through other channels, and in kind. It is possible that 
migrants in Saudi Arabia remit in kind more than migrants 
in other countries. This could be more reasonable taking 
into consideration that, apart from being the nearest to 
The Sudan, it enjoys cheap sea transport between them. However, 
as would be noted, migrants in Saudi Arabia remit larger 
amounts in cash than in kind. In such a case, an explanation 
might be found in the possibility that migrants in Saudi Arabia 
use channels of remittances other than the banks more frequently 
than migrants in other countries. This again is made more 
possible in Saudi Arabia because of the relative ease of 
entry to Saudi Arabia, as pil~rim for example, which might 
facilitate sending remittances with people going to The Sudan. 
Moreover, this relative ease of entering Saudi Arabia might 
increase the possibility of illegal migration, which could 
reduce remittances through the banks, either because illegal 
migrants cannot use them, or because they are afraid of 
being caught if they did so. 
The discussion, 50 far, refers to official remittances 
in cash through the banks. To these one should add savings 
and earnings which are sometimes repatriated secretly through 
other channels, as well as remittances in kind. These, 
however, might not appear directly in the balance of payments 
accounts, although they might ease the pressure on the balance 
of payments, apart from being an income source for families 
at home. Imports financed by these remittances might have 
put more strain on the balance of payments if they had to be 
imported by the government instead. It is interesting to ask 
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whether the size of remittances differ much according to 
migrants' characteristics. As shown in Table BlJ, average 
remittances in cash is about SR 496 a month per migrant, 
and in kind is about SR 117. Although average remittances 
seem to differ according to the age of the migrant, the 
period since out-migration, the marital status, whether he 
is accompanied by family, and his occupational and educational 
level, yet these differences are not very high. To test the 
hypothesis that there is no difference between average 
remittances of each category, we test the difference between 
average remittances of any two groups in each category as 
well as the overall sample average. That is, we test the 
hypothesis Ho: J.'.l - '\.lo2 = 0 i.e. there is no difference in 
average remittances of migrants, where ~ and ~2 are the true 
means of groups 1 and 2. This hypothesis is tested using 
the statist.ics: 
where x, cr 2 and n are the mean, variance and the number of 
observations respectively, and the subscripts I and 2 refer 
to groups 1 and 2 respectively(2). Applying this testJno 
statistically significant difference in average cash remittances 
is found, except for migrants accompanied by their families 
abroad (Table BlJ). These tend to remit statistically 
significant less cash than the overall sample average, as 
well as less than unaccompanied migrants. This, however, is 
as expected, since bringing the family abroad might increase 
expenditure abroad, and thus reduces the capacity of migrants 
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to remit. Another statistically significant difference 
occurs for recent migrants (those with less than a year since 
out-migration). Although there is no statistically significant 
difference in cash remittances between them and other groups, 
they tend to send statistically significant less remittances 
in kind. These probably remit in cash rather than in kind 
in order to settle the urgent needs of families at home and 
the debts or costs incurred as a result of migration. Thus, 
it seems that all migrants with their different socio-economic 
characteristics tend to remit as much as each other, except 
those who are accompanied by families abroad who tend to 
remit less cash than the average migrant. This, however, 
does not mean that all migrants remit exactly the same amount, 
but rather it means that no statistically significant difference 
was found between their average remittances. 
8.4: The determinants of remittances 
The above analysis, so far, raises the question, what 
determines the volume of these remittances. In this section, 
multiple regression analysis is used to shed some light on 
this area. The suggested regression model is of the form: 
MR = aO + a l INC .~ a 2 ALLOW + a 3 NDEP + a4 PF~~ + as MSTAT + 
a6 YENT + ~ (8.4.1) 
where 
MR = monthly volume of remittances per migrant 
INC = monthly income of the migrant 
ALLOW = allowances given to the migrant 
NDEP = number of dependents 
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PFAM = whether family is at home or abroad 
MSTAT = marital status of the migrant 
YENT = period since out-migration from The Sudan. 
~ = a random error term assumed to be normally 
~. 
1 
distributed with a zero mean and a constant 
variance; and 
are parameters to be estimated. 
Before presenting the results of the estimation of 
equation 8.4.1 above, it is appropriate to discuss the 
relationship between the dependent and the independent variables 
in the equation, their expected signs and the rationale behind 
their inclusion in the equation. The capacity of the migrant 
to remit home would depend, among other things, on the income 
he earns abroad. The hypothesis is that, the higher this 
income is, the higher the expected volume of remittances. 
This indicates a positive relationship between MR and INC. 
This variable is represented by the monthly salary of the 
migrant as reported in the migrants' survey. However, it is 
not only income that matters in this respect, but also the 
expenditure of the migrant abroad. The higher the expenditure 
~ of the migrant abroad, the less able he is to remit. This 
( 
( expenditure, however, might be reduced a great deal if the 
migrant is given allowances while abroad e.g. in the form 
of free accommodation, free transport, etc. The reduction 
in expenditure as a result of these allowances, might increase 
the capacity of the migrant to remit home. In this way, 
one would expect migrants who are given allowances, to remit 
more than those who are not i.e. a positive relationship 
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is expected between MR and ALLOW. As a proxy for these 
allowances, we use a dummy variable, equal to unity if the 
migrant is given any allolV'ances, and zero otherwise. The 
value of these allowances are not used instead, because of 
the possible correlation with the income variable. Moreover, 
if these allowances are not given to the migrant in cash, 
then their value would only be a guess and not very accurate. 
Migrants who are accompanied by their families abroad, 
apart from the possibility that they might lose contact with 
home, might have higher expenditure abroad than the un-
accompanied migrants. This indicates that the capacity of 
accompanied migrants to remit would be reduced, and thus 
remittances would fall if the migrant takes his family abroad. 
This would sugges~ a negative relation between MR and PFAM. 
The proxy used for this variable in estimation, is a dummy 
variable equal to unity if the migrant is accompanied by the 
family abroad, and zero otherwise. If the migrant is married, 
his commitment to send remittan~es home might be higher than 
the single migrants, and probably would have more dependents 
too. In this sense one would expect that married migrants 
would send larger amounts of remittances than the unmarried 
ones. However, the married migrants can take their families 
abroad, and thus their capacity to remit might be less than 
the unmarried. In this sense one would expect less remittances 
from married migrants. Thus the relation bet,V'een marital 
status of the migrant and the volume of remittances he sends 
home does not seem to be very clear, although it is more 
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likely that this relation is positive rather than negative. 
Marital status is approximated by a dummy variable equal to 
unity if the migrant is married, and zero otherwise. Both 
married and single migrants might have dependents at home 
to whom they have to send remittances. Thus the number of 
dependents is used to explain the volume of remittances from 
abroad. The hypothesis is that the higher the number of 
dependents, the higher the volume of expected remittances 
i.e. a positive relation is expected between MR and NDEP. 
The number of dependents as stated by each migrant is entered 
in the estimation. It is worth mentioning that we choose to 
use the number of dependents, rather than the number of 
children, in explaining the determinants of remittances, 
because the latter would exclude single migrants who have 
dependents at home. Using both the number of children and 
the number of dependents as separate explanatory variables 
would increase the possibility of multicollinearity. 'Both 
variables, however, were used alternatively, and it was the 
number of dependents which produced the more plausible results. 
Migrants are assumed to take some time to settle themselves 
abroad before they start sending remittances home. In this 
way recent migrants might remit less than those who have 
migrated for longer periods. This would mean that the volume 
of remittances is expected to increase with the increase 
in the period since out-migration, and thus a positive relation 
could be expected between this variable and the dependent 
variable. However, long standing migrants might tend to 
bring their families abroad and lose contact with home. If 
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this is the case, then remittances would fall with the 
increase in the period since out-migration, and thus a 
negative relationship with the dependent variable could be 
expected. In this way either observed sign between the 
volume of remittances and the period since out-migration 
could be explained. As a measure of the period since out-
migration, the last two digits of the y~ar of entry to 
Saudi Arabia is used. 
Having established the underlying rationale for using 
variables in equation (8.4.1) to explain the volume of 
remittances, we turn now to estimate this equation and 
report the results. The data were generated from the results 
of the migrants' survey. Using monthly remittances in cash 
as the dependent variable, the result of estimating equation 
(8.4.1) by OLS is as follows, with standard errors of the 
coefficien~s in parenthesis: 
*** MR = -357.828 + 0.108 INC 
(0.013) 
*** 
*** 
+ 132.747 ALLOW 
(37.529) 
*** 
+ 19.367 NDEP 
(4.879) 
-399.669 PFAM 
(55.859) 
+ 22.699 MSTAT + 5.563 YENT (8.4.2) 
(37.624) (4.216) 
R2 = 0.30, F = 21.206, D-W = 1.8558, n = 310 
Notes: R2 is R-squared, F is the F-statistics, D-W is Durbin-
Watson statistics, n is the number of observations, 
and *** indicate that the variable is significant at 
1% level of significance. 
All the coefficients in equation (8.4.2), except those 
for MSTAT and YENT, are significantly different from zero at 
1% level of significance. Moreover, all variables have the 
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right expected signs, with PFAM being a clear deterrent 
to the volume of remittances. The results indicate that 
the variables which are of significant importance in determining 
the volume of cash remittances from abroad are the first four 
variables. However, although the small value of R2 indicates 
a somewhat poor fit, yet the highly significant F-value 
indicates that the variables jointly do explain variations 
in cash remittances. 
8.5: Frequency of remittances 
Just as it is important to know about the size and 
determinants of remittances, it is also important to know 
about their frequency. How frequently migrants send remittances 
in cash is shown in Table Bl3 in Appendix B. While more than 
half of migrants send remittances occasionally, about 30% 
of them remit monthly. Of those who remit occasionally, 
about 54% remit three or four times a year, 32% remit 'five 
or six times a year, while only 8% remit once or twice a 
year and 6% remit more than six times a year. This indicates 
a reasonable frequency of remittances. When the frequency 
of remittances is broken down according to different socio-
economic characteristics of migrants, it seems that each 
group remit as frequently as any other. Recent migrants, 
however, remit more frequently than others, 52% of them 
sending remittances monthly. Presumably recent migrants 
send remittances as frequently as possible so as to settle 
debts incurred as a result of migration, and the baSic needs 
of dependents at home. 
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8.6: Channels of remittances 
There is no doubt that remittances in cash would improve 
the position of the balance of payments. However remittances 
sent through channels other than the official banking system 
might never add to foreign exchange earnings. Remitting 
through a 'black market' secretly, or with people going home, 
or keeping savings abroad might never add to the balance of 
payments. This calls for the investigation of channels through 
which remittances are sent home. Table B14 shows the channels 
of remittances usually used by migrants when sending remittances 
home. It is evident from the table that three main channels 
are used by migrants to remit home. These are through the 
official banking system, with people going back to The Sudan, 
and by paying in Saudi Arabia and receiving the equivalent 
in The Sudan, either themselves or their representatives at 
home. The three channels seem to be used equally by migrants, 
with a slight tendency to send remittances with people going 
home. Few migrants keep their savings and remittances abroad 
and take them home when they go home. These however are 
mainly those accompanied by their families abroad, who might 
need these savings abroad. 
It is int~rest±ng to ask why migrants use channels other 
than the banking system so frequently. There could be more 
than one reason for this, apart from avoiding the bureaucracy 
of the banking system in handling remittances. Paying 
remittances in Saudi Arabia and receiving the equivalent in 
The Sudan, is the traditional 'black market' way of sending 
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remittances. Thi~ has always offered a higher exchange rate 
for migrants than the premium rate offered by the banks. (3) 
The 'black market' dealings in foreign exchange exist to 
satisfy the demand for foreign currency by nationals, especially 
when there are official restrictions on the amount of money 
transferred out of the c·ountry. The government is thinking 
now of legalizing such dealings in foreign currency, by giving 
licences to people who want to trade in foreign currency, 
besides the banks. (4) Because of this high rate it is 
profitable for migrants to send their remittances through the 
'black market' rather than only the official banking system. 
Sending remittances with people going home, boils down to 
the same as paying abroad and receiving the equivalent in The 
Sudan. However, the exception here is that it does not 
necessarily take the 'black market' rate of exchange, but in 
many cases the official bank rate. Why do people use this 
method then? A good reason for this could be that th~s is 
sometimes more convenient for the recipient in The Sudan. 
It is much easier for the recipient to receive the money from 
someone who is arriving at his village, rather than from a 
bank which could be miles away from him. This argument is 
made more plausible, if we take into consideration the narrow 
spread of commercial banks in The Sudan, which tend to be 
concentrated in Khartoum and other large towns, in a vast 
country like the Sudan(5). Thus the problem is not only 
offering a higher rate of exchange by the official banking 
system, but also it has to do with the structure of the 
Sudanese economy in general, as well as the spread and 
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efficiency of the banking system. 
8.7: Main uses of remittances 
In many cases, and in the Sudan in particular, policy 
makers seem to be preoccupied by how to attract migrants' 
remittances in order to improve the balance of payments 
position, and very little attention, if any, is given to the 
utilization of these remittances. Given the proper direction, 
migrants' remittances could be of great help in domestic 
savings and investment, since they represent a high proportion 
of the average income of migrants before departure. To 
investigate how remittances are actually used at home, one 
should have information from the receiving end i.e. households 
who receive these remittances. However, since such data is 
not available we make use of information as to how migrants 
intend to spend their savings. 
in Table 8.2 overleaf. 
Some idea about this is given 
The table clearly suggests that migrants intend to spend 
their savings on consumption items rather than in productive 
investment. However, it is always important to guard against 
the fallacy of treating all consumption as necessarily un-
productive. For example, although family maintenance, 
including housing, education, and improved standard of living 
etc., represent consumption, this does not make it less 
desirable than investment. Thus it is always very difficult 
to draw a clear cut line between what should be considered 
as productive investment and what should be considered as 
consumption. In such cases any conclusions drawn on matters 
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Table 8.2: Intended use of savings by migrants 
Purpose 
1. Invest in Agriculture 
2. Conunerce 
3. Vehicles and transport 
4. Restaurant, hotel or canteen 
5. Industry and equipment 
6. Private car 
7. Marriage 
8. Housing 
9. Improve family living conditions 
10. Study abroad 
11. Other purposes 
12. Don't know yet 
13. Productive investment (1-5) 
14. Consumption items (6-10) 
Number 
39 
54 
22 
10 
6 
17 
62 
113 
78 
9 
4 
13 
131 
279 
Notes: (1) Percentage is out of the total sample of 
Column (2) does not add to 100%, because 
could have more than one purpose for his 
(2) Row (13) = rows 1 + 2+ 3+ 4+ 5· 
(3) Row (14) = rows 6 + 7+ 8+ 9+ 10. 
Source: Migrants' Survey. 
310. 
13 
17 
7 
3 
2 
5 
20 
37 
25 
3 
1 
4 
42 
90 
a migrant 
savings. 
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like the use of migrants' savings and remittances should be 
taken cautioUsly(6). 
The table indicates that the majority of migrants intend 
to spend some of their savings in building or buying houses, 
getting married, and improving their family conditions. 
These are sssentially consumption items, although housing 
construction may work towards solving housing problems, and 
increase the building industry activities. Productive invest-
ment, on the other hand, is concentrated in commerce, especially 
grocery stores, etc., on transport equipment such as taxis, 
buses, etc., and on restaurants and hotels. Although some 
migrants intend to invest their savings in agriculture, very 
few of them intend to invest in industry. This is probably 
because their savings are too small to go into large industrial 
projects, or probably because they try to avoid the risks of 
undertaking. large projects. In general, it seems that migrants 
intend to invest in small projects which require less 'capital, 
have quick returns, and probably no risk. However, if their 
savings were pooled, in some form of cooperative, or joint 
projects, they might be able to undertake large industrial 
investment. This is where the policy makers might be able 
to suggest projects, develop cooperatives, sell shares or 
bonds for certain projects to migrants, etc. Moreover, policy 
makers might provide feasibility studies, technical advice, 
etc., to be able to direct remittances to more productive 
uses. 
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8.8: Policies used to attract remittances 
The government have adopted many policies to attract 
migrants' remittances from abroad. These policies include 
imports on nil-value basis, reductions and exemptions from 
customs duties, reduced prices for acquisition of housing land 
when paid in foreign currency, and an incentive rate of 
exchange for remittances. In this section, we review and 
critically evaluate these policies, in an attempt to identify 
their weaknesses and shortcomings as well as their advantages, 
and whether they have been successful or not. 
8.8.1: Imports on nil-value basis 
This system was introduced in 1972" and at that time 
any person could import goods into the country, as long as 
he could pay for the foreign exchange requirements for them 
in his own way. The system was meant to provide some essential 
goods without putting more strain on the balance of payments. 
After 1974, the system was confihed to Sudanese migrants 
working abroad, and some regulations to define the goods which 
could be imported under the system were introduced. The list 
of approved goods varied from time to time. There is no 
information to show the extent of this policy in attracting 
remittances, nor whether the system is capable of providing 
goods for the domestic market, although a considerable 
proportion of migrants' remittances and savings are attracted. 
For example, in 1978, imports on the basis of this system 
amounted to £5 18.9 million, compared to £5 36.1 million in 
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cash remitted through the banks(7). In any case, however, 
many questions arise about this policy. For example there 
is the question about who is actually using this system; 
is it migrants themselves or other merchants who avoid paying 
tax in this way. Questions also remain as to whether the 
system is efficient in satisfying domestic demand. There is 
no way to ensure that migrants would import one commodity 
than another. Moreover, such a system might encourage 'black 
market' dealings in foreign exchange and in sending remittances 
home. Those who use the system might collect these remittances 
abroad to pay the foreign currency requirements of these 
imports. Furthermore, such a system might contradict with 
policies of offering an incentive rate of exchange to attract 
remittances through the banks. This is because either the 
migrant might spend his savings on goods imported under this 
system, and, therefore he would be left with nothing to remi t 
through the banks, or even if he has any, this might be 
remitted through the 'black market' which might offer higher 
rates to use remittances in purchasing these goods. 
8.8.2: Customs duty exemptions 
This system was introduced in July 1973. According to 
this, a migrant would get up to £5 700 exemption in customs 
duties on goods he imports, if he remits that amount through 
the banks. In July 1976, the maximum exemption was raised 
to £5 1500 plus 20% of any amounts above that if the migrant 
remits the equivalent of £5 1500 or more through the banks. 
Finally the system was completely abolished in March 1979(8). 
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Table 8.3 below shows the value of these exemptions. 
Table 8.3: Total customs duty exemptions offered to migrants 
1973/74 - 1978/79 
73/74 74/75 75/76 76/77 77/78 78/7S 
Exemptions (£S 1000) 10 152 449 2575 4852 
as % of total remitt-
ances 1.7 13·2 19.6 59.4 25·2 
as ~~ of export duties 0.1 1.4 3·7 20.4 36.5 
as % of import duties 0.02 0.2 0.4 2.4 4·5 
Source: Exemptions are from unpublished data from the Ministry 
of Finance and National Economy, Khartoum. Others 
are compiled from the Bank of Sudan "Annual Report" 
and "the Economic Survey" of the above Ministry. 
The table clearly indicates the increasing value of 
exemptions offered to migrants. During the period under 
6843 
27·9 
58·5 
6.2 
consideration, these exemptions increased about &84 fold. This 
increase has been much higher than the increase in remittances 
through the banks, which increased only 41 fold during the 
same period. This indicates that the increase in total 
remittances is not keeping pace with the increase in the 
value of exemptions. A main reason for this could be the 
way in which the exemption rate is put. Under the system, 
the migrant gets an exemption of £S 1500 for the first £S 1500 
he remits, and then 20% of any amount above that. The 
rational decision for the migrant in this case might be that 
he remits £S 1500 where he gets 100% exemption, and above 
that he remits up to the point where he could get his goods 
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free of duty, or he might calculate the gains of remitting 
through the 'black market'. This policy might be more 
effective if a progressive rate, which would rise with the 
increase in remittances, was used. In this way migrants might 
be attached to the banks, and the government might minimize 
its loss of import duties. However, as a percentage of 
import duties, these exemptions constituted only a small 
share, although an increasing one. This indicates relatively 
small losses of revenue to the government. As a percentage 
of export duties, these exemptions are larger, reaching 
more than 50% by 1978/79. This raises the question, whether 
it is rational to use this policy to improve the balance of 
payments, or to reduce export taxes in order to encourage 
exports, and thus earn foreign currency through exports. 
It is certainly better to earn foreign currency through 
exports because of the unpredictable nature of migrants' 
remittances. However, the answer to such a question would 
also depend on the competitiveness of the exports and how 
far reducing an export tax would encourage these exports. 
8.8.): Emigrants housing scheme 
This scheme was meant to sell government land for housing 
in Khartoum and other large towns, at reduced prices for 
migrants who can afford to pay the price in foreign currency. 
No information is available about the scheme. However, such 
a scheme would increase one -of the push factors of migrations, 
namely migration to facilitate building a house. Thus, such 
a policy would induce more migration, which could have other 
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effects on the economy, apart from the effects of remittances. 
Moreover, the policy would encourage urban settlement by 
migrants on return home, as well as expenditure of remittances 
in these areas, and thus might increase the urban-rural gap. 
To solve the housing problem, it might be better to establish 
building societies, for example, or through the Estate Bank 
of Sudan, to attract migrants' remittances and use them in 
building houses. Having built these houses, they could be 
sold to migrants and non-migrants on an equal basis. 
8.8.4: Incentive rate of exchange 
To attract remittances from abroad, migrants were offered 
an incentive rate of exchange by the banks. Thus, before the 
June 1978 devaluation of the Sudanese pound, while the official 
rate of exchange was £S 1 = US$ 2.78 and the effective rate 
(a rate used for certain imports and exports) was £S 1 = US$ 2.50, 
the premium rate offered to migrants by the banks was 
£S 1 = US$ 1.75. In June 1978, ,the official rate was devalued 
to the effective rate, while the latter was set at £S 1 = US$ 2.00 
the premium rate was not altered, but it was still higher than 
the effective rate. In March 1979, the customs duty exemption 
policy was abolished, and the premium rate was set at 
£S 1 = US$ 1.50. It was only in the September 1979 devaluation 
that the effective rate was set equal to the premium rate 
of £S 1 = US$ 1.25 and the official rate was set at 
£S 1 = US$ 2.00. The existence of such multiple exchange 
rates is always difficult to maintain in the short run. 
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Moreover, the 'black market' rate, as discussed above, has 
always been higher than the rate offered by the banks. 
In general, policies introduced to attrac~ migrants' 
remittances, do not seem to have fulfilled their goals. This 
is why some people have suggested restricting incentive 
policies towards migrants, and this is probably why some of 
these policies were abolished(9). However, as discussed above, 
some of these policies might have worked better if they had 
been properly applied. It seems that the problem is in the 
use of partial policies, and the pursuit of the narrow objective 
of improving the balance of payments, and at the same time 
policies were not used in conjunction with each other, some 
of them being in conflict with others. 
8.9: Summary and conclusions 
In this chapter attempts were made to assess the role of 
remittances from abroad and its implications for the economy 
of The Sudan. The evidence suggests that migrants send 
sizeable remittances, both in cash and in kind. The size of 
these remittances is determined by many factors, including 
the migrant's salary abroad, whether he is given allowances, 
whether he is accompanied by family abroad, as well as the 
number of dependents he has, etc. However, not all these 
remittances are sent through the banks. Channels other than 
the banks are used extensively by migrants. The evidence, 
moreover, suggests that remittances are largely spent on 
consumption rather than in productive use. Policies should 
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be adopted, not only to attract more remittances, but also 
to productively use them. These might be directed through 
the use of t~~ and incentives e.g. more t~~ on undesirable 
use and more incentives for items which are thought to be 
desirable. 
Notes to Chapter Eight 
(1) In 1972, the official rate of exchange of £S 1 = US¢ 2.87 
was depreciated to an effective rate of £S 1 = US¢ 2.50 by 
means of a tax and subsidy scheme of 15%. In June 1978, 
the official rate was set at the effective rate, while this 
was depreciated to £S 1 = US¢ 2.00. In September 1979, 
the official rate was set at the effective rate, and a 
parallel rate of exchange was established at £S 1 = US~ 1.25. 
In November 1981, the parallel rate was abolished and the 
official rate was devalued to £S 1 = US¢ 1.11. 
(2) More details of this test are in J. Kmenta (1971) "Elements 
of Econometrics" MacMillan 1971, p.136. 
(3) Before March 1979, the premium rate offered to the migrants 
by the banks was about US¢ 1 = £S 0.57. At that time the 
'black market' rate was about US~ 1 = £S 0.65. In March 
1979, when the banks rate was set at US~ 1 = £S 0.67, the 
'black market' rate rose up to about US~ 1 = £S 0.80 -
£S 0.85. In September 1979 when migrants were offered 
US~ 1 = £S 0.80 by the banks, the 'black market' rate rose 
to US~ 1 = £S 0.90 - £S 0.94. In July 1981, this was 
reported to have increased to US~ 1 = £S 1.05 - £S 1.06 
(Sudanow magazine July and August 1981). After November 1981 
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devaluation when the banks rate was set at US$l= £S 90, the 
'black market' rate rose to US$ 1 = £S 1.19 - £S'1.25. 
(4) Sudanow magazine "Interview with the Finance Minister ..• " 
Khartoum, July, 1981, p.12-l3. Also Sudanow magazine 
"Licensing foreign currency dealers: black market blues 
fade" Khartoum, August 1981, p.19-20. 
(5) Out of all commercial banks in the country about 35% are 
located in Khartoum alone. For more details about banks 
spread, see Bank of Sudan "Annual Report" 1978. 
(6) Other surveys undertaken among Sudanese migrants almost 
produced the same results as our survey. For the sake of 
comparison with Table 8.2 these aresults are reconstructed 
in the table overleaf. 
The two authors however, differ in the conclusions 
they reach, mainly because in differences in where to draw 
the lin'e between consumption and the productive investment. 
Abdalla, being a migrant himself, seems to be trying hard 
to prove that migrants do iqvest their savings productively. 
For this purpose he defines spending on agriculture, 
housing and marriage as productive investment, thus 
reaching the conclusion that " •.• the three priority areas 
were mainly in the nature of productive investment" p.39. 
Galaleldin, on the other hand, seems to be trying to prove 
the opposite, and thus he treats the productive investment 
as investment in agriculture and industry, and ignores the 
role of vehicles and transport, as well as commerce, etc. 
However, the reconstruction of their original results, as 
in the table overleaf, shows that both of them seem to 
- 188 -
Table a: Intended use of savings by migrants according to 
surveys undertaken. 
Purpose ~ Galaleldin Abdalla (a) (b) No. % No. % 
1. Invest in agriculture 18 4 69 28 
2. Corrunerce }m 4 2 3· Vehicles and transport 23 17 7 
4. Restaurant, hotel or 
canteen x x 
5· Industry and equipment 29 6 10 4 
6. Private car )( )C. 34 14 
7. Marriage 83 17 65 26 
8. Housing 125 25 66 26 
9· Improve family living 
conditions 112 22 37 15 
10. Study abroad x x 1 -
II. Other purposes 20 4 18 7 
12. Don't know yet x x x x 
13· Productive investment ( c ) 160 32 100 40 
14. Consumption items (c) 320 64 203 81 
Notes: x indicates that such a purpose was not used by the author. 
- indicates less than 1%. 
(a) For Galaleldin, to obtain the number of those who 
intended to improve family conditions, we added those 
reported by him as intending to buy durable consumption 
goods (17%) and those intending to buy non durable 
consumption goods (5~q. Rows (2),(3) and (4) are one 
purpose according to him. 
(b) For Abdalla, we made the following redefinitions (i) 
For housing, we added those reported as having the 
intention to "build a house" (23%) and those who intend 
to "finish a house" (3%). (ii) For improving family 
conditions, we use his purpose defined as 'consumption 
goods'. 
(c) Rows (13) and (14) are our own additions and calculated 
as in Table 8.2 above. 
Sources:(a) Galaleldin (1979) "External migration in The Sudan" 
ESRC, Khartoum, Dec. 1979 (Arabic) Table 14, p.45. 
(b) Abdalla A.A. "Foreign Labour in the Yemen Arab 
Republic: a case study of The Sudanese migrants" 
Bulletin No.84, ESRC, Khartoum, Feb. 1980, Table 22 
p.39· 
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stand on the opposite conclusion. In both surveys, it 
is the consumption items to which remittances and savings 
usually go. This of course does not mean that there is 
no productive investment as stated by Galaleldin, nor that 
productive investment is the main element as stated by 
Abdalla. 
(7) Bank of Sudan "Annual Report" 1978. 
(8) The system was abolished by the Council of Ministers 
Resolution No.145 dated 25 March 1979. On 2nd January 
1980, however, the system was reintroduced for six months 
only i.e. up to June 1980, to allow those who remitted 
£5 1500 or more before March 1979, to make use of the 
exemption (for this point see "The Economic Survey" 
Ministry of Finance and National Economy 1979/80. 
(9) Sudanese Socialist Union, Development Committee "Symposium 
on Migration" held on 27-30 December 1978, Khartoum, 
(Arabic). 
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CHAPTER NINE 
FACTORS INFLUENCING MIGRATION: A REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
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9.1: Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to review the theoretical 
and empirical studies dealing with factors which influence 
the movement of labour across international boundaries. 
Most empirical models of the determinants of international 
migration has been concerned with the factors responsible 
for fluctuations in early European migration to the 'New World', 
or what is known as the transoceanic migration to the U.S.A., 
Canada, New Zealand and Australia. Migration between European 
countries, especially from Southern to Northern Europe have 
also received considerable attention. Studies on migration 
between developing countries seem to be very few, or non-
existent. This is particularly true in the case of labour 
movement between MENA countries. This is probably because 
migration itself seems to have assumed a large scale only 
recently. The non-availability of data also seem to be one 
of the major limiting factors. Nevertheless, studies on early 
migration from Europe, or between European countries give 
some considerable insights into factors influencing labour 
migration. Section 2 presents a short summary of the pull-
push controversy i.e. whether factors in receiving countries 
are important or those in sending countries. Section 3 
presents the main theoretical approaches to the treatment of 
labour mobility. In Section 4, a review of some econometric 
studies in this area is presented, while the summary and 
conclusions are presented in Section 5. 
- 192 -
9.2: The pull-push controversy 
Most studies in the area of migration determinants seem 
to address themselves to the question whether the economic 
conditions in the destination country (the pull-factors) are 
more important in explaining fluctuations in migration than 
the economic conditions in the home country (the push-factors). 
A classic study addressed to this question is that by Jerome 
(1926), in which he concludes that the 'pull' elements were 
predominant in explaining European migration to the U.S.A. 
This view has found support from many authors, and was 
challenged by others. A brief summary of this controversy 
is presented by Gallaway and Vedder (1971), stating that 
"In recent years Jerome's conclusion has received 
support from a number of scholars, including 
Kuznets and Rubin, Easterlin, Fleisher, and 
Kelley ...... Others have challenged this view. 
Brinley Thomas states that 'the generally 
accepted view that immigration was dominated 
by the 'pull' of American economic conditions 
needs to be revised' ••••• " p.886 
Other studies which found support of the 'push' factors 
are many. Among these studies is the one by J.M. Quigley 
(1972) who concludes that 
" •••• it is unfair to conclude that the pattern 
of emigration during the period 1867-1908 was 
dominated by economic conditions in the U.S.A. 
The evidence indicates that the 'push' of 
domestic conditions in Sweden was at least as 
import.ant in determining migration .••. " P.124 
Recently in 1978, Magnussen and Siqueland have added 
new evidence to the dominance of the 'push' factors, stating 
that 
" 
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we can conclude that variations in 
Norwegian wages had a greater effect on 
Norwegian emigration to the U.S.A. than 
equivalent variations in U.S. wages. 
Interpreted in relation to the pull-push 
scheme, our results show that the 'push' 
was greater than the 'pull' ••• " P.Sl 
There are other studies which found support for both 
the push and the pull factors, some of which are reviewed in 
Section 4 below(l). However, the push-pull controversy seems 
to continue and to dominate the literature of international 
migration. However, one should ask what are these factors 
which influence labour migration. Or, what are the variables 
mostly used by these studies, and what is the rationale behind 
their use. We attempt to identify these factors in the next 
section. 
9.3: Theoretical approaches to the study of labour mobility 
The factors which influence a migratory movement are 
not always easy to trace, since these are several, some of 
which are of greater importance than others. Migration would 
depend on factors both in the sending and receiving countries. 
These factors could be economic factors, political, social, 
or demographic factors. The push-pull controversy does not 
seem to offer a clear cut answer. A migratory movement could 
be generated by both pull and push factors simultaneously. 
There are, however, different economic approaches to deal 
with this problem. 
Several different economic approaches to the analysis 
of labour mobility appear in the literature. These various 
economic explanations have their roots in the economic theory 
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of why and how individuals move in response to differentials 
in labour market conditions. Two basic explanations in this 
respect, are the differential economic advantage and the job 
opportunity hypotheses(2). The first emphasises differential 
financial gains as an inducement to workers' movement, 
while the other places the greatest stress on job opportunity 
conditions. Both of these derive from simple supply and 
demand conditions in various labour markets. On the one 
hand, with increased demand for labour, wage rates rise and/or 
unemployment falls. Other things being equal, individuals 
in other labour markets are attracted into the market where 
wages have risen and employment opportunities have expanded. 
The response to wage levels embodies the differential 
economic advantages, while the impact of unemployment on 
mobility reflects the job opportunity thesis. 
Another important approach to labour mobility is to 
treat migration as an investment in human capital decision, 
in which an individual would choose to migrate if his expected 
returns from migration are positive(3). According to this, 
what is important to the migrant is his expected net benefits 
from migration, rather than benefits at the present time. 
An individual faced with a migration decision will weigh up 
its net advantages i.e. benefits from migration minus costs 
incurred by the move. If expected lifetime benefits outweigh 
expected costs, he will choose to migrate. In other words, 
the individual will choose to migrate if the discounted 
present value of his expected net benefits is positive, i.e. 
migration is an investment decision. 
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These hypotheses, however, are not necessarily competing, 
rather, they might be incorporated into a single model of 
migration, since they use almost the same motives for migration. 
Monetary returns to migration are usually referred to as 
the income differential between the two countries if an 
individual chooses to migrate. The hypothesis is that, the 
higher the income differential between the two countries, 
the greater will be the tendency for individuals to move to 
the country with higher income levels. However, income 
differentials will only be meaningful if the individual can 
actually find a job in the destination country. Similarly, 
the foregone income in the origin country will be meaningful 
if the individual was originally employed at home i.e. income 
differentials would increase for those who were unemployed 
before migration. Thus unemployment and job opportunities 
in the two countries should be taken into consideration 
besides the income differential. Put another way, this 
amounts to saying that migrants .are "pushed" from the origin 
country by the high unemployment rate (or the poor employment 
opportunities) and the low income, while "pulled" to the 
destination country by the high income level and the high 
employment opportunities. 
Some attention, however, must be devoted to the specific 
form in which income differentials and employment opportunities 
are entered in a migration equation. For the potential migrant, 
the two are intertwined, since the latter could serve as a 
proxy for the probability of finding a job and earning the 
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income differential. (4) But employment opportunities and 
incomes in both countries could be entered separately in 
a migration equation, to assess the relative importance of 
the 'push' and 'pull' factors. 
There are other factors which influence migration, 
besides the income differential and employment opportunities. 
Costs of migration not only include monetary costs, like 
foregone income, or travel costs', but there are also non-
monetary costs. There are non-pecuniary costs of migration 
which relate to distance, for example, whether distance is 
viewed as an increasing travel cost, or a decreasing information 
flow. Moreover, there are factors which are likely to affect 
a migration decision, other than the economic ones. An 
important aspect of the decision to migrate is the availability 
of information about the labour market situation in the 
destination' country. One way of obtaining information, or 
reducing information costs, is previous mobility. The 
importance of information was stressed by Nelson (1959), 
and also Fleisher (1963), who hypothesised that the role of 
information provided by the presence of friends and relatives 
abroad is a significant variable affecting the magnitude of 
migration. Also one type of psychic cost relates to the 
adjustment in the country of destination. The adjustment 
costs should be higher, the greater the inter-country 
differences in culture, language, etc. However,these adjust-
ment costs might be reduced a great deal by the presence of 
relatives and friends and previous migrants, who might also 
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provide job information and initial help for new migrants. 
Thus, in many migration studies, previous migratory movements 
are used as an explanatory variable in the migration equation. 
This is because apart from the possibility that for personal 
reasons migrants might locate near relatives and friends, 
this variable also captures and measures the impact of factors 
such as the availability of information about labour market 
conditions in the destination country, etc. Thus, the greater 
the number of previous migrants from country i in country j, 
the more likely a migrant from i is to know someone in j who 
can provide him with such information and initial help, and 
thus the more likely he is to migrate to. j rather than other 
countries. 
Thus, there are many variables which are used to explain 
migration flows. These include income and employment 
opportunities in both countries, costs of migration, distance, 
previous mobility, as well as other variables. In summary, 
then, the typical migration function, estimated in most 
econometric studies dealing with the determinants of migration, 
is of the form 
N. . = f (Y ., Y., U., U., C .. , D .. , Nt l' O .. ) lJ 1 J 1 J lJ lJ - lJ 
where 
M.. = net (or gross) migration from country i to j. 
lJ 
Y.,Y. = per capita income in i and j respectively 
1 J 
U.,U. = unemployment rates in i and j respectively 
l. J 
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c.. = costs of migration 
~J 
D.. = distance between i and j 
~J 
Mt _l = previous migratory movement betwe€n i and j 
0.. = a set of "other variables" like age, educational 
~J 
levels, populations of i and j, etc. 
It should be pointed out, that not all studies use the 
same number of variables in their equations, nor do they 
use the same definition of these variables. These usually 
differ according to the aim and scope of the study, the 
availability of data, etc. The next section shows how these 
variables have been determined in some empirical studies of 
migration determinants. 
9.4: Empirical studies of migration determinants 
Empirical studies dealing with factors influencing 
migration, usually use one or more of the variables in 
equation (9.1) above. However, they usually differ in the 
number of variables they use, as well as in the form which a 
specific variable takes in the equation. In this section, we 
present a summary of some econometric studies dealing with the 
determinants of migration. Only a selection is presented 
here, to reflect the use of variables in equation (9.1) above. 
Table 9.1 overleaf presents a summary of the results of some 
studies in this area. The table shows the most significant 
and commonly used variables in a migration equation. Some 
of these studies use variables which are not reported here, 
although, as explained in the notes to the table, most of 
these are either lagged or dummy variables. In general, the 
Table 9.1: A summary of some econometric findings on determinants of migration. 
Variables Kelley Wi1kin- Gallaway Richard- Quigley Dutta 
son & Vedder son 
1965 1970 1971 1972 1972 1972 
(1) (2) (3 ) (4) (5) (6) (7 ) 
Constant -12.07 -12·347 -23·10 604.1* 37·140* -
(-1. 002) (83.3) (2.035) 
Y. -8.10 - 1. 90** 2.92** -4.394* -0.20 
1 (58.07) (1. 46) (1.58 ) (2.021) (0.13) 
-3.521* 
(2.97 6 ) 
Y. -5·28 - 0.01 2.30** 6.834* 0.25 
J (12.46) (0.01) (1.69) (3.271) (0.20) 
1.449 
(1. 850) 
Y. - Y. - 1.367*** - - - -1 J (4.635) 
u. 
- -
5.83** -1.16 - -
1 (1. 46) (2.28) 
u. 0.35** - 0·92 2·98* - -
J (0.09) (0.37) (1.51 ) 
M
t
_
1 0.62** 0.234** - - 0.389* 0.72** (0.09) (1.648) (3.059) (0.22) 
- ~--
Marr 
1977 
(8) 
-
-0.12** 
(4.22) 
-
0.922* 
(1.44) 
-0.26 
(0.13) 
-0.29 
(0.21) 
-
Magnussen 
& Sique1and 
1978 
(9) 
-
-1051.2* 
(-2.67) 
188.5* 
(3.25) 
-
-
-
0.035 
(2.17) 
I-
\C 
\C 
Table 9.1 (Contd.) 
Variables Kelley Wilkin- Gallaway 
son & Vedder 
1965 1970 1971 
(1) (2) (3) (4 ) 
P. - 0.058 -
1 (0.595) 
P. - 0.035 -
J (1.046) 
C .. - - -lJ 
Bt-26 
- - -
R2 0·79 0·71 0.62 
D - W 
-
1.86 2.09 
------ -
-~ 
Richard- Quigley Dutta 
son 
1972 1972 1972 
(5) (6) (7) 
-
0.466 
-
(1.034.) 
41.75*** 
- -
(10.08) 
- - -
-
1.243 
-
(1.124) 
0.743 0.84 0.88 
1. 95 - -
Marr 
1977 
(8) 
-
-
-
-
0.84 
1·51 
Magnussen 
& Siqueland 
1978 
(9) 
-
-
21·3 
(1:.32) 
-
I 
0.275 
-
I\) 
o 
o 
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Notes to Table 9.1: 
(a) 
(c) 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
Figures in parentheses are t-statistics except for 
Kelley, Richardson and Dutta where they refer to 
the standard errors of coefficients. 
*, **, *** indicate variable is significant at 10%, 
5% and 1% respectively. 
- indicate variable is not used in this study 
All variables are as defined in equation 9.1 above, 
except, P., P. refer to output level in country i 
and j, Bt=26 J is the birth rate in country i lagged 
26 years. R2 and D-W are R-squared and Durbin-Watson 
statistics respectively. 
Y. and Y. for Kelley are defined as growth rates of 
r~al perJcapita income i.e. AY. and AY., as a measure 
of long-term economic welfare. 1 J 
P. for Wilkinson is the output in j lagged one period, 
mJreover, other variables (mainly lagged dependent 
and independent variables) are used and do not appear 
in this table. 
(4) Gallaway and Vedder use other variables (mainly 
dummies) which are not reported here. 
(5) P. for Richardson is the gross domestic investment 
iff j. Other variables are also used (population). 
(6) Y. and Y. for Quigley are disaggregated into 
a~riculttiral and industrial income. Thus there are 
two coefficients for each of Y. and Y .. The first 
refers to industrial income ana the s~cond to 
agricultural income, for each of them. P. is the 
1 harvest in country i. 
Other variables are us~d by Dutta, mainly cost of 
living index in country i, and export prices of 
country j. 
(8) (Y.-Y.) for Marr is defined as income in j relative 
1 J to income in another destination country. 
(9) C .. is defined as the ticket fare to destination 
1J country. 
Source: These are taken from the relevant equation in each 
study. Where more than one country is used in the 
study, the equation referring to U.K. is reported here. 
When there is more than one equation for the same 
country, the one with the highest R2 is reported 
here. 
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table shows per capita income - whether difference or 
income in each country - unemployment rates, previous 
mobility as well as output levels and investment in destination 
country as the most commonly used variables. Most of these 
variables show the right expected sign, with most of them 
being significantly different from zero. The relative 
importance of each variable might be clearer when we discuss 
each study separately in the following pages. 
Kelley (1965) attempted to explain the factors governing 
U.K. migration to Australia in 1865-1935. He uses the 
unemployment rate, Ut , in both countries as the major 
explanatory variable, and dismisses the U.K. unemployment 
rate as being insignificant. Auding growth rates of per 
capita incomes in both countries, he finds them insignificant. 
Thus migration could be explained by the unemployment rate 
(labour market conditions) in the destination country showing 
that thus 'pull' factors are more operative than 'push' 
factors. The study uses l/Ut r~ther than Ut as its explanatory 
variable. In general however, it is rather limited in the 
number of variables it uses, and ignores the income variable. 
Wilkinson (1970), combines aggregate labour demand and 
.supply into a migration function. He argues that the 
equilibrium flow of labour into the U.S.A. from a given 
European country is a function of output level in the two 
countries (which indicates shifts in demand for labour) 
and the difference in real wages (referring to the supply 
side of the labour market). To allow for adjustments in the 
labour market to reach the equilibrium level of migration 
flow, he introduces a distributed lag model. This introduces 
many lagged dependent and independent variables in his model, 
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although most of them turned out to be insignificant. He 
estimates equations to explain migration to the U.S.A. 
from different European countries separately. The study 
finds that employment opportunities in the U.S.A., measured 
by changes in output, is less significant than the" 'push' 
factors. However, the introduction of many lagged variables 
might give rise to the problem of multicollinearity, besides, 
the Durbin-Watson test will not hold for testing for auto-
correlation in the presence of the lagged dependent variable 
as an explanatory variable(S). Moreover, the data used in 
estimation was the manufacturing sector output in the countries 
in question, rather than total output. 
Gallaway and Vedder (1971) set out to test the hypothesis 
that 'push' and 'pull' factors are both in operation 
simultaneously, using U.K. migration to the U.S.A. in 
1860-1913 .. They postUlate that migrants are 'pushed' from 
U.K. by the low wages and high unemployment, while being 
'pulled' to the U.S.A. by the high wages and low unemployment 
rates. This model is extended to include the effects of 
business cycles, hypothesising that migrants would be affected 
by the "bad news" about economic opportunity in the U.S.A. 
As a proxy for this, five dummy variables were used, each 
referring to a particular year in the U.S. economy. Moreover, 
U.K. migrants to Australia, South Africa, and Canada were 
introduced as separate explanatory variables. The study 
found that both 'pull' and 'push' factors are in operation, 
although the 'pull' factors seemed to exert a stronger 
influence. However, the 'pull' factor was represented more 
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strongly in their equations (the dummy variables) than 
the 'push' factors. It might be argued that dummies could 
also be used to represent business cycles in the U.K. 
Later, Richardson (1972) argues that fluctuations in 
investment in the destination country formed the main factor 
in attracting migrants. The conventional variables' of income 
and unemployment rates in both countries, and U.K. population 
and investment in the destination country, were used to 
explain migration. Investment abroad was found to be the 
most significant variable in explaining 1870-1914 U.K. 
migration to Australia, Canada, U.S.A. and New Zealand. 
This being the only variable highly significant throughout 
all equations, he concluded that: 
" ••• these conclusions suggest a demand-determined 
model in which rising investment creates an 
increasing demand for labour ••• Labour moved 
abroad not as a response to higher wages, or 
because slumps in Britain dried up new jobs at home, 
but rather because investment booms in the regions of recant 
settlement (destination countries) created 
employment opportunities overseas. Booms in 
these regions could not be accommodated by 
expansion in the indigenous labour force ••• " P.110 
In explaining the Swedish migration to U.S.A. during 
1867-1908, Quigley (1972) stressed that the 'push' factors 
are as important as the 'pull' factors. Using income in 
the U.S.A. to represent the 'pull' factors, and income in 
Sweden, the state of the Swedish harvest, and the lagged birth 
rate in Sweden as the 'push' factors, he sets out to test 
this hypothesis. A migration function was estimated for 
total migrants, agricultural workers, and non-agricultural 
workers. The income variable was disaggregated to agricultural 
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and industrial earnings, both in Sweden and U.S.A. The 
evidence indicated that the 'push' of domestic conditions in 
Sweden was important as the 'pull' factors, if not more so. 
However, the stress in this study is on the 'push' factors, 
and the 'pull' factors are represented by earnings abroad 
only, while employment opportunities were ignored. Moreover, 
variables like the state of the Swedish harvest might affect 
agricultural workers more than the industrial workers, for 
whom industrial output or unemployment rate might be more 
reasonable. 
Recently, Magnussen and Siqueland (1978), using a human 
capital approach to the study of labour mobility, postulated 
that individuals will choose the alternative which results 
in the highest lifetime inc?me for him. Thus, migration 
depends on lifetime wages in both origin and destination 
countries, as well as the costs of migration) assumed to be 
a once and for all cost (the price of a ticket is used as 
a proxy). Wages in the origin c,ountry, whether lagged or 
current, were found more Significant, thus the "push" factors 
are more operative than the 'pull'. However, the study does 
not explicitly test for the significance of unemployment 
rates in either country. Employment opportunities cannot 
be ignored, since they would determine whether the migrant 
could obtain the expected income or not. 
Marr (1977) differs from all these studies in pointing 
to the importance of alternative destination countries rather 
than only one receiving country. Thus "a potential migrant 
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has a whole range of countries to choose from" P.S7l. 
Thus, his explanatory variables are the inverse of the 
unemployment rate in both sending and receiving countries, 
the income in home country, and the income in destination 
country relative to another destination country. Taking 
one of his equations, U.K. migration to U.S.A. is formulated 
as 
IUS - c + c 
-. 0 1 PUK 
+ c 2 YUK + c 3 1 + c 4 UUK 
where I is UK immigration to USA, P is population, Y is 
income, U is unemployment rate and the subscripts US, UK 
and A refer to United States, United Kingdom and Australia 
respectively. In this way, what is important to the potential 
migrant is not only USA income, but this relative to Australia's. 
However, although the study shows that it is necessary to 
recognize explicitly the role of alternative destinations 
on migration, yet the introduction of destination income in 
this way produces another problem. This assumes knowledge, 
"not only of a home and destination country, but also about 
a wide range of alternative destinations. 
Dutta's (1972) study of Indo-Ceylon migration, 1920-1938, 
is one of those most similar to our own study, in the sense 
that, unlike the others, it deals with migration between 
two developing countries.· Like the others, however, the 
study hypothesises that migration is induced mainly by 
increments in labour returns expected in the new region 
and the costs of migration. Thus, wages in both countries, 
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previous migration, as well as the relative prices of 
exportables in the destination country are the main explanatory 
variables. The higher the price of exportables, the more 
expansion in this industry, and the more demand for labour, 
thus more migration. However, although this is quite logical, 
yet it assumes that migrants are employed only in this 
industry. Finding wages in the origin country insignificant, 
the study prefers to use the cost of living indices in the 
origin country as a proxy for earnings, or a 'push' factor, 
which is found to be highly significant. In this way the 
study concluded that, although both 'push' and 'pull' factors 
are operative, conditions in the country of origin were 
dominant. The study, however, uses few variables, a problem 
which seems to be rooted in the scarcity of data. 
As mentioned earlier, stUdies on migration in the MENA 
countries are very rare. To our knowledge, only one 
econometric study exists in this area. Azzam (1978), 'undertook 
a cross-section study to explain immigration to the oil-
producing countries of MENA. The explanatory variables used 
to explain 1975 migration from country i to country j in the 
region (M .. ), are relative per capita 
~J 
income growth Arab 
rate (% A Y '/P.) distance between i and J' ,J J , 
1'0 £'Y. IP. 
~ ~ 
relative 
per capita income (Yj~Pj) , relative temperature in principal 
Y. P. 
cities (T./T.), the ~ 1 stock of migrants from i in j in 
J 1 
1970 (SM .. ), percentage of population of i in rural areas (R.), 
~J ~ 
percentage of population of i in age group 21-29 (A.), as well 
1 
as migrants in j of origin other than i, as competing migrants 
(eM.). Using combinations of these variables, equations were 
J 
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estimated to explain 1975 immigration to Saudi Arabia, 
Kuwait, Libya, UAE, Qatar, and Bahrain, from other Arab 
countries, as well as a regression using pooled data together. 
Ten equations were reported in all, and an example of these 
is his pooled regression equation (equation 9, p.477), with 
t-statistics in parentheses. 
log(Mi.i) 
P. 
= -0.88 + 0.274 109(% AY,/P,j) + 0.181 109(Ai) 
(0.947) %AY./P. (0.333) P. 
~ ~ ~ ~ 
+ 0.623 log(~)* + 0.731 log(SM .. )*** 
(2.451) P. (11.118) ~ 
J ~ 
2 R = 0.789, F = 42.277 
The study finds that the most significant variable 
throughout all equations is the stock of migrants (SM .. ). 
~J 
This, howev'er, is used as a proxy for information and initial 
help, although the study assumes a five year lag in the 
transmission of this information, since the stock of migrants 
in 1970 is used to explain 1975 migration. Moreover, some 
of the variables used are demographic variables, like age and 
rural population, while others are of little relevance, like 
the relative temperature. On the other hand, the study seems 
to ignore the economic motives of migration, namely income 
and employment opportunities. It might be interesting to 
test for these more explicitly. 
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9.5: Summary and conclusions 
At the end of this chapter, it is appropriate to ask 
what conclusions can be drawn from the above review of 
literature? All studies mentioned above seem to start from 
the proposition that labour migration is a function of the 
benefits and costs associated with this movement. They 
move on to state that income gains and employment opportunities 
in both origin and destination countries reflect these 
benefits and costs. Other variables, notably previous 
migration as a proxy for information and initial help, are 
also. used and found to be significant in explaining migration. 
Other variables used as a proxy for levels of economic 
activity and employment opportunities include output levels 
in each country as well as investment. Most of the above 
studies have dealt with the controversy of push-pull factors, 
and were concerned to determine which factor is predominant. 
In spite of evidence supporting both push and pull factors, 
the controversy seems to continue, with no clear answer. 
Notes to Chapter Nine 
(1) This review of push-pull controversy is not meant to be 
exhaustive. Other studies which found evidence of either 
or both, and are not reviewed here include D. Pope (1968), 
G.L. Chapin, R.K. Vedder and L.E. Gallaway (1970), 
J.J. Orsagh and P.J. Moony (1970) and Y.A. Tomaske (1971) 
etc. 
x 
- 210 -
(2) A summary of these propositions are in R.L. Raimon 
(1962), also in L.E. Gallaway and R.K. Vedder (1971) 
etc. A survey of trends in theoretical treatment of 
labour mobility could be found in J.e. Simmons (1970). 
(3) This approach has been developed by L. Sjaastad (1962). 
(4) M.P. Todaro (1969) in his rural-to-urban migration model 
suggests that urban income should be adjusted for the 
probability of finding a job in the modern urban sector, 
a proxy for which unemployment rate in urban areas is 
used. 
(5) For this, ~ see Z. Grilic~es (1961). 
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CHAPTER TEN 
DETERMINANTS OF MIGRATION FROM THE SUDAN 
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10.1: Introduction 
In this chapter attempts are made to examine and 
investigate the economic factors which partially explain 
labour movement from The Sudan to the oil producing countries 
of MENA. In Section 2 a model is developed to test these 
factors. It is hypothesised that, in order to meet their 
demand for labour, oil producing countries in the region 
had to attract migrant labour into them. In other wordS, 
labour was attracted into these countries .more strongly than 
it was pushed by factors internal to the emigration countries. 
Section J sets out to estimate this model, present the 
results and discuss them. At the end in Section 4, a summary 
and conclusions from the findings are presented. 
10.2: The model 
As pointed out in Chapter 9, the migration of labour 
could be explained in terms of net increments in labour 
returns expected in the new reg{on. More generally, 
individuals move in response to economic and other forces. 
The economic and other incentives are connected with both 
the source and destination countries. It is the contention 
of this study that labour market conditions in the destination 
countries i.e. oil producing countries of MENA, have more 
influence on labour movements than those in the origin 
countries or the non-oil countries. Put in other words, 
it is hypothesised that, although both 'pull' and 'push' 
forces might be in operation, the 'pull' factors exert more 
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pressure on labour movements. 
As discussed in Chapter Two, following the 1973/74 
oil price rise, AOPEC countries were able to accumulate 
considerable surpluses of money, and their governments a 
considerable amount of revenue. Aiming at transforming 
these oil revenues into economic development these governments 
were able to draw up huge economic plans for development. 
The increased revenue and development expenditure led to 
increased economic activity in these countries. Given the 
relatively small and inexperienced population in these 
countries, it is clear that a major constraint on their 
rapid expansion would be a shortage of labour, and therefore 
there was the necessity to calIon imported labour. It is 
in the context of this demand for labour that one should 
seek to explain the factors influencing migration in the 
region. 
The increase in the demand for labour in the oil'countries, 
pushed wages to levels which are extremely attractive to the 
workers in neighbouring non-oil countries. Thus workers 
were financially motivated to migrate to these countries. 
This was reflected in comparing earnings of Sudanese migrants 
in our migrants survey in Saudi Arabia with what they 
used to earn before migration. The first is considerably 
higher than the latter (Section 7.9). These substantial wage 
differentials give the individual an opportunity to increase 
his earnings and savings as compared with home employment. 
Thus for the individual migrant, high earnings abroad seem 
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to be the primary motive for his migration. Indeed, migrants 
in the survey, asked about their migration motives, listed 
financial gains from migration as their primary motive. 
Table 10.1 below gives some idea on these. 
Table 10.1: Migration motives according to migrants in the 
sample. 
Very: 
Motive important 
% 
(1) High earnings in 
Saudi Arabia 56 
(2) Make savings 74 
(3) Low earnings in 
The Sudan 35 
(4) No job in the Sudan -
(5 ) No suitable job in 
The Sudan 1 
(6 ) Other reasons 7 
Notes:- % is out of the sample of 310. 
- indicates less than 1%. 
" 
Source: Migrants Survey. 
Less Not 
important important 
% % 
35 2 
17 3 
55 3 
1 90 
4 87 
6 0 
No 
answer 
% 
7 
6 
7 
8 
8 
87 
For the individual migrant in the sample, the table clearly 
indicates that the financial motives were more important than 
the employment related motives. Moreover, migrants seem to be 
attracted by the high earnings abroad and the possibility of 
making some savings, rather than only being pushed by the low 
earnings at home. Thus, economic conditions both in The Sudan 
and destination countries might have had some effect on 
migration. 
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To test, more explicitly, whether the economic conditions 
in receiving countries have more effect on migration than 
those in The Sudan, we use multiple regression analysis. The 
initial hypothesis is that migrants were 'pushed' from The 
Sudan by the low income and the high unemployment rate, and 
'pulled' to the oil countries by the high income and the low 
unemployment rate. However, one problem in testing this 
hypothesis is the non-availability of the data, especially 
about unemployment rates. Moreover, given the highly 
restrictive migration in the region in the sense that a 
worker is not allowed - in theory - to migrate unless he has 
a work contract, what would matter then is the demand for 
labour. Even if there is unemployment in immigration countries, 
the increased level of economic activity might necessitate 
the import of certain types of labour not available internally 
to these countries. On the other hand an unemployed worker 
in the Sudan might not be able to migrate because he has no 
work contract. Instead of the l.,lnemployment rate, the demand 
for labour might be well approximated by the level of 
economic activity, which could measure the employment 
opportunities for migrants. As a proxy for the level of 
economic activity, output levels in each country could be 
used. The basic relation to be tested then is of the form 
M . t = f(YD. t s-J, J-s, o s,t O. t) J, (10.1) 
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where 
M . t is migration from The Sudan to country j, at period t. 
s-J, 
YD. t is the per capita income, or wage difference between J-s, 
country j and The Sudan at t. 
o 
s,t repres~nt output level in The Sudan at t. 
o. t J, 
represent output level in country j at t. 
The income difference in relation (10.1) above would 
represent the financial gains to the migrants, while the 
output levels would represent the employment opportunities 
in both countries. The higher the income difference between 
The Sudan and country j, the more expected migration is. 
That is to say a positive relation is expected between M . t 
s-J, 
and YD. t' The increase in the economic activity in 
J-s, 
country j would increase the demand for labour in this country 
and thus provide more employment opportunities for migrants, 
so inducing more migration. This indicates a positive 
relation between M . t and O. t' 
s-J, J, The reverse holds for 
o i.e. an increase in the level of economic activity in 
s,t' 
The Sudan would create domestic demand for labour, more 
employment opportunities, hence less migration. In the 
next section we attempt to estimate this migration equation. 
10.3: Estimation and results 
One of the limiting factors throughout this study has 
been the non-availability of data. In this chapter, data 
also posed a problem for the estimation of relation (10.1) 
above. Before presenting the results then, a word about 
the data is necessary. 
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In the __ absence of any information about wages in the 
Sudan or in the immigration countries, GNP per capita is 
used as a proxy for earnings in The Sudan and abroad. Because 
of the nature of income distribution in these countries 
being skewed towards the Sheiks and members of the Royal 
families, GNP per.capita would be a poor proxy for migrants 
earnings. However in the absence of other information, 
there was no way but to use this. It is worth mentioning 
that non-oil GNP per capita was also used as an alternative 
proxy, but still produced the same results. 
As a proxy for the level of economic activity or output, 
one of these three variables was used; either construction 
GDP, non-oil GDP, or gross domestic investment. We excluded 
oil because it does not provide employment for migrants 
(Chapter Two), and because of its non-existence in The Sudan. 
However, especially for the Sudan, each of the three variables 
was highly correlated with the income variable, since-GNP 
per capita is highly determined by the non-oil sectors 
output. This relation would give rise to a problem of multi-
collinearity in the estimation. To reduce this problem, 
the unemployment rate in The Sudan is used as a proxy for 
home employment opportunities and found to produce a better 
result, both statistically and in terms of economic meaning, 
than any of the other three variables. For the immigration 
countries we use one of the three original variables. 
F.inally the dependent variable M . t also has its 
s-J, 
problems, since data on Sudanese migration to each country 
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is not available. However, making use of total migrants 
through the Labour Department we can construct a proxy for 
this variable. The statistics of the Labour Department, as 
discussed in Chapter Two, were estimated to form only about 
30 % of total migrants, and thus the total was adjusted by 
this factor. To find how many persons migrate to each 
destination country, we assume the distribution of migrants 
by destination country, as discussed in Section 2.4, to 
remain constant. Accordingly, it is assumed that about 70% 
of the total outflow is to Saudi Arabia, 20% to Libya, 3% 
to Kuwait, 1% to Oman, etc. Although these assumptions are 
questionable, there is no reason to believe that the 
distribution of migrants has changed considerably. However, 
the construction of the dependent variable in this manner 
would result in having the same variations in the dependent 
variable for each country. Thus in effect we would be explaining 
the total official migration from the Sudan. In other words, the 
question would be, if the total outflow was to Saudi Arabia, 
for example, what are the determinants of this outflow. 
The best results were obtained when gross domestic 
investment in country j is used as a proxy for the level of 
economic activity in that country. However, it is the previous 
level of gross domestic investment rather than the current 
which gives the best results. Possibly when investment takes 
place it goes first into machinery, etc., and only later 
generates additional demand for labour. Moreover, it Mas 
the logarithmic form which produced better results than the 
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direct linear relationship between the dependent and 
independent variables. Presumably because the variables 
are growing with time, transforming the data into log form 
might produce more linearity in their relationship. Thus, 
the final form of equation (10.1) which is estimated and 
reported here is of the form: 
log MS_j,t = ~O + ~l log YDj_s,t + ~2 log Us,t + ~J log GDIj,t_l 
+ tJ. t 
where 
M . t is as defined in (10.1) above. 
s-J, 
YD. t is the real per capita income difference between 
J-s, 
(10.2) 
country j and The Sudan, measured as (Y. tip. t -J, J, 
U 
s,t 
Y Ip ) where Y is real GNP at constant 
s,t s,t' 
1970 prices expressed in US~ and P is population. 
is the unemployment rate in The Sudan. 
GDI. t 1 is gross domestic investment, (or fixed capital 
J, -
formation) at constant 1970 prices expressed in 
US$ and lagged one period. 
tJ.
t 
is an error term with the statistical assumptions 
of being normally distributed with zero mean and 
a constant variance (T2, i. e. 1J. t .-...r N (0, (.t"2). 
The subscripts j, s, and t refer to country j, the Sudan 
and time respectively, and ~O' ~l > 0, ~2 > 0, ~J > 0 
and parameters to be estimated. 
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The rationale for expecting ~l and ~3 to be positive 
was discussed above. In the case of ~2' it is expected 
that as the domestic unemployment rate increases (i.e. less 
job opportunities at home) migration would increase, and 
thus a positive relationship is expected. Variables are 
expressed in real terms in US$ to eliminate the effects of 
domestic inflation and exchange rate fluctuations. 
Equation (10.2) is fitted to data for the period 1970-
1979(1), using OLS met~od. Non-availability of data limited 
the study to only three destination countries; Saudi Arabia, 
Libya and Oman. However, with 90% of Sudanese migrants 
in Saudi Arabia and Libya, and with Oman representing other 
small countries, the analysis could well be expected to 
explain the reasons for migration from The Sudan. The 
(2 ) 
results of estimating equation (10.2) are reported below' • 
Letters SA stand for Saudi Arabia, L for Libya, and 0 for 
Oman. Figures in parentheses are the t-statistics. 
SA-l 
Log M . t = 2.906* + 0.282 log YD. t + 0.339 log u 
S-J, (1.607) (0.544) J-S, (0.449) s,t 
+ 1.197 log GDI~*t 1. 
(2.923) J, -
2 R = 0.88, F = 15.383, D-W = 2.631. 
L-l 
* Log M . t = -35·003** + 3·757 log YDj_~,t + 0·587 log Us t 
S-J, (2.827) (1.90 7) (0.492)' 
+ 1.916 log GDI~ t 1 
(1.535) J, -
R2 = 0.70, F = 4.627, D-W = 1.719 
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Q::l 
Log M . t 
s-J, = -6.251** + 1.875 log YD** (2.582) (2.901) j-s,t 
- 0.481 log U 
(0.404) s, t 
+ 0.251 log GDI. t 1 
(0.519) J, -
2 R = 0.76, F = 6.251, D-W = 2.025 
Notes: R2 is R-squared, the coefficient of determination, 
F is the F-statistics, and D-W is Durbin-Watson 
statistics. 
* ** , , *** indicate that the variable is significant 
at 10%, 5% and 1% significance level respectively. 
All variables in the three equations produced the right 
expected signs, except the unemployment rate in equation 0-1. 
Moreover, all variables, with the exception of unemployment 
rate, are significantly different from zero in one or more 
of the three equations. Unemployment rate, being ins~gnificant 
in the three equations, and with the wrong sign in one of 
them, indicates that the 'push' factors are less operative 
in inducing migration. Gross domestic investment in destination 
countries is significant in the case of Saudi Arabia and 
Libya, but not significant in the case of Oman. One should 
notice, however, that most migration is to Saudi Arabia and 
Libya rather than to Oman. The income variable, on the other 
hand, is significant in the case of Oman and Libya but in-
significant in the case of Saudi Arabia. Oman being the 
furthest of the three countries from The Sudan, probably 
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needed a significant income difference to attract migrants 
in order to offset migration costs. As pointed out earlier, 
the income variable tended to be correlated with other 
variables, especially GDI. t l' and this is why we do not J, -
use income in the Sudan and destination countries as separate 
variables. Added to this, the use of income difference rather 
than the income in each country separately would save one 
degree of freedom, which is needed because of the small number 
of observations. However, when income in The Sudan and 
destination country are used as separate variables to explain 
migration, income in the receiving countries is highly 
significant, while income in The Sudan is less significant, 
although with the right expected sign i.e. negative sign(J). 
This indicates that, while migrants are 'pushed' from The 
Sudan by low income, they are strongly 'pulled' or attracted 
to destination countries by the higher income. Thus, although, 
both 'pull' and 'push' factors are in operation, the 'pull' 
factors seem to exert more pres~ure on migration. 
The results, so far, include only three explanatory 
variables. The demand for labour abroad, being one of the 
major causes of migration, could attract migrants from other 
countries and not only from the Sudan. Moreover, information 
about these income gains abroad and job opportunities are 
important for the potential migrant. Thus, it is clear 
that more explanatory variables should be added to equation 
(10.2) above. No information, however, is available about 
the number of non-Sudanese migrants in any of the immigration 
countries, and therefore we would not be able to test how 
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competition of migrants from other countries works as a 
deterrent factor for migration from the Sudan. We define 
a new variable SM. t' as the stock of Sudanese migrants in 
J, 
country j at period t. This variable would capture the 
effect of friends and relatives abroad in providing information 
for potential migrants, work contracts, as well as initial 
help. The equation to be estimated then is of the form 
Log MS_j,t = ~O + ~l log YDj_s,t + P2 log Us,t + ~3 log GDlj,t_l 
+ P4 log SMj,t + tt (10.3) 
where SM. t is the. stock of Sudanese migrants in country j 
J, 
at period t, tt is a random error term with the usual statistical 
assumptions, i.e. Lt -.fN(O, (j2), and all other variables are 
as defined in equation (10.2) above, with p. the parameters 1 
to be estimated. 
It is hypothesised that the more the stock of migrants 
in j are, the more likely the migrant would £ind someone who 
could provide him with work contract, initial help and job 
information, thus the more likely migration would occur to 
country j, i.e. we expect P4 > O. Other parameters are expected 
to behave as in equation (10.2). The results o£ estimating 
equation (10.3) are reported below, with t-statistics in 
parentheses, and notes as in the set o£ equations SA-l to 
0-1 above. 
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SA-2 
Log M . t = -2.798* - 0.257 log YD. t + 0.396 log U 
S-J, (1.446) (0.226) J-S, (0.489) s,t 
+ 1.056 log GD~l + 0. 488L 1og SM. t (2.0'7:7) , - C9.S4:» J, )( 
R2 = 0.89, F = 10.254, D-W = 2.791 
~ ~.~ 
L-2 t.; ~ 1· s7 2 i-
Log M . t = -21.162** + 2.862 log ~~;~) t + 0.193 log U 
S-J, (-2.368) (2.250) I.uy.::S, (0.253) s,t 
0-2 
** 
- 0.016 log DGI. t 1 + 0.891 log SM. t 
(-0.016) J, - (3.183) J, 
R2 = 0.90, F = 11.285, D-W = 2.635 
Log M . t = -0.281 + 0.265 log YD. t + 0.271 log U 
S-J, (-0.168) (0.58 2) J-S, (0.467) s,t 
+ 0.989 log GDI~*t 1 + 1.325 log SM~** 
(2.855) J, - (4.726) J,t 
R2 = 0.96, F = 26.946, D-W = 2.635 
The introduction of SM. t into the equation improved 
J, 
the results both in terms of higher R2 and F-value for Libya 
and Oman, where it is highly significant. In the case of 
Saudi Arabia, although it has the right expected sign, this 
variable is insignificant. The investment variable continues 
to be-... significant for Saudi Arabl~ and Oman, al though is 
insignificant and has -the wrong sign in the case of Libya. 
The unemployment variable continues to be insignificant in 
explaining migration. SM. t' as a proxy for information J, 
- 225 -
would be expected to perform better in explaining migration 
if the movement of labour is free. Given the highly 
restrictive movement of workers in the region, in the sense 
that a worker cannot migrate officially without a work 
contract, information about opportunities abroad are made 
less effective in explaining migration. This, however, does 
no~ render this variable useless and irrelevant to the 
degree of not using it in a migration equation. Relatives 
and friends abroad provide potential migrants with these 
work contracts, as well as initial help on arrival, as well 
as job information after the migrant arrives abroad (Chapter 
Fi ve). 
The unemployment variable, being insignificant throughout 
the estimated equations is dropped out to see how the results 
behave. Estimating equation (10.3), without the unemployment 
rate in The. Sudan, produced the following results, with 
t-statistics in parentheses. 
Log M . t = -2.563 - 0.130 log YD. t + 1.065 log GDf~*) 
S-J, (1.464) (-0.123) J-S, (2.245) ~-,i-l 
+ 0.431 log SM. t 
(0.518) J, 
R2 = 0.89, F = 15.569, D-W = 2.514 
Log M . t = -21.259** + 2.890 log YD** + 0.006 log GDI. t 1 
S-J, (2.591) (2.484) j-s,t (0.007) J, -
+ 0.903 log SM~** 
(3.557) J,t 
R2 = 0.90, F = 17.803, D-W = 2.464 
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Log M . t = -0·341 + 0·371 log YD. t + 0.961 log GDI~*t 1 
s - J , ( -0. 215 ) ( 1 • 007 ) J - s , ( 3 • 021 ) J, -
+ 1.287 log SM~** 
(5.127) J,t 
R2 = 0.95, F = 41.227, D-W = 2.577 
Excluding unemployment rates in The Sudan from the 
estimated equations, improves the results over the previous 
) 
equations, in terms 0rhigher valu~=~~·.).2 and F-statistics .. 
These are especially higher in the case of Libya and Oman. 
Moreover, variables which have been significant in the other 
previous equations, are also significant now, but with slightly 
higher t-ratios. Thus, home unemployment rate is not a 
strong variable in 'pushing' migrants from the Sudan. However, 
as discussed in Section 3.3.3, unemployment rate in the Sudan 
seems to be low, mainly because of the government pol~cy of 
ensuring employment for most of the educated manpower. Under 
such conditions, one would not expect unemployment rate to 
behave differently than in the results above. 
The improved results in the set of equations 2 and 3, 
however, have been at the expense of higher D-W statistics. 
Although statistical-tests on the significant presence of 
serial autocorrelation using this D-W test has been in-
conclusive, the relatively high D-W value indicates that we 
cannot rule out the possibility of serial autocorrelation. 
To reduce this possibility, equation (10.3) was re-estimated 
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with an auto-regressive scheme to correct for the presence 
of serial autocorrelation. The auto-regressive scheme used 
here is the iterative method suggested by D. Cochrane and 
G.H. Orcutt in 1949, or what is known as Cochrane-Orcutt 
transformation of data(4). The method estimates p, the 
coefficient of first-order autoregressive scheme from OLS 
residuals i. e. from the equation 'J.L t = ((.0 + P'J.L t _l , where 'J.L t 
are residuals obtained from fitting OLS to the original data. 
The dependent and independent variables are then transformed 
so that the residuals from the transformed data is roughly 
uncorrelated. The transformation is ~ = x t -px t _ l , where ~ 
is the transformed variable and x t ' x t _l are the original 
ones. Then OLS estimates are obtained using the transformed 
data. This process is repeated until p converges. It was 
shown that the procedure is convergent and that estimates 
possess opt1mal properties i.e. are consistent and asympto-
ticallyefficient(5). 
Applying this procedure to ,the data, equation (10.3) 
was re-estimated to allow for auto-correlation correction. 
The results obtained are as follows: 
SA-4 
Log M . t = -2.813* - 0·722 log YD . t + 1.109 log U 
S-J, (-2.086) (-0.823) S-J, (1.484) s,t 
+ 1.254 log GDI~*t 1 + 0·554 log SM, t 
(2.97 4 ) J, - (0.701) J, 
R2 = 0.96, F = 26.512, D-W = 2.619; 
j> = -0.608 
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L-4 
Log M . t = -24.513** + 3.237 log YD** + 0.887 log U 
S-J, (2.534) (3. 217) s-j,t. (1.325) s,t 
+ 0.015 log GDI. t 1 + 0.801 log SM~* 
(0. 013) J, - (2.174) J,t 
R 2 = o. 96, F = 24. 610, D-W = 2. 429, P = -0 . 61 C 
0-4 
Log M . t = -0.427 + 0·323 log YD . t + 0.600 log U 
S-J, (-0.3 07) (0.664) S-J, (0.897) s,t 
+ 1.154 log GDI~** + 1.338 log SM*** 
(4.07 2 ) J,t-l (5.206) j,t 
. ,t,ut,v .fin. 
In all three equations, R2 and F-statistics are much 
higher indicating a better goodness of fit than previous 
equations •. Moreover, all the significant variables in the 
previous equations are now significant with higher t-ratios. 
It is also noted that the t-rat~o for the unemployment rate 
is higher than in the previous equations, but this variable 
is still insignificant. 
Thus, the results, in general, confirm the hypothesis 
that both 'push' and 'pull' factors are in operation, but 
the 'pull' factors operate more strongly than the 'push' 
factors. Investment in the receiving countries have the 
most significant effect on migration. These results compare 
favourably with Richardson's (1972) results, in which he 
finds fluctuations in investment overseas the most important 
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factor inducing early migration from U.K. However, our 
results should be taken cautiously, and should be treated 
as tentative because of many factors. The important one of 
these is related to data. Apart from the small number of 
observations, which doubts the significance of these variables 
with such small degrees of freedom, one could also doubt the 
assumptions underlying the dependent variable's construction. 
The assumptions of constant share of migrants through the 
labour department out of total migrants, as well as the 
assumption of a constant distribution of migrants among 
receiving countries, might not hold true in any given time. 
This could be especially true in the case of Libya, with 
which political relations were completely broken off after 
July 1976, and no migrants were allowed officially to migrate 
from the Sudan to Libya. However, because of our assumptions 
to construct the dependent variable, this was reflected in 
the number of migrants to other countries too. In this way 
we found the same fluctuations in migration to each country. 
We are aware of this shortcoming in our data, but the least 
thing we could do is to call for better provision and collection 
of data in future research. To allow for this effect in the 
present study, equation (10.3) was re-estimated with a dummy 
variable equal to unity in 1977 and zero othenvise. This, 
however, did not change the conclusions arrived at, without 
using this dummy variable. 
The second problem which affects our results is the 
specification problem inherited in this type of model. 
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The number of migrants in destination country is not only 
affected by the level of output, but also contributes to 
the increase in this output. Thus an interrelated relation-
ship exists between the two of them. In this way a 
simultaneous equation model might produce more reliable 
results than the single equation model. Given the state of 
data at hand, we cannot undertake such a task. Such an 
application of a simultaneous equation model, although 
complicated, could be left for future research. However, 
the simultaneous equation bias in our results, if it exists, 
is probably weak, although we cannot state by how much. 
Previous output is used to explain current migration in our 
equations. 
10.4: Summary and conclusions 
The investigation undertaken in this chapter has shown 
that, as a result of the huge expansion in the economies 
of the AOPEC, and the increased ,development expenditure, 
labour has been attracted into these countries from the 
non-oil countries. The development expenditure and expansion 
in the level of economic activity in the oil countries have 
resulted in increased demand for labour in these countries. 
This has resulted in higher earnings relative to earnings 
in emigration countries. A direct and significant relation-
ship has been found between fluctuations in the level of 
economic activity in these countries, as measured by gross 
domestic investment, and the number of immigrants into them. 
For the individual migrant, the economic or material benefits 
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have been an important motive for migration. Thus, income 
differential between the Sudan and the immigration countries, 
as well as the fluctuation in the level of investment in the 
oil countries, are the most significant variables in explaining 
migration from The Sudan. The 'push' factor of unemployment 
rate in The Sudan has been found insignificant. Relatives 
and friends abroad are also important in providing job contracts 
to potential migrants, as well as information and initial help. 
In general, then, the 'pull' factors of migration have exerted 
more pressure on migration from The Sudan than the 'push' 
factors. This, however, does not rule out that some of the 
'push' factors were in operation. Nor does it negate the 
fact that, due to problems with data, our conclusions are 
tentative and should be treated rather cautiously. 
Notes to Chapter Ten 
(1) Data used in the regression analysis is in Table A12 in 
Appendix A. 
(2) While gross domestic investment gives more plausible 
(3) 
results, using construction GDP or non-oil GDP does not 
change the conclusions. For the sake of reference, 
however, equation (10.3) is estimated using these two 
variables and reported in Table Al) in Appendix A. 
When migration, M . t' is regressed on income per capita 
s-J, 
in the Sudan and destination country as separate variables, 
the following result is obtained, with Y t and Y. t 
s, J, 
representing real per capita GNP, expressed in US~ and 
constant 1970 prices, in the Sudan and country j 
respectively. Figures in parentheses are t-statistics. 
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Saudi Arabia 
Log M . t = 6.989 - 2.280 log Y* + 1.878 log Y*** 
S-J, (0.961) (1.948) s,t (4.813) j,t 
R2 = 0.83, F = 16.529, D-W = 1.647 
Libya 
Log M . t = -35·523 - 0·788 log Y + 6.240 log Y** 
S-J, (-1.239) (-0.360) s,t (2.452) j,t 
2 R = 0.56, F = 4.493, D-W = 0.798 
Oman 
Log M . t = -4.923 - 3·009 log Y** + 4.126 log Y*** 
S-J, (-0.670 ) (2.919) s,t (5.5 24) j,t 
2 R = 0.86, F = 21.)92, D-W = 2.741 
(4) Cochrane D. and Orcutt, G.H. (1949). 
(5) Many econometrics textbooks contain discussion of auto-
regressi.ve disturbances. Examples of these are Johnston, 
J. (1963), Chapter Eight; Kmenta, J. (1971) p.269-297; 
and Madda1a (1977), p.274-291. 
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CHAPTER ELEVEN 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
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The alas of this study were to investigate, critically examine and 
... luate the nature and process of Labour migration from the Sudan for 
wo.k 1D other countries, as well as to assess the causes of this Labour 
... emeet. aDd its implications for the economy of the Sudan and the 
1IUlividual migrant and non-migrant. The purpose of this chapter is to 
present a summary and some conclusions of this study. Many problems, 
bDwever, were encountered in conducting this study. Section 1 of the 
chapter briefly states some of these. In section 2 some conclusions of 
t~ study are presented, while in section 3 some policy proposals are 
suggested. 
11.1: Problems of data and econometric analysis 
Before presenting the summary and conclusions of this study, we 
stress that these should be treated very cautiously, because of many 
difficulties, especially with the data. Some of these problems are 
spelt out in this section, not only to point out the weaknesses of the 
present study, but also in the hope that they might be avoided in 
future research in this area. 
The analysis in this study draws on many sources of data, particularly 
the statistics of the Labour Department, our own. survey among migrants 
in Saudi Arabia and two other surveys (Galaleldin, 1979 and Abdalla, 1980). 
In Chapter Two we have shown that the statistics of the Labour Department 
are unreliable, understate the number of migrants and clearly lack the 
necessary details for a thorough migration study. The other two surveys 
have their own problems too. Galaleldin, for example, does not state 
how the survey was undertaken, while Abdalla states that questionnaires 
were distributed among migrants at their places of work and collected 
from them, without stating any further details of how this was done. 
Our survey in Saudi Arabia clearly has its own problems too. Apart 
from the small sample size, the survey had many difficulties which 
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IUggests that it might not be particularly representative. As pointed 
out in Chapter Four. one of the main difficulties in conducting the 
survey was to obtain a suitable sampling frame ~o draw the sample from. 
ThuB, the sample was chosen from migrants selected from Sudanese clubs 
in Riyadh and migrants at their places of work in. Riyadh city. Some 
randomness was possible in selecting these clubs and places of work since 
these were selected from a long list of addresses by the use of a simple 
random sampling (with the help of random number tables). However. there 
was no way to ensure randomness for the respondents selected from each 
chosen club or place of work since no lists of names were available. 
Added to this are the difficulties of conducting the survey without the 
help of trained interviewers. the difficulties of obtaining the co-operation 
of Saudi authorities. and the fact that the survey was undertaken in 
Riyadh only which might not be particularly representative. However. 
given the absence of basic information and the limited time and facilities. 
it was impossible to conduct the survey other than in this way. Most of 
these difficulties might be aVOided in future research as pointed out 
earlier in Chapter Four. with more time and facilities. These. however, 
suggest that the conclusions drawn from the present study are very 
tentative and indicative rather than conclusive. 
The econometric analysis undertaken in this study has its short-
comings too. The estimated equation for the determinants of remittances 
in Chapter Eight, for example. apart from being based on the results of 
our survey whose conclusions are tentative as pOinted out above. has 
another difficulty. Instead of the explanatory variables NDEP and PFAM -
numbers of dependents and place of family - it would have been more 
appropriate to use the number of accompanying dependents and the number 
of dependents left at home. These could have been obtained if the question 
relating to them in the questionnaire had been properly asked. However, 
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given the ti:me and limited resources, it was thought necessary to limit 
the number of questions asked. Again, this is a point that could be 
iaproved in a future study. 
One of the major difficulties in our econometric analysis concerning 
the deterainants of migration in Chapter Ten, was the non-availability of 
data, especially about the dependent variable; the number of migrants 
fra. the Sudan to each destination country. Because such detailed data 
was not available, we had to disaggregate the total number of migrants 
through the Labour Department. Obviously, as admitted in Chapter Ten, 
using saparate equations for each country is not proper under such 
conditions. However, since Saudi Arabia apparently receives nearly 
7~ of Sudanese migrants, the equations for Saudi Arabia were particularly 
iJlportant. This problem might be avoided in future research by better 
provision and collection of data. However, since published data is not 
available 1J1 the case of the Sudan, this might be overcome through the 
collection of unpublished data. An example of this is the statistics of 
the Department of Passport and Immigration in the Sudan, which we were 
unable to obtain. 
Observing these difficulties as well as others noted in the relevant 
chapters of the study, one can only say that the conclusions of this 
study are tentative. In all, it could be said that, altbough the study 
has been an attempt in the right direction, it failed to draw precise 
conclusions, most of which could be drawn only by further research in 
this area. Nevertheless, the follOwing section states some of these 
tentative conclusions. 
11.2; Summary and Conclusions 
Although Sudanese migration for work abroad started as early as 
the 1960's, it assumed large numbers only in the 1970's, especially 
after the mid 1970's. This migration is basically to the AOPEC, 
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especially Saudi Arabia and Libya. Although the numbers involved in 
migration do not seem to be very large, it is the rapidly increasing 
scale which seems to cause the most concern. However, this magnitude 
itself is in question, and actual migration is thought to be well 
above that recorded. 
This migration seems to involve different types of Labour -
unskilled, skilled, highly skilled as well as employed and unemployed 
labour. According to our survey, although a considerable proportion of 
migrants are unSkilled labour, the skill composition of migrants seems 
to be skewed towards relatively skilled and trained manpower. This 
observation is also supported by the other two surveys referred to above 
as well as by the official statistics of the Labour Department. For 
exaaple, out of all migrants through the Labour Department between 1974/75 
and 1977/78, only 26.~ were classified as unskilled Labour (P.54). Thus 
it is not only the rapidly chang1ng numbers, but also the skill composition 
of migrants which gives rise to most alarm. 
The factors governing migration of labour relate to economic 
conditions in both emigration and immigration countries. Although problems 
with our econometric analysis, as pOinted out in Chapter Ten and in the 
above section, do not allow preCise conclusions to be drawn in this respect, 
the impression is that economic conditions in the immigration countries are 
&aong the most important factors inducing migration. The development 
expenditure and the expansion in the level of economiC activity in the 
AOPEC, especially after the 1973/74 oil price boom, resulted in increased 
demand for labour in these countries relative to those in neighbouring 
noo-oil countries, thus attracting workers to the Labour markets where 
earnings are higher. The fluctuations in the level of economic activity 
in the receiving countries, as measured by the level of gross domestiC 
investment was one ?! the most significant variables in explaining migration. 
This is particularly true in the equations for Saudi Arabia, which is the 
"Jor receiver of migrants. In all, the tentative conclusion is that the 
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'pull' factors of migration seem to exert more pressure on migration than 
the 'push' factors prevailing in the Sudan. 
The net impact of this migration on the economy of the country depends 
on many factors some of which are measurable as well as others which are 
unquantifiable. However, in this study, it was not possible to quantify 
even those factors which are measurable in prinCiple due to lack of data. 
Under such circumstances, it is very difficult to conclude with high 
preCision whether migration has been beneficial of harmful to the economy 
of the Sudan. Nevertheless, the investigation in this study can give 
some indications in this respect. Due to the selectivity in the migration 
process, reductions in the labour force, especially skilled labour, might 
develop into an acute shortage if migration continues at the present rate 
and composition. The output losses due to migration, bowever, do not seem 
to be very serious at present because of the short period since migration 
occurred in large numbers. Although some migrants were already employed 
before aigration. the country seems to be able to export some of its 
unemployed labour force. In the absence of migration abroad, unemployment 
and/or underemployment in the country might have been far more serious 
than their present levels. 
one of the obvious benefits to the country is migrants' remittances 
from abroad. These increased considerably over the decade of the 1970's, 
especially after the mid-1970's. They began to represent a considerable 
proportion of the exports and imports of the country, contributing 
positively to foreign exchange earnings. However, the flow of remittances 
from abroad sbould not discourage the government from tackling the basic 
problems of the economy and finding a more reliable source of foreign 
exchange. Because of the unpredictable nature of remittances, they can 
not be depended upon as a regular source of income and foreign exchange 
earnings. More important also is the use these remittances are put to 
at home. Altbough some remittances seem to go into productive investment, 
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according to our survey most of them seem to be $pent on consumption 
items. The other two surveys referred to above also report that migrants 
remittances are largely spent on consumption (P.187-189). 
For the individual migrant, the financial gains due to migration 
seem to be considerable. As a result of migration, migrants are able to 
earn considerably higher amounts of money than before migration. Moreover; 
not only the migrant himself, but also his family at home seems to derive 
substantial monetary gains from migration. As a result of migration, 
migrants are able to send home amounts of money which far exceed what 
they used to earn for themselves and their families before migration. 
In this way they seem to be able to contribute to the improvement in 
the standard of living of their families at home, as well as other 
parts of the population. 
11.3: Soae policy proposals 
In developing a strategy for migration for the country, consideration 
should be paid not only to the manpower aspects, but also to other aspects 
of the economy and SOCiety. A complete ban on migration, for example, 
aight not only be ineffective, but would also violate the basic human rights 
of freedom of movement and residence. Such measures, moreover, would be 
meaningless unle.s suitable and sufficient opportunities in the country 
are created through further acceleration of the country's economic 
development, resulting in optimum utilization of manpower. Nevertheless, 
some basiC regulations to organize the migration process might be 
deSirable. So far the government has taken restrictive measures to control 
the migration of public sector employees. These are not allowed to 
migrate without permission from their employers. However, in view of 
the high illegal migration rates, such policies are bound to fail. 
However, since surplusses of some types of labour seem to exist in the 
country along with shortages in other types, the obvious strategy for 
the government is to monitor each category and regulate migration and 
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training accordingly. The Sudan, even if it pays special attention to 
the salaries paid to trained and skilled manpower, cannot compete with 
wages offered to migrants abroad. Nevertheless, the pay structure in 
the country could be changed so as to favour categories of labour which 
are thought to be in sbortage. However, one should stress that a first 
step towards this is to reassess, more realistically, the supply-demand 
situation for labour in the country. In this respect, it is not only 
necessary to know the total number of workers migrating and how many 
of each, but more importantly the actual supply and demand for labour in 
the domestic economy. This involves the reassessment of the performance 
of the economy in general, as well as the employment, education and 
training programs. If, for example, the goverment continues to provide 
employment for all educated manpower, then education and training should 
be linked more directly to the growth in the public sector. Thus, 
co-ordination is necessary between economic planning, manpower planning 
and educational and training planning, and these last two should form an 
integral part of the first. All this might be attained through further 
research, not only in migration but also in the domestic labour market 
and other aspects of the economy. 
To en.ure that the country achieves the highest possible benefits 
fro. this migration, and avoids possibly significant losses, policies should 
be developed to attract migrants' remittances from abroad. However, 
since migrants actually do remit large amounts of money home, efforts 
should be made to ensure that these remittances are sent through the 
official banks rather thaD through other channels. Although policies 
have eXisted in this respect, they do not seem to have worked efficiently 
either because of problems with the policy itself or because some poliCies 
were in conflict with each other. Offering an incentive exchange rate 
for migrants, apart from the difficulty of sustaining a multiple exchange 
rate system for long periods, might not be the most effective method of 
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attracting remittances through the banks. The 'black market' has 
always offered a higher rate to migrants than the banks. Incentives 
which could be offered by the Government are those relating to the 
exemption of migrant from paying customs duties on their imported 
goods. Such a policy could be used with a progressive rate of 
exemption linked to the amount of remittances through the banks in such 
a way that exemptions would increase with the increase in the volume 
of remittances. 
Policies regarding remittances should not concentrate only on how 
to attract them, but more attention should also be given to the use of 
these remittances at home. Migrants' remittances and savings could be 
directed from consumption to more productive use so as to facilitate 
the eConomiC development process. Although this is difficult to aChieve, 
yet there are some policies which might affect the use of remittances in 
one way or another. The proper use of a tax and incentive scheme, for 
example, might be helpful in this respect. More tax could be put on 
items considered to be undeSirable, with incentives given for more 
desirable use of savings and remittances. The Government could also 
attempt to promote some development projects by selling shares, bonds, 
etc., either to migrants while abroad or at home. It could provide 
technical adVice, feasibility stUdies, etc., for migrants to promote 
productive use of savings and remittances. It is worth emphasiSing, 
however, that it is not only the question of migration and remittances 
which needs some attention, but more important is the whole question . 
of comprehensive planning to provide a more accurate and realistic assess-
ment of the performance of the economy in general. 
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APPENDIX A 
Table AI: some economic indicators: Middle East and North African countries 
Population GNP per a.g.r. Trade 
cacita of Balance 
Total a.g.r. % A.loR. GNP a.g.r. GO! 
Country 1979 70-79 1975 1979 1979 70-77 70-79 1970 1979 
(1) (2) ( 3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
ill , 
countries 
, 
Algeria 18.2 3.3 49 37 ~8,940 1,580 2.1 11.4 -68 -953 i 
Bahrain 0.4 7.1 · . 47* 2,080 5,460 20.3 · . -4.2 48,***, I 
Iraq 12.6 3.3 51 26** ~0,430 2,410 6.7 27.2 635 7300*** 
Kuwait 1.3 6.2 53 60 ~1,870 IIi' ,270 0.6 22.4 1149 13273 
Libya 2.9 4.1 51 50 ~3,390 8,210 3.9 10.6 1723 9320 : 
Oman 0.9 3.2 • • 20** 2,570 2,970 4.0 · . 181 1045 
Qatar 0.2 10.3 · . 33* 3,750 1J6,590 -0.4 · . 163 2472 
, 
S. Arabia 8.5 4.5 52 33** ~2,640 7,370 13.0 46.7 1260 25730 
UAE 0.8 6.7 · . 14* ~2,990 Ps ,590 -3.6 · . 267 7303 
non-oil 
countries 
Egypt 40.9 2.0 56 44 ~8,600 460 1.3 21.5 -267 -3589 
Jordan 3.1 3.4 51 70 2,630 1,180 1.9 · . -130 -1038 
Lebonan 3.1 0.8 55 68*"* . . .. · . • • -413 -1530 : 
Morocco 19.5 2.9 50 28 ~4,460 740 4.2 15.2 -137 -1143 : 
Sudan 17.9 2.6 53 20 6,630 370 2.5 8.0 - 16 - 222 : 
Syria 8.4 3.6 48 53 8,920 1,070 6.0 16.5 -135 -1132 : 
Tunisia 6.2 2.1 54 55 6,950 1,120 6.5 11.4 -105 - 920 
, 
YAR 5.8 1.8 51 1DH 2,421 420 · . • • -182 -1372 
: 
YPDR 1.8 2.3 51 1DH 89C 500 · . · . - 63 - 347 
Notes: (1) Total mid-year population in millions. 
(2) Annual growth rate of population 1970-1979. 
(3) Percentage of population in working age (15-64). 
(4) Adult literacy rate(%} • 
(5) Gross National Product (GNP) in million US,S. 
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(6) GNP per capita in 1979 in US~. 
(7) Annual growth rate of GNP per capita 1970-1977. 
(8) Average growth rate of Gross Domestic Investment 1970-1979. 
(9) Trade balance in 1970 in million US~,(- indicates deficit) • 
(10) Trade balance in 1979 in million US~ , (- indicates deficit) • 
* 
As in 1970. 
** 
As in 1974. 
*** 
As in 1978. 
.. Indicates data not available. 
Sources: 
(a) World Bank Atlas, 1973-1980. 
(b) World Bank !'World Development Report" 1980 and 1981. 
(c) World Bank "World Tables" 1980, 2nd ed., John Hopkins 
University Press. 
• u (d) IMr, International rinancial Statistics. 
(e) UNESCO "Statistical Yearbook" 1978-1979. 
(f) U.N. "Demographic Yearbook" 1980. 
(g) U.N. "Yearbook of National Account Statistics". 
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Table A2: Migrant labour in the Middle East and North Africa, by origin 
and destination countries (1000), 1975. 
~ ):I CD ...... ;:0::: r 0 .0 ):ItI) c:: -I I-' m 11 ~ .... 3 m 11 m • Q Origin Ie -=r m C" m ("I- m c ):I ("I-m 11 D m '< :::J m C"Q. • Cl 11 m .... m 11 ........ r"1 I-' .... .... ("I- m · m :::J 
Egypt 1.0 1.2 7.0 37.6 229.5 4.6 2.9 95.0 12.5 391.3 
Jordan 0.4 0.6 5.0 47.6 14.2 1.6 6.0 175.0 14.5 265.0 
Lebonan - 0.1 3.0 7.2 5.7 1.1 0.5 20.0 4.5 42.1 
Morocco 0.3 - - - 4.9 - - - - 5.2 
Oman - 1.4 - 3.7 - - 1.9 17.5 14.0 38.5 
Sudan - 0.4 0.2 2.0 7.0 0.5 0.5 35.0 1.5 47.1 
Syria - 0.1 0.2 16.5 13.0 0.4 0.8 15.0 4.5 50.9 
Tunisia - - - - 38.5 - - - - 38.5 
YAR - 1.1 - 2.8 - - 1.3 280.4 4.5 290.1 
YPDR - 1.1 - 8.7 - - 1.3 55.0 4.5 70.6 
Other Arab - 0.1 - 18.0 - - - 2.0 0.5 20.6 
Total Arab 2.3 6.1 15.4 lA4.2 312.8 8.2 15.2 fB4.9 61.0 ]260.1 
% (1) 0.2 0.5 1.2 11.4 24.8 0.7 1.2 55.1 4.8 lJO.O 
% (2) 23.5 21.0 23.4 68.7 93.4 11.6 28.1 89.9 24.3 70.1 
India 0.3 8.9 5.0 21.5 0.5 25. 0 16.0 15.0 61.5 ]54.7 
Pakistan 0.1 6.7 5.0 11.0 4.5 ~.5 16.0 15.0 100.p ]90.8 
Iran - 2.0 40.0 28.9 - 0.4 4.0 10.0 21.0 Il6.3 
Other Asia - 1.0 - 1.~ 0.5 0.2 2.0 8.0 2.0 14.8 
Europe and 
North AmerJ ell 6.1 4.4 0.5 2.0 7.0 2.8 0.8 15.0 5.0 43.6 
Others 1.0 - - 1.1 9.5 0.3 - 15.0 0.2 27.6 
Total (non-Arab) 7.5 23.0 50.5 65.6 22.0 02.2 38.8 78.5 189.7 537 .8 
% (3) 1.4 4.3 9.4 12.2 4.1 11.6 7.2 14.6 35.3 IlO.O 
% (4) 76.5 79.0 76.4 31.3 6.6 88.4 71.9 10.1 75.7 29.9 
% % 
(6) K7) 
31.1 21.'; 
21.0 14;. 
3.~ 2~3 
O.Li 0.3 
3.1 2.l 
3.7 2.6 
4. C 2.8 
3.1 2.1 
23.1 16~ 
5.e 3.5 
I.E 1.1 
JOO. C 'iO .1 
28.8 8. € 
35.5 110. E 
19.7 5. E 
2.8 O.E 
8.1 2. t 
5.1 1. E 
100.C 29.~ 
Total 9.8 29.1 65.9 209.8 334.E 'Il.4 54.0 773.4 250.7 !197.9 100.1 
% (5) 0.5 1.6 3.7 11. 7 18.€ 3.9 3.0 43.0 13.9 100.0 
I 
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Notes to Table A2: 
(1) indicates no migrants recorded for this destination country or origin. 
(2) % (1) represents distribution of Arab migrants by destination country 
as percentage of total Arab migrants in the ME~~. 
(3) % (2) respresents distribution of Arab migrants by destination country 
as percentage of total migrants in that country. 
(4) % (3) represents distribution of non-Arab migrants by destination 
country as percentage of total non-Arab migrants in the region. 
(5) % (4) represents distribution of non-Arab migrants by destination 
country as percentage of total migrants in that country. 
(6) % (5) represents the distribution of total migrants (Arabs and non-
'Arabs) by destination country as percentage of total migrants in 
the region. 
(7) % (6) represents the distribution of migrants by origin country as 
percentage of the relevant sub-total, i.e. migrants of an Arab 
origin as percentage of total Arab migrants in the region, while 
migrants of non-Arab origin as percentage of total non-Arab migrants 
in the region. 
(8) % (7) represents the distribution of migrants by origin country as 
percentage of total migrants (Arab and non-Arab) in the region. 
Source: abridged from J.S. Birks and C.A. Sinclair (1980) "International 
migration and development in the Arab region" ILO, 1980, Tables 10 
and 13, p.l35-l37. 
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Table A3: Total population of the Sudan by age, sex, and rural urban, 
(1000), 1973. 
Total DO ulatlon Urban population Rural OODulation 
Age % Sex % Sex 
group 80th Sex Both of Ratio 80th of Ratio 
(years) sexes Male Female Ratio sexes Total (%) sexes Total (%) 
(1) (2) (3) ( 4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Under 1 372.3 190.1 182.2 104 90.5 24.3 103 254.6 68.4 105 
1 - 4 2067.7 1058.7 1009.0 105 336.3 16.3 103 1445.8 69.9 105 
5 - 9 2464.4 1277.7 1186.7 108 391.5 15.9 101 1688.2 68.5 108 
10 - 14 1560.2 824.0 736.2 112 298.5 19.1 108 1000.8 64.1 113 
15 - 19 1217.2 603.5 613.7 98 262.6 21.6 113 732.4 60.2 92 
20 - 24 1000.4 453.4 547.0 83 233.5 23.3 119 591.4 59.1 70 
25 - 29 1212.8 539.6 673.2 80 250.8 20.7 121 760.1 62.7 69 
30 - 34 904.3 429.5 474.8 90 171.2 18.9 129 560.2 61.9 81 
35 - 39 919.8 471.6 448.2 105 166.3 18.1 127 597.4 64.9 100 
40 - 44 641.5 334.5 307.0 109 110.0 17.1 128 409.6 6:3.7 104 
45 - 49 487.5 267.5 220.1 122 84.4 17.3 128 322.1 66.1 120 
50 - S4 393.4 208.9 184.5 113 64.4 16.4 115 255.1 64.8 108 
55 - 59 208.8 116.6 92.2 126 36.4 17.4 126 138.8 66.5 123 
60 - 64 241.6 130.7 110.9 118 38.2 15.8 111 161.8 67.0 112 
65 - 69 126.5 72.0 54.6 132 21.2 16.8 125 85.0 67.2 126 
70+ 268.0 143.9 124.1 116 43.6 16.3 104 186.6 69.6 125 
Unstated 27.1 16.0 11.1 144 1.7 6.3 204 15.5 57.2 128 
Total 4113.6 7138.0 6975.6 102 2605.9 18.5 113 9204.5 65.2 98 
Notes: (1) Sex ratio is (male ~ female) x 100. 
(2) Urban and rural population exclude the nomadic population, 
and thus may not add to total population. 
Source: 1973 population census, provisional results, Volume 1, Table 12 
(a, b and c), Department of Statistics, Khartoum, 1977. 
Table A4: Population by province of birth and province of enumeration. 1973 census. 
~ Place of umeration Blue Red Bahre Birth Khartoum Nile Kasa11a Northern Sea Kordefan Darfur Gaza1 
Khartoum 646,526 24,818 11,693 8,296 4,792 9,758 3,884 1,333 
Blue Nile 69,312 ~298729 22,353 5,634 3,128 18,014 6,376 1,241 
Kasa11a 11,386 15,065 649,390 6,251 4,822 2,376 1,659 146 
Northern 123,059 47,239 36,283 783,047 37,848 9,396 2,984 688 
Red Sea 4,590 3,224 9,331 3,680 206,764 1,156 1,310 1,771 
Kordofan 85,265 13,438 15,643 7,294 6,720 1,590,952 21,836 3,181 
Darfur 46,19B 114,419 29,065 2,3B3 1,662 30,807 1571,867 4,697 
Bahre1 Gaza1 7,595 3,522 937 718 532 7,938 6,168 293356 
Upper Nile 8,775 6,651 980 1,113 330 2,521 408 889 
Equatoria 7,032 2,438 1,032 734 433 4,110 948 3,080 
Province not stated 1,955 4,236 1,091 286 810 4,124 3,615 10,766 
Other countries 27,950 44,436 33,055 5,060 3,212 10,514 43,764 554 
Not known 266 1,694 20 42 198 85 234 52 
Total 1,040,621 ~70l,307 810,873 824,558 a.71, 252 1,691,7t;;,. I,66~53 l,321,745 
-- --
2"f/,ZJ"l 
Source: 1973 population census. 
~: Population in this table does not include the nomadic population. 
Upper 
Nile 
2,862 
14,050 
381 
3,083 
422 
36,412 
4,800 
3,880 
689160 
3,793 
774 
1,147 
10 
760,774 
Equatoria 
2,499 
2,107 
764 
3,038 
953 
8,201 
3,122 
4,408 
8,112 
634.094 
4,407 
50,546 
46 
722,297 
Total 
716,459 
2,440,944 
692,240 
1,046,665 
233,201 
1,910,342 
1,809,120 
1,329,466 
718,959 
658,042 
32,064 
220,239 
2,647 
1,810,388 
I 
I\) 
+-(Xl 
Table A5: Population born outside the Sudan by age, sex, and mode of living (1000), 1973. 
Total Urban population Rural population 
foreign % of Sex % of % of % of 
Age born Total ratio total total total 
Group pop. pop. Male female % Total for.born urban pop. Total for. pop 
(Years) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (B) (9) (10) 
Under 1 4.2 1.1 2.1 2.1 100 0.9 21.4 1.0 3.3 7B.6 
1 - 4 22.0 1.1 11.3 10.7 106 4.4 20.0 1.3 17.6 80.0 
5 - 9 23.4 0.9 11.3 12.0 94 5.3 22.6 1.4 18.1 77 .4 
10 - 14 13.2 O.B 6.9 6.2 III 4.4 33.3 1.5 B.B 66.7 
15 - 19 14.0 1.2 6.2 7.7 Bl 5.4 38.8 2.1 B.5 61.2 
20 - 24 17.5 1.7 7.1 10.4 68 6.7 38.3 2.9 10.8 61.7 
25 - 29 23.3 1.9 9.8 13.4 73 7.7 33.0 3.1 15.6 67.0 
30 - 34 18.9 2.1 9.2 9.7 95 6.7 35.6 3.9 12.1 64.4 
35 - 39 18.7 2.0 9.7 9.0 . 108 6.8 36.4 4.0 11.9 63.6 
40 - 44 16.2 2.5 8.3 7.9 105 6.0 37.0 5.5 10.2 63.0 
45 - 49 11.2 2.3 6.1 5.1 120 4.2 37.5 5.0 7.0 62.5 
50 - 54 11.2 2.8 6.5 4.7 138 4.0 35.7 6.2 7.2 64.3 
55 - 59 5.6 2.7 3.4 2.2 155 2.0 35.7 5.5 3.7 64.3 
60 - 69 10.6 2.9 6.1 4.5 136 3.9 36.8 5.6 6.7 63.2 
70+ 10.3 3.8 5.8 4.5 129 3.5 34.0 8.0 6.8 66.0 
Total 220.2 1.6 110.0 110.2 100 71.9 32.7 2.8 148.3 67.3 
-----
Notes: (1) column (2) represents foreign born population as % of total population of The Sudan. 
(2) column (5) = (column 3 f column 4) x 100 
% of 
total 
rural pop. 
(11) 
1.3 
1.2 
1.1 
0.9 
1.2 
1.8 
2.1 
2.2 
2.0 
2.4 
2.2 
2.8 
2.7 
2.7 
3.6 
1.6 
I 
! 
(3) columns (8) and (11) are urban and rural foreign born population as % of urban and rural population 
of Sudan respectively. 
Source: 1973 population census. 
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Table A6: Foreign barn papulation by nationality, 1973 
Nationality or country No. % 
Nigeria 162,505 58.8 
Chad 44,819 16.2 
Ethiopia 20,348 7.4 
Zaire 20,354 7.4 
Egypt 11,806 4.3 
Uganda 863 0.3 
Other Africa 4,833 1.7 
Total Africa 265,528 96.1 
Yemen 3,242 1.2 
Other Arab 576 0.2 
Total Arab 3,818 1.4 
India 1,307 0.5 
Pakistan 125 0.05 
Other Asia 678 0.2 
Total Asia 2,110 0.8 
Greece 572 0.2 
Other Europe 1,383 0.5 
Total Europe 1,955 I 0.7 
Others 2,694 [ 1.0 
Not stated 150 0.05 
Total 276,255 100.0 
Source: 1973 population census. 
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Table A7: Work permits issued to foreigners in 1977/78, by nationality 
Country o~ Nationality No. % 
Egypt 1,065 21.4 
Ethiopia 673 13.5 
Other Africa 502 10.1 
Total Africans 2,240 44.9 
Yemen 219 4.4 
Other Arabs 52 1.0 
Total Arabs 271 5.4 
India 447 9.0 
Pakistan 167 3.4 
Other Asia 36 0.7 
All Asians 650 13.0 
Britain 783 15.7 
Greece 110 2.2 
Other Europe e99 18.0 
Total Europeans 1,792 36.0 
others 31 0.6 
Total 4,984 100.0 
Source: Department of Labour,-Annual Report, 1977/78; Khartoum. 
Table A8: GOP by economic sector, 1955/56 - 1979/80 (selected yeare) ae % of total GOP, at current prices (Sudan) 
sector/year 55/56 66/67 69/70 70/71 71/72 
GOP at fector cost: 
(£S million) 229.9 533.4 701.5 761.1 832.4 
Agriculture* 60.0 33.0 37.6 38.7 38.8 
Industry (manuf.) 4.5** 9.3** 9.3 8.9 8.9 
Elect. & water 4.5 3.1 2.4 2.3 2.0 
Construction 5.7 4.5 3.5 3.1 3.2 
Commerce*** · . 28.9 14.5 14.9 16.9 
Transport**** 7.5 6.3 7.3 6.7 6.2 
Govt. services 6.7 8.3 11.6 11.5 11.8 
other services 
· . 
5.1 13.5 13.9 11.8 
Mining · . .. 0.3 0.2 0.4 
Total GOP 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
---
Notes: 
* 
** 
Agriculture, livestock, forestry and fishing. 
including mining. 
*** 
**** 
Commerce, finance and real estate. 
Transport and communications. 
indicates data not available. 
72/73 73/74 74/75 75/76 76/77 77/78 78/79 
896.8 1246.2 1510.8 1776.9 2091.0 2426.3 2784.4 
38.4 41.4 38.7 33.9 33.4 32.8 32.1 
8.9 8.6 9.2 8.4 8.4 8.4 8.3 
2.0 1.5 1.4 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.1 
3.5 4.9 4.3 4.8 5.2 5.5 5.9 
15.9 14.1 16.2 17.1 16.7 16.3 15.9 
6.9 6.0 5.9 10.4 11.0 11.7 12.4 
11.7 12.9 10.0 9.3 9.4 9.5 9.7 
12.4 10.3 13.9 14.2 14.2 14.2 14.2 
0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Sources: (1) 
(2) 
Department of Statistics "National income accounts and supporting tables" Khartoum (different years). 
Ministry of finance and National Economy "Economic Survey" Khartoum (different years). 
79/80 
3198.9 
33.5 
8.2 
1.1 
6.3 
15.5 I 
I 
13.1 
9.8 
14.2 
0.3 
100.0 
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Table A9: Estimates of additions to the labour force from the education 
system by level of education, 1970-79. 
~ Higher .Uni-Y ducation ear Primary Intermediate Secondary Institutes versity Total (a) 
1970 67,923 9,001 2,789 190 .1,599 81,502 
1971 72,994 11,284 4,192 200 1,768 90,438 
1972 73,086 9,583 4,543 210 1,856 89,278 
1973 71,403 10,802 6,344 343 2,185 91,077 
1974 61,608 17,039 9,543 553 2,061 90,804 
1975 65,156 24,147 12,790 470 2,574 105,137 
1976 63,030 23,422 13,375 470 2,487 102,784 
1977 63,760 26,303 14,366 585 2,419 107,433 
1978 67,324 27,442 14,855 560 2,426 112,607 
1979 69,550 29,602 16,269 588 2,547 118,556 
Total 675,834 188,625 99,066 4,169 21,922 989,616 
Notes: (a) Total excludes graduatas from non-Sudanese universities, and 
university post-graduates because no data is available. These 
however are very few. 
Source:(l) For the primary, intermediate and secondary graduates, because 
there was no data, the following equation is used to estimate 
the number of graduates for each level. 
where 
G. t = graduates of educational level i in period t. 
1., 
FS. t-l = Final year students of level i in the previous 
1., year, t-l 
Ij,t = Intake of the next level of education j at 
period t. 
R. t = Repeats of i at period t 
lo, 
D. t = Deaths of i at t, out of 
lo, 
in the final year 
the final year. 
All this information was compiled from the UNESCO "Yearbook of 
Educational Statistics" different years, except data on deaths 
which was not available, and this was excluded. However, in 
the final result, deaths might cancel with students from 
non-Sudanese schools. 
(2) For graduates of Higher Institutes and universities, data is 
compiled from the UNESCO "Yearbook of Educational Statistics" 
and the "Economic Survey" of the Ministry of Finance and 
National Economy, Khartoum (different years). 
, 
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Table AIO: CQnsumer prices and cost of living indices in The Sudan 
and Saudi Arabia, 1970:: 100. 
Consumer price Cost of living index 
Year Sudan Saudi Arabia Khartoum Riyadh 
H.S. (1) L.5.(2) (3) 
1970 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1971 101.4 104.4 101.2 101.4 104.8 
1972 115.1 109.0 109.5 113.3 109.3 
1973 132.7 127.1 126.7 132.7 127.0 
1974 167.3 154.2 157.3 167.4 154.2 
1975 207.3 207.6 190.4 207.5 207.5 
1976 210.8 273.2 194.2 211.0 273.0 
1977 246.1 304.1 240.7 262.9 304.2 
1978 295.0 317.0 288.9 313.9 317.2 
1979 385.8 344.4 385.9 412.1 344.4 
Notes: (1) H.S. is cost of living index for high salaried employees. 
(2) L.S. is cost of living index for low salaried employees. 
(3) Cost of living index in Riyadh is for an urban household 
with an average income of SR 600-899 per month, Le. low 
salaried employees. 
Source:(a) For consumer prices, IMF "International Financial Statistics 
Yearbook" 1980. 
(b) For cost of living indices in Khartoum, "The Economic Survey 
1975¥80" Ministry of Finance and National Economy, Khartoum, 
(Arabic). 
(c) For cost of living indices in Riyadh "Statistical Yearbook 
of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia" Central Statistical Departmeot, 
Ministry of Finance and National Economy, Riyadh 1980. 
Table All: Monthly remittances of Sudanese working abroad by source Arab countriea - January 1975 -
October 1979 (£S 1000) 
Month/ Saudi 
Year Bahrain Iraq Jordan Kuwait Lebanon Libya Oman Qatar Arabia Syria 
1975 J 1.6 0.2 0.3 2.5 3.4 18.7 0.6 1.3 3.9 0.4 
F 7.7 0.8 0.9 1.5 4.5 45.0 0.6 0.7 5.9 0.4 
M 1.4 0.8 0.2 2.2 0.7 43.0 0.6 1.0 2.8 0.4 
A 1.5 1.9 0.3 2.9 0.5 69.2 0.6 2.0 2.4 0.6 
M 0.9 O.B 1.1 1.1 1.9 47.3 0.6 O.B 2.7 0.6 
J 1.5 O.B 0.6 2.0 1.9 78.5 0.6 1.9 8.2 0.6 
J 0.6 1.2 1.4 3.0 1.9 118.9 0.6 3.8 6.8 0.6 
A 0.6 0.8 0.3 2.9 1.2 64.4 0.6 2.2 5.3 0.2 
S 7.8 0.3 0.2 1.1 2.7 82.6 0.6 2.0 1.2 0.1 
0 1.5 0.8 0.4 0.8 2.5 98.1 0.4 3.6 1.5 0.2 
N 1.5 0.3 0.9 1.7 5.5 91.9 0.4 0.4 2.6 0.2 
0 2.5 0.8 1.6 3.6 0.7 84.4 0.9 1.7 7.2 0.1 
1976 J 0.3 0.3 0.6 1.7 0.4 197.6 0.8 7.2 14.6 0.2 
F 0.3 0.3 1.2 1.2 1.0 145.4 0.4 3.0 10.0 0.3 
M 0.3 0.3 0.7 1.7 0.4 . 146.6 0.7 9.3 13.6 0.4 
A 0.7 0.2 0.3 2.4 0.5 168.1 0.8 10.0 10.6 0.4 
M 0.3 0.2 1.2 1.9 0.4 146.8 1.1 1.6 8.9 0.5 
J 0.3 0.4 0.7 6.4 0.2 188.6 1.4 2.1 15.1 0.6 
J 0.4 0.7 0.6 5.9 0.2 82.9 0.9 1.7 14.8 0.1 
A 0.7 0.2 1.0 7.8 0.3 132.4 1.4 0.9 64.0 0.3 
5 0.7 1.0 0.2 7.9 0.4 154.6 0.4 5.1 57.6 0.4 
0 0.7 0.5 1.9 u.5 0.4 87.7 1.7 6.4 40.1 0.1 
N 0.7 0.4 0.5 23.0 0.4 132.6 1.9 14.4 70.0 0.2 
0 1.4 0.6 0.7 17.0 0.4 160.0 1.0 32.8 63.3 0.3 
Yemen 
UAE YAR Tota 
6.7 0.1 39.7 
9.4 0.2 77.6 
9.9 0.5 63.9 
9.3 0.1 91.3 
7.4 0.4 65.6 
9.4 0.4 106.4 
11.8 0.7 151.3 
4.8 0.4 83.7 
5.8 0.4 104.8 
8.4 0.5 118.7 
8.4 0.4 114.2 
8.4 0.8 112.7 
8.8 0.8 233.3 
7.6 1.5 172.2 
16.9 1.0 191.9 
16.7 0.6 211.3 
8.2 1.3 172.4 
26.3 1.3 243.4 
18.0 0.4 126.f 
10.3 0.4 219.7 
43.1 0.5 271.9 
20.6 1.3 165.9 
30.4 1.8 261.9 
88.1 1.5 367.1 
\ 
~ 
Table All: Monthly ramittancas of Sudanese working abroad by source Arab countries - January 1975 -
October 1979 (£5 1000) (Contd.) 
Month/ Saudi Yamen 
Year Bahrain Iraq Jordan Kuwait Lebanon Libya Oman Qatar Arabia Syria UAE YAR Tota~ 
1977 J 5.3 4.1 4.3 17.1 6.0 208.9 1.0 17.6 188.6 1.1 67.4 6.5 527.9 F 5.3 5.5 8.1 35.8 6.0 155.8 2.0 40.7 149.6 1.1 63.5 1.1 474.5 III 5.3 5.5 9.5 11.0 9.2 128.7 2.7 55.9 149.8 1.1 77.5 7.6 464.6 A 6.8 2.3 7.5 9.7 9.2 315.7 1.9 40.7 236.8 1.1 112.3 5.9 769.9 
1'1 5.3 5.5 11.2 6.3 10.6 258.6 4.0 61.8 260.8 0.5 176.9 3.5 805.0 J 19.8 9.3 10.2 :37.3 3.B 267.3 3.4 25.8 287.9 1.7 64.3 7.9 738.7 J 27.3 B.B 20.7 43.8 6.0 44B.9 3.7 24.7 273.1 1.1 79.0 10.1 947.2 A 16.7 3.0 6.0 107.5 6.0 317.0 2.0 29.3 249.6 1.1 13B.5 13.B 891.3 
.5 13.5 9~6 11.2 . 77.1 6.0 447.1 -3.4 78.4 264.9 1.1 99.7 10.9 1022.9 0 30.4 6.7 11.6 159.0 2.3 521.2 3.6 45.0 462.3 1.1 114.0 7.3 1364.5 N 61.4 4.2 11.2 144.2 6.0 313.1 10.0 34.9 444.5 1.1 184.2 8.1 1222.9 0 127.8 8.8 22.7 1A4.9 6.0 201.3 14.9 33.9 483.9 1.1 143.7 21.6 1250.2 
1978 J 02.7 3.9 13.6 115.9 8.5 234.2 29.4 19.8 326.0 0.9 113.7 10.4 959.0 
F 83.1 17.9 24.9 175.0 2.1 195.2 68.9 47.7 53B.0 1.2 151.B 8.7 1314.5 
M 129.1 8.5 15.1 214.1 2.6 269.3 93.2 79.3 570.8 1.5 169.3 18.2 1571.0 
A 28.3 9.3 12.0 157.4 4.9 318.5 90.7 92.8 301.5 3.0 154.1 7.0 1179.5 
Iii 66.0 4.9 9.9 210.4 1.4 628.4 76.7 81.2 556.5 5.8 160.4 13.6 1815.2 
J 134.5 14.0 11.0 268.2 2.9 519.5 112.3 161.1 718.8 7.0 230.7 62.4 2242.4 
J 99.6 12.3 21.3 211.0 2.7 903.4 139.6 143.1 1031.7 9.7 358.9 118.6 3051.9 
A 203.5 8.5 24.0 215.4 2.6 420.3 176.0 136.2 604.8 6.4 190.0 60.9 2048.6 
5 202.7 14.3 13.1 282.8 2.6 499.3 168.8 65.6 781.6 3.7 179.2 143.2 2356.9 
0 159.2 16.6 19.6 171.1 2.6 207.3 168.5 101.5 571.1 8.2 183.5 62.2 1671.4 
N 143.5 28.5 15.1 247.2 2.6 202.2 189.8 117.5 521.6 9.6 218.5 79.1 1775.2 
0 99.5 28.5 19.3 210.3 2.6 214.1 146.0 103.8 326.8 7.8 228.9 54.1 1441.7 
I 
I\) 
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Table All: Monthly remittances of Sudanese working abroad by source Arab countries - January 1975 -
October 1979 (£S 1000) Contd. 
Month/ Saudi 
Year Bahrain Iraq Jordan Kuwait lebanon Libya Oman Qatar Arabia Syria 
.'.979 J 37.6 14.6 14.6 196.6 7.4 353.6 37.1 65.6 391.5 14.6 
f 55.2 17.7 6.7 132.2 15.2 460.7 25.7 27.8 435.7 7.4 
M 72.8 6.8 100.0 409.4 24.9 41.5 543.2 
A 46.0 159.2 296.3 52.9 88.5 390.8 
M 15.3 179.3 399.3 74.1 121.9 514.2 
J 45.5 158.4 281.2 83.4 98.4 416.3 
J 19.2 153.7 257.9 69.5 78.9 374.6 
A 23.0 188.8 248.1 39.5 41.2 283.5 
S 39.7 134.1 353.7 68.9 83.5 494.4 
0 36.8 190.2 476.3 188.4 187.8 100.0 
Notes: - indicates that data is unavailable. 
Source: Unpublished data from the Bank of Sudan. 
Yemen 
UAE YAA Tot.l 
411.4 34.8 1564.8 
122.1 48.2 1354.6 
92.2 31.1 1321.9 
333.0 108.3 1475.0 
130.6 90.6 1533.3 
120.7 112.6 1316.7 
162.7 92.2 1208.7 
144.6 72.4 1041.9 
196.0 79.0 1449.3 
246.6 103.4 2156.5 
I\l 
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Table A~ Data used in regression analysis for estimating equation 10.2. 
GNP per capita in Construction GOP in 
US~ at 1970 prices million US~ at 1970 
Vear (1) . prices (2) 
Saudi Saudi 
Sudan Arabia Libya Oman Sudan Arabia Libya 
1969 201.1 468.7 1676.0 298.6 117.8 216.3 285.7 
1970 188.6 498.6 1702.1 300.0 115.5 207.5 286.8 
1971 193.0 579.3 1583.5 311.0 112.9 195.0 270.7 
1972 194.5 646.4 1423.2 332.6 112.9 220.9 368.1 
1973 199.7 756.5 1539.1 266.2 118.8 307.8 469.9 
1974 200.2 1055.5 1357.0 360.8 154.7 243.1 337.5 
1975 217.7 1241.4 1363.9 425.7 152.0 338.1 430.4 
1976 214.1 1264.7 1627.1 465.6 112.1 854.2 483.1 
1977 220.5 1497.5 1729.9 464.7 115.1 1463.0 524.7 
1978 194.8 1652.1 1835.1 464.2 95.0 1978.5 566.9 
1979 127.2 1894.7 1952.4 465.8 78.8 2338.3 616.9 
---~--
Non-oil GOP in million 
US~ at 1970 prices 
(3) 
Saudi 
Oman Sudan Arabia Libya 
18.9 2782.2 1916.0 1689.9 
25.4 2665.5 2054.6 1719.3 
42.4 2796.8 1992.4 1633.8 
49.2 2894.0 2120.8 1777.5 
41.0 3050.3 2412.4 2008.7 
33.6 3142.0 1860.7 1433.4 
49.7 3521.6 1999.1 1801.4 
53.6 3569.3 3007.9 2023.6 
46.6 3781. 3 4122.2 2143.6 
51.3 3392.8 4946.3 2289.5 
50.1 2781.6 5845.7 2490.9 
Oman I 
I 
75.8 
84.4 
106.3 
141.9 
129.5 
106.1 
149.9 
172.8 
177.7 
169.9 
166.4 
N 
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Table A~ Contd. 
Gross domestic investment stock of Migrants Number of Migrants 
Million US$ at 1970 prices (Number) 
Year (4) (5) (6) 
Saudi Saudi Saudi 
Sudan Arabia Libya Oman Arabia Libya Oman Arabia Libya Oman 
1969 271.8 742.2 979.3 23.0 - - - 2,102 420 30 
1970 274.7 623.6 659.9 35.3 2,102 420 30 992 198 14 
1971 250.3 527.9 697.2 74.0 3,094 618 44 1,797 359 26 
1972 201.1 658.4 907.6 91.4 4,891 976 70 1,041 208 15 
1973 269.8 949.7 1190.0 75.1 5,932 1,184 85 1,008 202 14 
1974 579.9 825.2 894.3 100.6 6,942 1,386 106 1,500 300 21 
1975 619.5 1179.6 1142.9 125.5 8,440 1,686 135 2,044 409 29 
1976 640.5 2342.2 1103.0 142.3 10,484 2,095 218 5,822 1,164 83 
1977 580.2 3358.5 1219.9 118.8 16,306 3,259 280 4,331 866 62 
-
1978 479.8 4098.4 1362.8 124.6 20,637 4,125 533 14,476 2,895 207 
1979 393.4 5010.6 1482.8 122.6 35,113 7,020 848 21,910 4,382 313 
Source: (1) Columns (1), (2), (3) and (4) are based on data of the World Bank "World Tables" 2nd edition, John Hopkins 
University Press, 1980, except for 1978 and 1979 for which projections are made assuming the same 1970-77 growth 
rate. for the Sudan, however, the two years were obtained from the "Economic Survey" Ministry of finance and 
National Economy, Khartoum, 1980/81. To obtain these variables at 1970 prices, GNP deflators in each country 
were used. To express them in US$, average yearly exchange rate for each country was used, which is obtained 
from the IMf "International financial Statistics", as well as from the above source. Population in each 
country, to calculate GNP per capita, is obtained from UN "Demographic Yearbook" and the above two sources. 
(2) Columns (5) and (6) were obtained using the Department of Labour statistics, Khartoum, and assumptions made 
in chapter TwO above about the distribution of migrants by destination country. 
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Table Al~ oLS estimates of equation (10.3) using construction GOP (CGO. t-1) and non-oil GOP (NOG. t~l) as 
praxis for the level of economic activity in destination cou~try.( t-ratio in parenthesis) J, 
SA-l 
L-l 
0-1 
SA-2 
L-2 
0-2 
Notes: 
Constant yO. t U CGO j ,t_l NoG. t 1 SM. t R2 
- 2 F s,t R O-W J, J, - J, 
-1.066 0.237 0.588 0.947** 0.055 
(-0.515) (0.239) (0.719) (2.046) (0.534) 0.89 0.81 10.097 2.883 
-21.216** 2.857** 0.192 -0.002 0.889** 
(2.312) (2.283) (0.251) (-0.001) (2.102) 0.90 0.82 11.284 2.633 
1.809 0.045 0.197 -1.349* 1. 278*fl 
(0.598) (0.073) (0.282) (1.992) (3.570) 0.93 0.88 17.975 2.406 
-12.582 0.618 0.887 1.882* 0.033 
( 1.854) (0.426) (0.9~7) (1. 562) (0.025) 0.86 0.76 7.940 2.5612 
-19.142 3.116** 0.121 -0.556 0.934*'lH1 
(-1. 738) (2.028) (0.152) (-0.281) (3.416) 0.90 0.82 11.482 2.740 
-4.311 0.155 0.032 1.670 1. 343 0.91 0.84 12.437 2.182 
(-0.639) (0.203) (0.039) (1.176) (2.266) 
All variables are as defined in equations ~10.2) and (10.3) in Chapter 10, except CGO. t-l and NOG. t-l are 
as defined in the heading to this table, R is R-squared, F is the F-statistics,n2 is ~djUsted R-sqi~red. 
and O-W is Ourbin-Watson of statistics *, **, *** indicate the variable is significant at 10%, 5% and 
1% respectively. 
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Table Bl: Migrants by province of birth and last place of residence in The Sudan before migrations. 
(Numbers). 
~ z -i ;:0;; :0 ;:0;; CD C'l ;:0;;00 ;:o;;z l?~ o~ t"i~ esidence 0 :r :r m PI I-' PI zE o 0 o 0 t"i m PI 0- (I) C N .... :r t"i C t"i t"i Ii C PI t"i m C Province . c-t t"i PI m m I-' .... O-et- 0. ct" -1) ct" t"i ct" ID ct" :r z et- 00 I-' Ii m cT o :r o :r c :r -1):r .... :r of birth m .... 0 m I-' :z III m -1)m -1)m Ii m c m o m t"i I-' C III PI .... PI Ii PI t"i Ii Ii t"i ::J Ii ::J m 3 !;;' ::J ::J ::J ::J ::J ::J ::J --I 0 ct" III I-' 
Northern 52 6 103 9 - - 2 1 - 1 - - - 174 
The Nile - 4 19 1 1 - - - - - - - - 25 
Khartoum 
- -
39 - - - - - - - - - - 39 
Red Sea 
- -
3 5 - - - - - - - - - 8 
Kasalla 
- -
1 - 2 - - - - - - - - 3 
Blue Nile 
- -
7 - - 3 - - - - - - - 10 
Gazera - - 22 - - 2 7 1 - - - - - 32 
White Nile - - 2 - 1 - - 1 - - - - - 4 
Southern Kordofan - - 7 - - - - - - - - - - 7 
Northern Kordofan 
- -
3 -- - - 1 - - 2 - - - 6 
Southern Darfur - - 1 - - - - - - - - - - 1 
Northern Darfur - - 1 - - - - - - - - - - 1 
Southern Region 
- - - -
- - - - -
- - - - -
Outside Sudan 
- - - -
- - - - - - - - -
-
Total 52 10 208 15 4 5 10 3 - 3 - - - 310 
-- ---
Notes; (1) - indicates no observation in the sample. 
(2) The Southern region includes Equatoria, Upper Nile and Bahrel Gazal provinces. 
(3) In comparison with Table A40f Appendix A, it should be naoticed that in 1974, the following 
division was made to provinces a) Northern province was divided into Northern province and 
the Nile province b) Blue Nile province was divided into Blue Nile, Gazera and White Nile 
provinces c) Kordofan and Darfur provinces were divided into Southern and Northern Kordofan 
and Darfur respectively. 
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Table 82: Occupation abroad by occupation in The Sudan (%) 
...... c: r: en CJ M"J:> :::1-4 J:> "0 Z -4 ~ ...... ::l t-j CD " ..... OJ C"l ..... CD a..R-t-j 0 0 CD to :3 . a.. ..... CD :::I C"l C"l C"l :3 0 M" Home c." CD ...... t-j M"O ..... ;;r .... -II U CD .... ~ ...... " c OJ I ::l . 0 ...... 'I I ::l :::I . C" 
Unskilled 98 - 2 - - - - - 13 
Farmers 97 - - - - - - 3 9 
Skilled 26 - 61 7 2 2 - 3 20 
Clerk 4 - 8 58 23 - 4 4 8 
Accountant 
- -
13 11 71 
- -
5 12 
Technician 3 
-
6 6 
-
77 
- 9 11 
Prof. & 
Admin. - - - - 9 - 82 9 15 
No job 31 - 6 9 29 3 11 8 11 
Total 31 
-
16 9 16 9 15 5 100 
Notes: (1) Percentage is percentage of the relevant occupation in The 
Sudan, except for totals which are percentages of all sample 310. 
(2) - indicates no observation in the sample. 
Table 83: Employment sector abroad by employment sector in The Sudan. 
K :J:> rt":3 n ~·M R-n R--i 
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Home III 0 ::J-1) ::J rt" III III rt" III III 3 (/) ::J ~. I-'::J III (/) E 0 (j) C 10 III 11 11 ::J t1 0.11 3-0 0 n 10 ::J rt" III 0- III 
I-' 0 C 0. ~. III 0 C 0 III III rt" ~. -t1 3 
I I n ~ III ::J 11 (j) R- oo 0 0 -0 rt" . rt" 11 I-' 
Agriculture 
-
3 5 - 28 3 3 28 - 28 3 13 
Manufacturing 2 4 4 4 34 8 28 11 - - 4 15 
Construction 
- -
7 
-
7 - - 86 - - - 5 
Elect. & water 
- -
14 14 29 
- -
29 
- -
14 2 
. 
Commerce 
-
8 
- -
54 15 
- - -
23 - 4 
Transport & comm 
-
3 3 
-
16 29 3 19 
-
13 13 10 
Finance 
- - -
-
-
40 
-
20 20 - - - 2 
Services 
-
1 4 7 21 6 6 42 1 3 10 35 
Mining & oil 
- - - - - - - -
100 
- -
0.3 
Domestic servants 
- - - - - - - - -
100 
-
0.3 
No job or answer 
-
5 5 2 31 2 17 14 2 7 14 14 
All sample 0.3 3 4 4 26 7 10 28 1 8 8 100 
~.: Percentages are of the relevant employment sector in The Sudan. For all sample, percentage is out of 
total sample of 310. 
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Table 84: Occupation abroad and in The Sudan by level of education (%). 
~--~ education Cant 
Occupation ~ read or General Higher Higher University Post- All 
write Primary Secondary Secondary Institute 1st Degree Graduate sample 
abroad 
Unskilled 97 69 42 4 - - - 31 
Skilled 3 24 34 11 25 7 
-
16 
Clerk 
- -
8 24 7 7 
-
9 
Accountant 
- -
5 40 4 24 7 15 
Technicians 
-
1 8 13 43 2 
-
9 
Professional & admin 
- - -
1 18 49 93 13 
No job or answer 
-
6 3 6 4 11 
-
5 
In Sudan 
Unskilled 37 35 10 - - - - 13 
farmers 43 23 
- - - - -
9 
Skilled 13 32 55 6 21 7 
-
20 
Clerk 
- -
5 28 
-
2 
-
8 
Accountant 
- -
3 34 4 18 
-
12 
Technicians 
-
1 8 17 57 
- -
11 
Professional & admin 
- - - -
18 56 100 15 
No job or answer 7 7 18 15 
-
18 0 11 
All sample 10 23 12 26 9 15 5 100 
Notes: (1) Percentages are percentages of the relevant educational level, except for all sample which refers 
to the percentage of the relevant educational or occupational level out of the total sample 310. 
(2) - indicates no observation in the sample. 
I\) 
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Table 85: Employment sector abroad and in The Sudan by level of education (%). 
I General Higher Higher 
Illiterate Primery Secondary Secondary Institute University 
Abroad 
Agriculture 
-
1 - - - -
Manufacturing 7 - 5 2 4 2 
Construction 3 3 10 2 11 2 
Elect. & water - 1 - 7 - 9 
Trade & commerce 30 41 37 22 4 20 
Transport & comm - 6 5 16 4 7 
Finance 13 4 - 22 4 11 
Services 23 11 26 17 71 33 
Mining & oil - - 3 1 - 2 
Domestic servo 23 21 10 1 - -
No job or answer - 11 5 8 4 13 
In Sudan 
Agriculture 47 27 3 5 4 -
Manufacturing 10 24 8 24 11 3 
Construction 3 - - 4 21 4 
Elect. & water 
-
4 
-
- 7 4 
Trade & commerce 7 10 5 1 - 2 
Transport & comm 10 9 18 13 7 2 
Finance - - 3 2 - 4 
Services 13 11 42 38 46 51 
Mining & oil - - - 1 - -
Domestic servant 
-
1 
-
- - -
No job or answer 10 14 21 17 4 18 
All sample 10 23 12 26 9 15 
~~~-
Notes as in Table 84. 
Post-
graduate 
-
-
-
7 
-
-
-
93 
-
-
-
-
-
13 
-
-
7 
-
80 
-
-
-
5 
All 
Sample 
0.3 
2.6 
4.2 
3.9 
25.8 
7.4 
10.0 
28.4 
1.0 
8.4 
8.1 
12.6 
15.2 
4.5 
2.3 
4.2 
10.0 
1.6 
34.5 
0.3 
0.3 
13.5 
100 
l\J 
0\ 
\.JI 
Table 86: Job information channels by level of education and occupation abroad (%). 
IS: Channels 
educetion .~ Labour Private 
and exchange Employ. News- Direct Friends and Business Other Did not 
occupation offices Agencies papers contact Relatives contacts ways state 
Education 
Can't read or write 10 - - - 63 - 3, 23 
Primary 13 1 1 3 65 - - 17 
Gen. Secondary 16 3 - 13 55 3 3 8 
H. Secondary 7 2 18 4 55 7 
-
6 
H. Institute 14 
-
25 21 21 11 
-
7 
University 9 2 16 18 40 7 2 7 
Post-graduate 7 - 20 33 13 20 - 7 
Occupation 
Unskilled 11 2 - 1 70 - 1 14 
Skilled 14 - 16 20 44 - - 6 
Clerk 7 - 18 - 64 7 4 -
Accountants 13 2 13 4 65 2 2 -
Technicians 18 4 14 14 27 8 - -
Professional & Admin. 10 2 24 26 17 19 2 -
All sample 11 2 11 9 51 5 1 11 
-
Notes: (1) Percentage is percentage of the relevant educational or occupational levels. For all sample this 
refers to percentage out of total sample (310). 
(2) - indicates no observation in the sample. 
I\) 
0\ 
0\ 
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Table 87: Time spent in first job search by level of education, occupation 
abroad, way of entering Saudi Arabia, and way of obtaining a 
job contract (%) 
~I Time Less 
Categor es~ than more No job one 1-2 2-3 3-6 than 6 or 
month months months months months answer 
(1) Education 
Can't read or write 37 20 20 10 13 
-
Primary 49 24 10 3 6 9 
General secondary 63 5 8 8 13 3 
Higher secondary 57 16 12 7 
-
7 
Higher institute 68 14 
-
11 4 4 
University 62 13 
-
13 4 7 
Post-graduate 93 
- - 7 - -
(2) Occupation abroad 
Unskilled 46 20 14 7 11 1 
Skilled 64 22 4 4 2 4 
Clerk 50 14 14 18 4 
-
Accountant 65 13 10 10 
- 2 
Technician 79 3 3 11 3 
-
Professional & Admin. 79 14 - 2 5 -
(3) Ways of entering 
Saudi Arabia 
Work contract 67 17 9 4 1 2 
For a visit or Hajj 34 15 10 19 15 8 
Through other.countrreS72 8 4 4 4 8 
ather ways - 50 
- -
50 
-
Did not state 50 7 - - - , 43 
(4) Ways of obteining 
job contract 
Labour Office 100 
- - - - -
Employment missions 86 - 3 7 3 -
Private employment 
agencies 100 - - - - -
Relatives & friends 40 33 15 7 1 4 
Official secondment 100 - - - - -
Other ways 67 33 
- - - -
Did not state 45" 12 " 9 12 11 11 
(5) All sample 57 15 8 8 5 6 
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Table 88: Whether migrants ch~nge their jobs abroad and average number 
of job movements by education and occupation abroad. 
Job Mobility Average 
number of 
Did not Changed No job job 
change job job or answer movements 
Categories (%) (%) (%) (No.) 
Education 
Can't read or 
write 53 47 
- 1.8 
Primary 42 51 7 1.5 
General Secondary 58 39 3 1.5 
Higher Secondary 67 27 6 0.5 
Higher Institute 75 18 7 0.3 
University 69 22 9 0.4 
Post-graduate 100 
- - 0.0 
Occueation 
Skilled 46 53 1 1.8 
Unskilled 76 22 2 0.9 
Clerk 68 32 
- 0.7 
Accountant 56 44 
- 0.9 
Technician 82 18 
- 0.3 
Professional & 
Administrativa 91 7 2 0.1 
No job or answer 
- 12 88 
-
All sample 61 33 6 0.9 
~.: Percentage is out of the relevant group. 
Table 89: Percentage of migrants in different income groups by occupation abroad. 
I~occup- All Unskilled Skilled Professional & atlon migrants workers workers Clerks Accountants Technicians Administrative Income -':--
(Riyals) 5 TI 5 TI 5 TI 5 TI 5 TI 5 TI 5 TI 
Less than 499 
- - - - - - -
- - - - - - -500-999 1 1 4 2 
- -
- -
- - - - - -1000-1499 4 1 9 3 6 
- 4 
-
- - - - - -1500-1999 15 9 .34 26 10 4 14 4 6 
-
4 
- - -2000-2499 24 16 35 34 28 14 36 14 10 6 29 7 2 
-2500-2999 14 19 8 24 18 24 21 43 27 13 14 25 10 -3000-3499 13 13 4 7 22 18 14 20 27 27 11 14 10 7 3500-3999 9 11 1 2 10 22 11 14 17 21 18 11 17 12 4000-4999 9 13 1 1 4 12 
- 7 8 23 21 25 36 33 5000-5999 1 4 - - - 2 
- - 2 6 4 14 2 12 6000-6999 1 3 - - - -
-
- - 2 - 4 7 14 7000-7999 2 0.3 - - - -
- - - - - - 12 2 8000-8999 1 1 - - - -
- - - - - - 2 10 9000+ 1 2 ' 1 1 - -
-
- - - - - 2 10 
Average 5(1) 2572 3113 1970 2327 2512 3032 2372 2857 867 3510 3088 3781 4531 5553 Average 5(2) 621 752 476 562 607 732 573 690 693 848 746 913 1094 1341 Average 5(3) 388 470 297 351 379 457 358 431 432 529 466 570 683 838 Average 5(4) 59 
-
30 
-
55 
- 47 
- 60 - 72 
-
125 -
% (1) 1053 1275 1587 1873 1104 1331 1219 1468 1155 1413 1036 1268 875 1073 % (2) 658 797 990 1170 689 831 762 917 1720 882 647 792 546 670 
I\) 
CJ\ 
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Notes to Table S9: 
(1) - indicates no observetion in the sample. 
(2) 5 = monthly salary. 
(3) TI = monthly total income i.e. monthly salary plus value of allowances 
(4) Average 5(1) = average 5 and TI for each occupational group in Saudi 
Arabian Riyals 
(5) Average S(2) = average S(l) expressed in Sudanese pounds using the 
premium exchange rate of £51 = 4.14 SR offered to migrants by the 
banks at the time of the survey. 
(6) Average 5(3) = average S(l) expressed in Sudanese pounds using the 
official exchange rate of The Sank of Sudan of £51 = 6.63 SR at 
the time of the survey. 
(7) Average 5(4) = average income in Sudan before migration reported by 
migrants in the sample, in Sudanese pounds. 
(8) % (1) = average 5(2) as percentage of average 5(4). 
(9) % (2) = average 5(3) as percentage of average S( 4). 
(10) Percentages for income groups are out of the relevant occupational 
levels. 
. 
Table 810: Percentage of migrants in different income brackets by level of education. 
~ General Higher Higher Income Illiterate Primary Secondary Secondary Institute University brackets .
(Riyals) 5 TI 5 TI 5 TI 5 TI S TI 5 TI 
Less than 499 - - - - - - - - - - - -
500-999 - - 3 - 3 3 1 1 - - - -
1000-1499 13 3 10 3 3 - 1 - - - - -
1500-1999 30 20 27 25 24 11 11 1 4 - - -
2000-2499 43 47 30 25 29 16 24 12 14 4 9 -
2500-2999 7 23 7 17 21 32 23 28 25 14 4 4 
3000-3499 7 3 9 8 B 21 lB 1B 11 14, 22 16 
3500-3999 
-
3 6 10 5 5 9 17 18 21 20 11 
4000-4999 
- -
3 4 5 B 6 12 1B 21 22 36 
5000-5999 - - - - - 3 - 4 4 14 2 4 
6000-6999 
- - - - - -
- - -
4 4 11 
7000-7999 - - - - - - - - - - 2 -
8000-8999 - - - - - - - - - - - 2 
9000+ 
- -
1 1 - - - - - - - 2 
Average 5(1) 1900 227B 2069 2409 2249 2699 2415 2954 2962 3654 316B 3878 
Average 5(2) 458 550 500 582 543 652 583 714 715 883 765 937 
Average 5(3) 2B7 344 312 363 339 407 364 446 447 551 478 585 
Average 5(4) 30 - 34 - 41 - 53 - 86 - B8 -
% (1) 1527 1833 1471 1712 1302 1590 1100 1347 831 1027 869 1065 
% (2) 957 1147 918 1068 827 993 687 842 520 641 543 665 
- .-
Notes: (1) Percentages for income groups are percentages of the relevant educational levels. 
(2) Notes as in table 89· 
Post-graduate 
5 TI 
- -
- -
- -
- -
- -
8 
-
- -
13 
-
28 20 
7 20 
7 13 
27 7 
7 20 
7 20 
5637 6935 
1362 1675 
850 1046 
175 
-
778 957 
486 598 
J 
N 
--l 
I-' 
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Table 811: Ability to save, frequency of savings and the proportion of 
income saved by occupation abroad (% of the relevant occupation). 
Prof. 
All Un- Account- Techni- & 
Variable Sample skilled Skilled Clerk ants ciane Admin. 
(1) Ability to save 
Able to save 86 90 92 86 94 100 88 
No savings 7 8 6 14 6 
- 10 
No job or answer 7 2 2 
- - - 2 
(2) Frequency of 
savings 
Monthly 26 19 32 36 29 39 28 
Occasionally 59 70 58 46 65 57 62 
No job or answer 15 11 10 8 6 4 10 
(3) Proportion of 
income saved 
Less than 1/10 1 
- -
4 
-
4 2 
1/10 2 3 2 7 - 4 -
1/5 6 11 4 4 4 4 2 
1/4 13 19 14 14 13 18 2 
1/3 31 35 40 25 33 21 31 
1/2 19 10 20 18 25 29 33 
2/3 11 9 8 11 17 18 14 
3/4 2 - 2 - 2 4 5 
More than 3/4 - - - - - - -
No savings, 
answer or job 15 12 10 8 6 
-
10 
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Table 812: Ability to save, frequency of savings and proportion of income 
saved by level of education (%) 
General Higher Higher Uni-
Variable Illiterate Primary Second. Second. Instit. versity 
(1) ability to 
save 
Able to save 87 82 92 92 89 78 
No savings 13 8 5 2 7 9 
No job or answer 
-
10 3 6 4 13 
(2) Frequency of 
savings 
Monthly 20 20 21 28 36 29 
Occasionally 67 62 66 61 54 49 
No job or answer 13 18 13 11 11 22 
(3) Proportion of 
income saved 
Less than 1/10 -
-
- 2 - 2 
1/10 3 3 5 2 
- -
1/5 17 3 8 6 
- 4 
1/4 13 20 13 16 7 7 
1/3 43 35 40 22 32 . 24 
1/2 7 13 8 24 29 24 
2/3 3 7 13 15 18 13 
3/4 - - - 2 4 2 
More than 3/4 
- - - - - -
No savings, answer 
or job 13 14 13 10 11 22 
~.: Percentage is the percentage of the relevant educational level. 
Post-
grad. 
87 
13 
-
47 
47 
7 
-
-
7 
-
33 
40 
7 
7 
-
7 
Table 813: The decision to remit, average remittances, and the frequency of remittances by different socio-
economic characteristics of migrants. 
% who % who Average remittances a month per migrant frequency of 
remit remit remittances 
in in in cash . in kind Total 
cash kind 
Categories SR PS t SR PS t SR PS t monthly occasion-
% ally % 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
(1) All sample 88 55 496 19 - 117 5 - 613 24 - 30 58 
(2) Age 
Less than 20 years 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
20-24 88 55 475 23 -0.453 96 5 -1.311 571 28 -0.875 41 47 
25-29 85 55 489 20 -0.201 III 5 -0.408 600 25 -0.317 23 62 
30-34 90 55 522 17 0.624 123 4 0.384 645 21 0.711 35 55 
35-39 91 50 560 19 1.034 130 5 0.446 690 24 1.051 26 65 
40-44 95 63 459 19 -0.653 154 7 1.543 613 26 0.393 22 74 
45+ 100 80 486 16 -0.503 140 3 0.547 626 19 0.688 80 20 
(3) Period since 
migration 
0-6 months 64 23 407 24 -1.224 44 3 -4.026***451 27 -2.027** 52 13 
It years 86 53 536 19 0.963 121 4 0.206 657 23 0.881 31 55 
2t years 88 48 520 22 0.494 103 4 -0.644 623 26 0.207 19 69 
3t years 94 79 500 18 0.098 168 6 2.250*"* 668 24 1.056 32 62 
4t years 98 65 509 20 0.338 150 6 1.541 659 26 0.977 20 78 
st years 88 50 517 19 0.263 113 4 -0.111 630 23 0.190 38 50 
6t - lot years 91 64 444 14 -0.827 127 4 0.402 571 18 -0.562 23 68 
More than lot yrs. 92 50 416 16 -1.487 77 3 -1.939* 493 19 -1.996** 38 54 
(4) Marital status 
Single 85 53 500 22 0.153 103 4 -1.173 603 26 -0.273 31 54 
Married 91 58 490 17 -0.184 134 5 1.176 624 22 0.326 29 63 
1\:1 
-.1 
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Table 813: The decision to remit, average remittances, and the frequency of remittances by different socio-
economic characteristics of migrants. (Contd.) 
% who % who Average remittances a month per migrant Frequency of 
remit remit remittances 
in in in cash in kind Total 
cash kind 
Categories SR PS t SR PS t SR PS t monthly occasion-% ally % 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (l3) 
(5) Place of family 
-3. 235***' Abroad 81 50 366 8 111 3 0.038 483 
11 -2.681*** 31 51 
In Sudan 88 81 518 23 0.853 115 5 -0.029 633 
28 0.754 24 63 
(6) Education 
Illiterate 100 70 484 24 -0.318 136 7 0.911 620 31 
0.190 37 63 
Primary 94 65 459 22 -1.104 121 .6 0.215 
580 28 -0.886 28 66 
Intermediate 95 71 501 22 0.099 142 6 1.115 643 
28 0.486 40 55 
Secondary 85 49 559 23 1.511 92 4 -1.700* 651 27 
0.820 28 57 
H. Institute 82 25 441 15 -0.915 61 2 -2.468** 501 17 
-1.642 21 61 
University 73 51 440 14 -0.984 140 4 0.816 580 
31 -0.473 31 42 
Post-grad. 87 47 630 11 1.044 177 3 0.984 
801 27 1.210 27 60 
(7) Occupation abroad 
Unskilled 99 70 412 24 -0.866 131 7 1.053 
603 31 -0.309 33 66 
Skilled 96 56 561 22 1.459 109 4 -0.464 
670 26 1.181 32 64 
Clerk 89 68 498 21 0.040 119 5 
0.089 611 26 0.069 46 43 
Accountant 85 60 539 19 0.834 140 5 1.010 
679 24 1.042 23 62 
Technician 93 29 596 19 1.409 63 2 -2.465** 
659 21 0.601 21 71 
Profess. & Admin. 86 45 554 12- 0.949 150 3 1.031 704 15 
1.231 36 50 
------ --
I\) 
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Table 813: 
Notes: % is the percentage of the relevant group. 
SR = Saudi Riyals 
PS = Percentage of salary 
t = the t-ratio to test the difference between average remittances, 
and calculated as follows: 
x - x 1 2 
where x is average remittances, ar2 is the variance, n is the 
number of observations and the subscripts 1 and 2 refer to any 
group of migrants and the total sample respectively. i.e. Cols. 
(5), (8) and (11)" show the t-ratio to test the difference in 
average remittances between the group and the overall sample 
average. The observed t-ratio for the difference in average 
remittance of accompanied and unaccompanied (by family abroad) 
migrants is 3.720 which is significant at 1% level of significance. 
*, **, *** indicate significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level of 
significance respectively. The theoretical t-ratios are 1.645, 
1.960 and 2.576 respectively. 
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Table B14: Channels of remittances by socio-economic background of migrants. 
With Pay in SA Keep in 
Through people and receive form of Other 
Banks going in Sudan foreign channels 
home exchange 
(1) (2) (3) ( 4) (5) 
Category % % % % % 
All migrants 62 66 63 21 4 
(1) Age 
Less than 20 yrs. 
- - - - -20-24 55 69 59 12 2 
25-29 62 62 55 20 5 
30-34 60 65 69 33 4 
35-39 74 68 59 15 
-40-44 70 89 93 15 7 
45+ 80 80 60 40 
-
(2) Education 
Cant read or 
write 70 93 93 10 3 
Primary 73 83 65 4 
-Intermediate 68 76 74 11 
-Secondary S9 62 S4 28 7 
Higher Secondar) 68 39 60 39 4 
University 42 42 47 24 4 
Post-graduate 47 60 67 67 13 
(3) Period since out 
migration 
0-6 months 39 39 32 - -
11 years 49 64 59 20 5 
21 years 60 67 65 29 4 
31 years 67 68 65 18 9 
41 years 80 80 78 33 2 
51 years 75 S6 50 19 
-
61-101 years 77 77 73 23 5 
More than 101 yrs. 75 79 75 17 4 
(4) Marital status 
Single 56 63 59 19 4 
Married 69 71 67 23 4 
(5) Place of family 
abroad 63 52 59 48 7 
in Sudan 62 88 63 16 3 
(6) Occupation abroad 
Unskilled 71 92 80 4 1 
Skilled 70 70 68 22 6 
Clerk 71 79 57 14 4 
Accountant 60 52 50 35 4 
Technicians 57 61 57 39 4 
Prof. & Admin. 55 43 62 43 10 
1;L&. : raw percentage does not add to 100% because a migrant can use more 
than one channel to send his remittances home. 
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Table 815: Ways of entering Saudi Arabia by level of education and 
occupation. 
Means/ways Work Visit Through 
Education Contract or other Other 
and or Pilgrim- countries ways 
Occupation Work Visa age % % % % 
(1) Education 
Can't read or 
write 63 37 
- -
Primary 59 35 1 
-
Intermediate 67 24 8 2 
Secondary 54 26 8 
-
Higher Institute 86 4 10 
-University 51 27 20 2 
Post-graduate 80 7 13 
-
(2) Occueation abroad 
Unskilled 65 33 1 1 
Skilled 70 16 10 
-
Clerk 50 25 14 
-
Accountant 54 31 8 
-
Technicians 75 18 4 
-
Prof. & Admin. 62 17 19 2 
No job or answer 25 38 12 
-
( 3) Occueation in Sudan 
Unskilled 75 23 3 
-
Farmer 52 48 
- -
Skilled 66 18 11 2 
Clerk 58 23 8 
-
Accountants 47 29 11 
-
Technicians 77 15 3 -
Prof. & Admin. 67 16 18 
-
No job or answer 40 46 6 3 
( 4) All sample 61 26 8 1 
N.B.: % is out of the relevant educational or occupational level. 
-
Did not 
state 
% 
-
4 
-
12 
-
-
-
-
4 
11 
6 
4 
-
25 
-
-
3 
12 
13 
6 
-
6 
5 
Table 816: Ways of obtaining job contract or work visa by level of education and occupation. 
~, Ways Employ Private friends Official 
Education and ~ Labour ment employ. and Second- Other Did not 
occupation Office Missions agencies Relatives ment ways state 
(a) Education 
Illiterate 10(16) - - 57(89) - - -
Primary 11(19) 1(2) - 45(76) - - 1(2) 
Intermediate 16(24) 8(12) 5(8) 26(40} 3(4) 5(8) 3(4) 
Secondary 9(16} 7(14) 2(5) 21(39} 9(16) - 6(11) 
Higher Institute 18(21} 32(38) - 29(33) 7(8) 
University 7(13) 7(13) 2(4} 20(39} 7(13) 2(4) 7(13) 
Post-graduate 7(8) 47(58) - - 27(33) - -
(b) Occupation abroad 
Unskilled 11(17} - 1(2) 54(81} - - -
Skilled 14(20} 22(31) . 2(3} 24(34} - 4(6) -
Clerk 4(7) 7(14) 4(7) 25(50} 7(14) - 3(7) 
Accountants 15(27) 4(8) - 25(46} - - 10(19) 
Technicians 18(24) 14(19) 4(5) 14(19} 21(29) - 4(19) 
Prof. & Admin. 5(8) 24(38) 2(4) 5(8) 21(35) 2(4) 2(4) 
No job or answer - - - 25(100) - - -
(c) Occupation at home 
Unskilled 17(23) - - 58(77} - - -
farmer - - - 55(100) - - -
Skilled 13(20) 16(24) 3(5) 27(41} - 3(5} 3(5) 
Clerks 8(13) 4(7) 4(7) 27(47} 8(13) - 8(13) 
Accountants 16(33) 3(6) - 18(39) - - 11(22} 
Technicians 18(23) 15(19) 3(4) 21(27) 18(23) - 3(4} 
Prof. & Admin. 8(10) 22(33) 2(3) 11(17) 20(30) 2(3} 2(3} 
No job or answer 3(7) 6(14) - 31(79} - - -
(d) All sample 11(17) 9(15) 2(3) 30(49) 6(9) 1(2) 3(5) 
Notes: as in Table 815. figures in parenthesis refer to percentage out of those who entered Saudi Arabia with a 
work contract from the relevant occupation or educational level, thus % could add to 100%, while the other does 
not add because some migrants have entered without a work contract as in Table 815. 
I\) 
-,J 
\0 
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Table B17: Year of entry to Saudi Arabia by education and occupation (%). 
Categories Before 1970-1970 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
(a) Education 
Illiterate 27 3 7 10 17 20 13 3 
Primary 10 15 4 20 14 14 18 4 
Intermediate 13 8 10 21 8 18 13 8 
Secondary 2 2 5 16 11 18 3:3 12 
Higher Institute 4 
-
7 11 
-
18 46 14 
University 
-
7 2 18 16 9 27 22 
Post-graduate 
-
13 
- - -
7 80 
-
(b) Occueation abroad 
Unskilled 14 11 5 13 13 18 20 5 
Skilled 8 8 6 26 10 16 20 6 
Clerk 7 
-
7 11 7 14 :36 18 
Accountant 2 
-
4 25 21 15 23 10 
Technician 3 3 3 20 3 20 50 
-
Prof. & Admin. 2 12 5 7 7 10 45 12 
No job or answer 
-
6 6 
- -
19 19 50 
(c) Occueation at home 
Unskilled 10 10 - 13 6 28 28 5 
Farmer 24 7 7 24 21 14 3 -
Skilled 8 8 10 18 11 15 26 5 
Clerk 4 - 8 15 12 15 27 19 
Accountant 3 :3 3 21 11 16 32 13 
Technicians 
-
6 :3 12 6 18 44 12 
Prof. & Admin. 2 7 2 7 7 13 44 18 
No job or answer 14 11 7 20 17 6 11 11 
(d) All sample 8 7 5 16 11 15 28 10 
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Table B18: Intended period of migration by education and occupation abroad. 
Less 5 More Fin- Until Get Don't No. 
than to than ish con- sav- know ans-
Category 5 10 10 For the ditions ing yet wer years years years ever contract improve target 
(a) Education 
Illiterate 17 30 10 - - - - 43 -
Primary 11 42 
- - -
1 1 41 3 
Intermediate 18 42 3 - - 3 3 26 5 
Secondary 34 30 1 
-
2 5 
-
20 7 
H. Institute 39 32 - - - - 4 21 4 
University 33 18 - 2 - 2 4 31 9 
Post-graduate 33 47 - - - - - 7 7 
(b) occueation 
abroad 
Unskilled 17 36 3 - - 1 1 38 4 
Skilled 24 40 2 - - 2 4 28 -
Clerk 36 36 - - 4 - - 25 -
Accountant 29 21 2 - 2 B 2 25 11 
Technician 32 39 - - - - - 25 4 
Prof. & Admin. 31 31 2 2 - 2 2 26 6 
No job 25 25 - - - - - 6 44 
(c) All sample 25 34 2 * * 2 2 29 6 
N.B.: * indicates less than 1%. 
-
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Table B19: Work abroad suitability to past experience and qualifications (%). 
very suitable Not Did 
suitable to some suitable not No 
Categories extent at all state job 
All sample 2B 37 27 3 5 
(1) Education 
illiterate 17 40 43 
- -Primary 25 32 30 7 7 
Intermediate 29 42 26 
-
3 
Higher Second. 24 43 24 2 6 
Higher Inst. 43 36 18 
-
4 
University 31 29 27 2 11 
Post-graduate 40 40 20 
- -
(2) occueation abroad 
Unskilled 20 37 38 5 
-Skilled 40 32 28 
- -Clerk 29 25 43 4 
-Accountant 17 54 27 2 
-Technicians 43 50 7 
- -
Prof. & Admin. 45 38 14 2 
-No job 
- - - -
100 
(3) Wa~ of enterin!3 
Saudi Arabia 
Work contract 31 39 27 2 2 
Visit or Hajj 28 38 23 5 8 
Through other 
countries 16 32 44 
-
8 
ather ways - 50 50 
- -
(4) Wa~ of obtaining 
job contract 
Labour Office 21 46 27 6 
-
Emp. missions 55 31 14 
- -
Private employ. 
agencies 60 
-
40 
- -
Relatives and 
friends 24 42 29 1 4 
Official second-
ment 35 59 6 
- -
ather ways 100 
- - - -
N.B.: % is of the relevant category. 
-
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APPENDIX C 
The Questionnaire Schedule 
We would like to gather some information about migration from 
The Sudan to Saudi Arabia, for the purpose of a research at the University 
of Stirling, U.K. We would very much appreciate your help in this respect. 
Your name and address do not appear in the questionnaire. The 
information you give will be treated in the strictest confidence, and 
will be used only for research purposes. 
Ql: Would you please fill in the following table about yourself. 
Age Place of Marital No. High- Year Last place birth Status of est of lived in in Sex Town child- level entry The Sudan 
complet- or of to town or ren 
ad yeers M F Provo ville M S educate S.Arabia Provo village 
: 
Q.2: How many persons (including wife and children) depend on you for a 
major part of their life? •••••••• ~ersons 
Q.3: Does your family live with you in Saudi Arabia now? 
DYes 
ONo 
Q.4: ~hat is the highest degree, diploma or certificate you have? 
.................................. 
Present Employment: 
Q.5& Do you have a job at present? 
DYes 
DNa 
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IF YES 
Q.6: (a) What is your main occupation? ••••••••••••• 
(b) How long have you had this job? ••••••••••• Years •••••••• months 
(c) In this job, are you 
o self employed 
CJworking for someone else, is it 1) Government or 
2) Private 
(d) Where do you work? •••••••••••• 
(e) is your present job: 
o permanent 
CJ casual 
CJ seasonal 
(f) Is this the first job you had since you came to this 
country, or did you change your job? 
Dfirst job 
CJchanged my job (how many times?) •••••• times 
Q.7: How long did you stay before you got your 1st job? 
o Less than a month 
o One to two months 
o Two to three months 
o Three to six months 
o More than six months. 
Q.8: In what way(s) did you seek information about jobs? or How did 
you find the job you moved to: 
Through 
o Labour offices in The Sudan 
[J Private employment agencies 
o Newspapers 
o Friends and relatives 
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o employment missions 
D chance contacts 
o direct contacts 
o business contacts 
o others (specify) 
a.9: If you are presently not working (i.e. your answer to Q.5 is no) 
a) How long have you been unemployed? ••••••• months 
b) Have you ever worked since you came to this country? 
DYes 
DNa 
c) If YES to (b) above, what was your most recent occupation? •••••••••..• 
a.IO: Do you think your present occupation is suitable to your qualifications 
and previous experience? Is it 
o Very sui table 
o Suitable to some extent 
ONot suitable at all 
OHave no job. 
Previous employment in The Sudan 
a.ll: Have you had a job in The Sudan before migration? 
IF YES 
OYes 
DNa 
a) What was your main occupation? ••••••. 
b) How long have you had that job? •••••• Years •••••• Months 
c) In that job have you been 
o self-employed 
[Jworking for someone else (1) government or 
(2) private 
d) Where have you been working? ............. . 
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(e) Did you leave your job in The Sudan: 
o voluntary 
o redundancy 
o dismissal 
[Jothers (specify). 
0.12: IF NO (i.e. was unemployed in The Sudan) 
(a) How long were you without a job? •••••• months •••••• years 
(b) You had no job in the Sudan because 
c:J no job was available 
CJ There was a job, but not suitable for you 
CJ There was a job, but pay is little 
CJ Did not look for a job 
o Other reasons (specify) 
Income in Saudi Arabia: 
0.13: Could you tell me what is your approximate income per month now? 
(By income we mean your net income after tax, and including bonus, 
overtime and/or profits) ••••••••• Riyals/m8nth. 
0.14: (a) Do you receive from your employer any sort of allowances that 
you haven't included in 0.13 above, in the form ot for example, free 
housing or rental allowances, transport, holiday ticket, etc.? 
DYes 
o No 
(b) If yes, about how much would their value amount to per month 
approximately? •••••••• Riyals/month. 
Savings abroad: 
0.15: Since you migrated abroad, have you been able to accumulate any 
savings or reserve funds? 
DYes 
o No 
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IF YES (a) Have you been able to save 
o regularly 
o occasionally 
(b) How much of your monthly income do you think 
you save? Do you think you save 
[Jless than 1/10 of your income 
o 1/5 
o 1/3 
o 3/4 
0.16: What do you intend to do with yaur savings? 
(Please give as much information as possible) 
Remittances 
0.17: 00 you send any money home? 
IF YES 
DYes 
DNa 
(a) How frequent do you send money home? 
o 1/10 
0 1/ 4 
0 1/2 
o mora tha n :¥4 
[]monthly (how much per month approx.) •••••• Riyals 
o occasionally 
(b) If occasionally (i) How many times a year approximately? •••••• times 
(ii) How much each time approximately? ........ Riyals 
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IF NO Why you do not send any money home? Because 
[] your income is not enough and there is nothing left 
CJ you have no person in Sudan to send money to 
[] exchange control problems 
[J you have no job at present and no income 
[] other reasons (specify) 
Q.18: How do you usually send money home? (Please tick one or more of the 
following) 
[] through the banks 
o with people going home 
[Jpay in Saudi Arabia and receive the equivalent 
in the Sudan 
[Jkeep in form of foreign exchange and take home later 
c:Jother way(s) (specify) 
Q.19: Do you send any remittances in kind (not money cash) home? 
[JYES (how much per month approx.) •••••• Riyals 
o NO 
Q.20: How much your monthly income in the Sudan was? 
•••••••• pounds/mo~th 
Q.21: (a) Do you own a house or a piece of land for a house in the Sudan? 
o YES where? ••••••••• 
o NO 
(b) If YES, did you own this house/land before or after migrating 
abroad 
o Before 
DAfter 
(c) How did you own this house/land? 
o Government land distribution 
o Emigrants housing scheme 
o Buying 
[Jother ways (specify) 
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0.22: How long do you intend to stay in Saudi Arabia? 
•••• years 
0~23: (a) Do you intend to go back to The Sudan finally? 
DYES 
o NO 
(b) IF YES (i.e. you intend to go back to The Sudan) do you intend to 
CJgo back to your previous Job 
[Jlook for another paid job 
[Jhave your own business (what type?) ••••• 
[Jdon't know yet 
(c) Where do you intend to settle when you go back home? 
o in Khartoum 
o other large towns 
o rural areas 
[Jdontt know yet 
0.24: How did you first enter this country? 
o wi th a work contract 
o came for a visit (Hajj or Om r-a ) and stayed 
o through other countries 
o other ways (specify) 
Q.25: If you have entered this country with a work contract, how did you 
obtain this work contract? From 
[] Labour Office in The Sudan 
[] Employment missions to The Sudan 
o Private Employment ,~gencies 
[JRelatives and friends 
o Official secondment 
o Other ways (specify) 
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Q.26: Why did you migrate from The Sudan? Could you state for each 
of the following reasons, whether was very important, less important, 
or not important as a reason for your migration from The Sudan. 
Motive Very Less Not important important important 
(1) High earnings in Saudi Arabia 
(2) No job available in The Sudan 
(3) Low income in The Sudan 
( 4) Migration to make savings 
(5) No suitable job in The Sudan 
(6) Other reasons 
Thank you for your cooperation 
A: BOOKS 
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